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PREFACE1
On April 7, 2009, the Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme
Court handed down a historic unanimous judgment convicting
former dictator Alberto Fujimori on four charges of human rights
violations: the multiple murders of La Cantuta and Barrios Altos, and
the kidnappings of Samuel Dyer and journalist Gustavo Gorriti.
The Court, which conducted proceedings that were exemplary in
their meticulousness and impartiality, held that the crimes committed
by Fujimori were proven “beyond all reasonable doubt,” and
therefore convicted him as an autor mediato [indirect perpetrator or
perpetrator by means] within the framework of an organized
apparatus of power. The Court also found that the cases of Barrios
Altos and La Cantuta were crimes against humanity.
The judgment establishes clearly the decade-long criminal
relationship between Fujimori and Vladimiro Montesinos, and
Fujimori’s relationship with the high commanders of the Armed
Forces as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of
State, which facilitated the implementation of a systematic policy of
human rights violations that included at least 50 other documented
cases perpetrated by the Colina group.
One enormously important aspect of this judgment is that it
vindicates the dignity of the victims of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta,
as it was recognized officially for the first time in that they did not
belong to a terrorist organization and, therefore, were not terrorists.
For all of this, the Court has sentenced Fujimori to 25 years in
prison. It is our opinion that this is a fair sentence, consistent with the
law and proportional to the aberrant nature of the crimes perpetrated.
Before the eyes of the world, Peru has rendered justice on behalf
of the victims who clamored for it without being heard for 17 years.
This event represents a milestone in the struggle for justice and
respect for human dignity.
The conviction of the former dictator sets a historic precedent with
regard to crimes against humanity perpetrated from the highest

1. Ronald Gamarra Herrera, Address at the Press Conference Announcing
Judgment Convicting Former President Alberto Fujimori Fujimori (Apr. 7, 2009).
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spheres of power, which are most often met with impunity. The
relatives of the victims and the human rights organizations commend
the Court’s decision to set an example in its punishment of Fujimori,
who committed crimes in complicity with Vladimiro Montesinos in
this and in many other cases of human rights violations, as well as in
multimillion-dollar crimes involving corruption and the theft of State
resources that are still pending judgment.
The National Coordinator of Human Rights underscores the
integrity of the Justices who sat on the Special Criminal Court.
Throughout the trial they demonstrated impartiality, transparency
and objectivity, ensuring fairness and due process in the case, in
which Fujimori enjoyed the greatest latitude and guarantees to assert
his defense.
This case sets a historic precedent that vindicates the Peruvian
Judiciary due to the moral reserve embodied by few judges such as
those who made up the Special Criminal Court. The same can be said
for the representatives of the Office of the Attorney General.
We hope that this historic judgment will serve as an example for
other cases of human rights violations that are currently pending. In
the interest of the truth and justice to which the victims, their
relatives and all of society are entitled, such violations must not be
met with impunity.
This year, 2009, will be remembered as the year in which justice
was served upon a former president who symbolizes much of the
worst that our society has been capable of expressing in recent
decades. Let us not rejoice in the conviction of a man and the sorrow
of his family. Let us rather take comfort in what it represents in terms
of the message of equality before the law, of consolation for the
thousands of victims he created without remorse, and of legitimacy
for our democracy that is so fragile, and which he set out to destroy.
On this day, I want to pay homage to the perseverance and
courage of the relatives of the victims of Barrios Altos and La
Cantuta, who never gave up and were not intimidated in the face of
corrupt and homicidal power, and who persisted until justice was
served. This well-deserved triumph is theirs. To them, to these
mothers and sisters, belongs this vindication that justice has
delivered today with regard to their loved ones, murdered by the
person who has been found guilty and sentenced today. To you,
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mothers of La Cantuta and Barrios Altos, and on your behalf, to all
of the relatives of the victims of all of the cases of human rights
violations that cry out for justice in our country, our deepest
embrace.
Ronald Gamarra Herrera
Executive Secretary
National Coordinator of Human Rights
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INTRODUCTION2
As part of its legal dissemination and promotion activities
surrounding the trial and the judgment in the Fujimori case, the
National Coordinator of Human Rights presents to the legal
community in particular, and to the public in general, a selection of
paragraphs from the judgment handed down last April 7, 2009 by the
Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, which sentenced
former president Alberto Fujimori Fujimori to 25 years in prison
(hereinafter “judgment”).3 The selection, it should be noted, has been
made bearing in mind the objective public for which this publication
is intended, that is to say, legal practitioners: judges, prosecutors,
attorneys and law students, among others. Given the undeniable
value of the legal contributions of the judgment, we think it is
extremely important for it to be disseminated promptly with a view
to the effective litigation of cases involving serious human rights
violations. This will enable national legal practitioners to contribute,
from their respective occupations, to the strengthening of the Rule of
Law in Peru, based on their full understanding and subsequent
implementation of the different substantive and procedural legal
points developed in the judgment. Likewise, because of its use of
international and comparative law sources, the judgment
undoubtedly can be used as a point of reference in societies
undertaking similar processes to fight against impunity, not only
regionally but also worldwide.
This introduction makes reference to four points that, in our
opinion, are worth highlighting because of their practical application
in previous criminal cases—in the prosecution of state agents as well
as of members of the terrorist organization Shining Path—and in the
unquestionable practical effects they will have on future cases.

2. Introduction by Juan Pablo Pérez-León Acevedo, Legal Advisor to the
National Coordinator of Human Rights.
3. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases,
Case No. AV 19-2001, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special Criminal
Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru).
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1. EVIDENCE
The Court asserts that in a “free evidence” system like Peru’s, no
special or exclusive means of proof are required to prove a particular
fact; rather, the criteria that must be followed in the weighing of
evidence are materiality and relevance.4 Examining the different
categories of evidence, the Court arrives, inter alia, at the following
conclusions:
• Pretrial investigations may be accorded weight as evidence or
may form part of the weighing of the evidence.5
• The statement given by a witness in another, allegedly related,
criminal proceeding cannot be used if the person was not
offered as a witness in the current oral proceedings and no
irreparable reason for his absence has been proven (principle
of immediacy and confrontation).6
•
•

•

•

By its nature, witness testimony is reproducible at trial so that
it can be contested.7
Newspaper articles may be a sufficient means of proving and
verifying the alleged criminal conduct. In particular, the
existence of news items in the newspapers is evidence of the
public repercussion of a specific act or event. They reflect
incontrovertible facts or statements from public figures or
government employees, and have not been refuted or subject to
questioning. It is an objective news item, and therefore the
concept of the hearsay witness does not apply.8
The information or statements contained in a book are public
and voluntary and, at the same time, involve the expression of
some knowledge before society.9
Although the absence of uniformity in the totality of a
witness’s statements (including statements made by the

4. Id. ¶ 57.
5. Id. ¶ 65.
6. Id. ¶ 71. This differs from the case of statements made in Congress, which
are not recognized as evidence.
7. Id. ¶ 72.
8. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases,
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 73, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special
Criminal Session of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru).
9. Id. ¶ 74.
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accused or an expert witness) does not favor an initial opinion
of merit, it is absolutely possible for there to be a retraction or
change to one’s version of the events. In this case, the totality
of witness statements must be examined internally as well as in
relation to the other evidence in the case, to determine which
of the versions is the most consistent with the events. It is not
necessary for there to be effective confrontation at the time the
pretrial statement is given; only the opportunity for
confrontation is required.10
•

With respect to the book of transcriptions of the
“Vladivideos”: i) the subject matter does not fall within the
personal realm that is typically private or subject to express
legal protection, due to the fact that the statements were not
made under duress and the issues discussed were of public
importance; ii) because they are written transcripts of
conversations contained in audio recordings or videos, they are
copies. This does not prevent them from being examined as
documents, as they reflect the idea set forth in an original
document—the audio recordings or videos.11

•

The statements of Vladimiro Montesinos made before other
authorities (congressional, prosecution and judicial) can be
used and are fully admissible, on the exceptional and
irreparable grounds arising from Montesinos’s refusal to
testify in spite of having been summonsed and made to appear
at the hearing.12
The Record of Congressional Debates is the source of the
evidence that, at the same time, contains specific information
that was provided by a specific person. These records are
instruments that contain statements, and are viewed as such.13
Army Manual ME 38-20 existed and was implemented, having
been officially approved, and therefore, was the official Army
doctrine.14 Manual ME 38-23, in turn, described the mission of

•

•

10. Id. ¶ 75.
11. Id. ¶ 77.
12. Id. ¶ 83.
13. Id. ¶ 84.
14. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases,
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 88, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special

670

•

•

•

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:657

the countersubversion teams.15 Manual ME 41-7,
“Unconventional Countersubversive War,” outlines a rigorous
doctrine to confront armed subversion, in which part of the
strategy aims to eliminate the leaders of the armed insurgent
organization, and relaxes and softens the mechanisms of
control with respect to international humanitarian law,
constitutional government and human rights.16
The law does not prohibit in general the submission or use of
documents in ongoing proceedings prior to the conclusion of
the original proceeding in which they were initially offered.17
The existence of the so-called Plan Cipango, which led to the
formation of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment, was
proven.18
The speech of Army General Hermoza Ríos highlights the
qualities of the Colina group when it had already committed
various crimes, which demonstrates actual and institutional
support.19

•

The declassified documents from the U.S. Department of State
are admissible as evidence in a limited or referential sense.20

•

The Court acknowledges the intrinsic value of the decisions of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights [IACtHR] in
general, and of the judgments in the Barrios Altos and La
Cantuta cases in particular. Without prejudice to the facts
proven,21 it specifies that the relevance of those facts in terms

Criminal Session of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru).
15. Id. ¶ 91.
16. Id. ¶ 114.
17. Id. ¶ 95.
18. Id. ¶ 96.
19. Id. ¶ 98.
20. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases,
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 102, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru).
21. Basically: i) the existence of the Colina group; ii) that the serious acts
committed by this group fall within the framework of systematic repression, to
which certain sectors of the population were subjected with the full knowledge of,
and even orders from, the highest-ranking leaders of the Armed Forces, the
intelligence services and the Executive Branch and; iii) that the crimes committed
could not have been committed without the knowledge of, and superior orders
from, the highest levels of the Executive Branch, including the President of the
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of the criminal law, the application and interpretation of the
relevant criminal provisions and, if appropriate, the
determination of the sentence, are the exclusive jurisdiction of
the criminal court. It further adds that the criminal court is
where the evidence necessary for a conclusive ruling as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused will be examined.22
•

The same reasoning should be applied with regard to the
judgments of the Constitutional Court handed down in the
respective amparo [appeal for relief under the Constitution for
a case of violation of civil rights] or habeas corpus cases.23

•

The probative value of the Final Report of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission [TRC] lies in the so-called
contextual facts, referring to the existence of numerous forced
disappearances and arbitrary executions attributed to State
agents, as part of a widespread and systematic practice.24

•

The reports from the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and Amnesty International convey the human rights
situation in a country.25

•

There is no reason to exclude the effective cooperation
judgments from the body of the evidence. The position of the
arrepentidos [cooperating witnesses under the Repentance
Act] with respect to their prior statements goes to the weight of
the witness testimony, not of the legality of hearing it.26 With
respect to documentary evidence, it must be recalled that the
IACtHR has established that although items published in the
print media are not documentary evidence per se,27 newspaper
articles may be important if they corroborate other evidence or
confirm the public nature and general knowledge of the

Republic. See id. ¶ 105.
22. Id. ¶ 106.
23. Id. ¶ 107.
24. Id. ¶ 123.
25. Id. ¶ 131.
26. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases,
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 142, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru).
27. Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras Case, Merits, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 146 (July 29, 1988).
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pertinent facts.28 In addition, the IACtHR has established that
some journalistic articles have probative value when they print
the text of public statements made by high-ranking
government employees or when they corroborate testimony.29
In cases of forced disappearances, the IACtHR has granted
special relevance to circumstantial evidence (for example,
police reports)30 and presumptions.31 Due to the fact that, by
nature, forced disappearances seek to erase all traces of
evidence, the IACtHR has held that it is possible to conclude
that a person has disappeared if the plaintiff: i) demonstrates
the existence of an official practice of disappearances, or at
least the State’s tolerance of such a practice; and ii) establishes
a link between the specific disappearance and the State
practice.32 Turning to the text of the ICC Statute,33 we find that
it establishes that the ICC shall determine the relevance or
admissibility of any evidence considering, inter alia,34 the
following: i) its probative value, ii) its relevance to the case;35
and iii) any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair
trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness. The
foregoing is covered in greater detail in the ICC’s Rules of
Procedure and Evidence36 and, essentially, also reflects the
practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former

28. Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, ¶
70 (Feb. 6, 2001).
29. Velásquez-Rodríguez, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 146.
30. Blake v. Guatemala Case, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 36, ¶ 49
(Jan. 24, 1998).
31. “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala Case, 1999 InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 63 (Nov. 19, 1999).
32. Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4, ¶ 125 (July 29, 1988).
33. Adopted by Legislative Resolution No. 27517 of September 16, 2001,
which adopts the ICC Statute. The Rome Statute of the ICC was ratified pursuant
to Article One of One of Supreme Decree No. 079-2001-RE, published on 10-092001. The ICC Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002.
34. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 69(3), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
35. Id. art. 69(4).
36. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, ICC-ASP/1/3, rules 63-75
[hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure].

2010]

JUDGMENT AGAINST FUJIMORI

673

Yugoslavia and Rwanda37 and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.38

2. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, MURDER, GRIEVOUS BODILY
HARM, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: BARRIOS ALTOS AND LA
CANTUTA
It should be specified that, because of the date of the events at
issue in the case and the still nascent state of the adaptation of our
domestic laws to the different international instruments that define
acts classified as crimes against humanity when committed in a
widespread or systematic manner, the Court determines the
defendant’s individual criminal responsibility based on the crimes
defined in our code. It thus abides by an unconditional observance of
the principle of legality. With respect to kidnapping, the Court finds
that the offense of aggravated kidnapping, with the aggravating
circumstance of cruel treatment, has been committed against Gustavo
Gorriti and Samuel Dyer.39
The Court additionally finds, consistent with the execution of the
act and the motives for the deaths that occurred at the tenement
house in Barrios Altos (Barrios Altos Case) and on Avenida Ramiro
Prialé (La Cantuta Case), that: i) the commission of the crime was
prepared in advance, which assumes the existence of a preconceived
plan, at least in the guidelines for its execution; ii) for that purpose, a
special intelligence detachment was formed, whose missions
included killing those it believed to be linked to the political or
military apparatus of the terrorist organization “Shining Path.” The
Court adds that the individuals who carried out these acts did so with
complete coldness and determination, with the understanding that
37. With respect to requirements and examples of relevant evidence and the
exclusion of evidence, see Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR
95-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 129 (June 1, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-9516-T, Decision on Evidence of the Good Character of the Accused and the
Defence of Tu Quoque (Feb 17, 1999); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36T, Decision on the Defence of “Objection to Intercept Evidence”, ¶ 53 (Oct. 3,
2003).
38. With respect to the production of evidence based on the action of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leona, see Prosecutor v. Norman, Case
No. SCSL-04-14-AR73, Decision on Appeal Against “Decision on Prosecution's
Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence”, ¶ 26 (May 16, 2005).
39. Judgment, ¶¶ 678 et seq., 823.
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they were taking part in a military operation to eliminate members of
the Shining Path, which resulted in 25 deaths between the two cases.
The above was confirmed by their advantageous use of special
circumstances of time and place, the unexpected nature of the attack
and the defenseless state of the victims. Therefore, the accused was
convicted of the offense of aggravated murder, the aggravating
circumstance being malice aforethought.40 In the case of the four
victims of the offense of bodily harm, the Court considered the
aggravated definition, given the establishment of: i) the basis of
“imminent danger to the life of the victim” or ii) the basis of
“injuries that cause permanent disability.” Added to this is the
subjective element, in this case the animus vulnerandi or laedendi to
cause the serious injury to the victim.41
With respect to the classification of the crimes of murder and
grievous bodily harm as crimes against humanity, due to the context
in which they were committed, the Court begins by making reference
to the different international legal instruments in which crimes
against humanity are defined, including the ICC Statute.42 It is well
established that crimes against humanity go beyond the scope of
conventions (treaties) or written texts, as their commission is also
prohibited by customary norms; however, the Court, as previously
indicated, recognizes that the definition of the offense from the ICC
has still not been incorporated into our laws, and therefore the
principle of legality is respected unconditionally.43
The definition the Court provides, based on the respective
customary rule, is consistent with Article 7 of the ICC Statute in
stating that the attacks must take place during the course of a
widespread (number of victims or scale of the attack) or systematic
40. Id. ¶¶ 700, 823.
41. Id. ¶¶ 702-09.
42. The following are among those mentioned: i) Charter of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg art. 6.c, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S.
279; ii) Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5, Jan.
19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589; iii) Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) (May 25,
1993); and iv) Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3,
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 6, 1994).
43. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases,
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 711, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru).
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(existence of a policy or preconceived plan) attack against the
civilian population (objective element), and that the agent or actual
perpetrator must have knowledge of the broad and general context in
which the acts take place; that is, that such conduct is part of an
attack with the specified characteristics (subjective element).44 Such
elements have been developed extensively in the case law of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia45 and
Rwanda46 and by the ICC itself in the affirmation of the charges in
the case of Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui47 as well as in the recent
arrest warrant against Sudanese President Al Bashir.48
Next, the Court notes that the term murder, as it is phrased in the
Statute and as recognized in the case law of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“kill or cause death”),49 is not the
same as Article 108 of the Peruvian Criminal Code, which sets forth
the elements of the offense of murder.50 Finally, the Court does not
44. Id. ¶¶ 714-16.
45. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment, ¶ 206 (Mar. 3, 2000)
(regarding widespread nature); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T,
Judgment, ¶ 35 (Nov. 29, 2002) (regarding systematic nature); Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 659 (May 7, 1997) (regarding knowledge).
46. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Sep. 2,
1998) (regarding widespread nature); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 123 (May 21, 1999) (regarding systematic nature); Prosecutor
v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, ¶ 71 (Dec. 6, 1999) (regarding
knowledge).
47. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 389-402 (Sep. 30,
2008).
48. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, ¶¶ 81-89 (Mar. 4, 2009). Available (in English) at: http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf [last visited May 25, 2009].
49. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 598.
50. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases,
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 713, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru). Although the Court
does not make reference to the text of the Elements of Crimes set forth in the ICC
Statute, the Court’s conclusion essentially goes in the same direction, insoafar as
the text states: “That the perpetrator has killed one or more persons, including
through the imposition of conditions of existence aimed deliberately at causing the
destruction of part of the population,” and it further specifies in a footnote that the
phrase “killed” is interchangeable with the phrase “caused death.” Elements of
Crimes, Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 7(1)(b); Crime against humanity of
extermination and footnote No. 8, respectively, available at http://www.icc-
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address the issue of whether grievous bodily harm can, based on the
conditions under which it was inflicted, be categorized as a crime
against humanity. It is our opinion that such classification is possible
within the residual category of conduct involving inhumane acts,
included in Article 7(1)(k) of the ICC Statute (which does not
include expressly the act of causing bodily harm) based on the
content of that international instrument itself, as well as on relevant
international case law, provided that it is proven that the offense was
committed with the intent to inflict serious physical or mental injury
to the victim. Basically, the (failed) intent to kill cannot be
transformed into intent to cause serious physical or mental injury.51

3. PERPETRATION BY MEANS OF CONTROL OVER AN ORGANIZED
APPARATUS OF POWER
The Court begins with a general reference to autoría mediata
[perpetration by means or indirect perpetration], identifying three
types: i) control by error (control over the action of the person who
executes the crime by means of deception); ii) control by coercion
(control over the action of the person who executes the crime by
means of threat or intimidation); and iii) perpetration by means of
control over an organized apparatus of power.52 It then refers to
Article 23 of the Criminal Code of Peru, which addresses
perpetration by means in the following language: “Any person who
carries out the punishable act, by himself or through another, and
those who commit it jointly. . . “53 Given the facts and context of the
case, the Court examines in detail the context that gave rise to the
doctrine of perpetration by means of control over organized
apparatuses of power, developed originally by German jurist Claus

cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/15157C68-85AE-4226-B41AC6F6E6E21026/0/Element_of_Crimes_Spanish.pdf (last visited May 18, 2009).
51. Id. art. 7. […] (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
(emphasis added). The phrasing of the text of the Elements of Crimes of the ICC
Statute is identical. Pro Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, ¶¶ 463-65, available at (in
English) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf (last visited May 25,
2009). Decision based on: Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2A, Judgment, ¶ 117 (Dec. 17, 2004).
52. Barrios Altos, et. al., AV 19-2001, ¶¶ 718-22.
53. Id. ¶ 722.
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Roxin.54 The Court, along this line of reasoning, looked to
comparative jurisprudence55 as well as national case law. With regard
to the latter, the trial and appeal judgments in the case of Abimael
Guzmán are highlighted in particular.56 What follows is the detailed
analysis of the premises for the establishment of this type of
responsibility. Thus, the Court identifies as a general premise the
existence of the organization, which entails the assignment of roles,
and the development of an operational life of these power structures
that is independent of its members.57 Next, the Court lists and
explains extensively the objective elements/requirements58 and the
subjective elements/requirements.59 Two objective requirements are
cited: i) command authority, that is, the high-level strategic capacity,
of the “person in the background,” to give orders or assign roles to
the part of the organization subordinate to him [two levels are
identified: formal orders common in state organizations, and orders
given for their actual effectiveness, common in organized
apparatuses of power designed from their inception to be totally
separate from the legal system]; and; ii) deviation from the law, that
is, the functioning of the apparatus as a whole outside the legal
system, producing unlawful effects as a unit that acts totally outside
the law. In the specific case of state criminality, the central authority
at the high strategic level of the State uses the structures of the state
apparatus for the commission of international crimes.
There are also two subjective requirements/elements that are
mentioned: i) fungibility, that is, that the physical perpetrator can be
substituted or exchanged by the superior to execute the crime. This
feature has been explained graphically by Roxin through the
changeable or substitutable wheel or cog (immediate or direct
perpetrator) in the power machine (apparatus of power) and; ii) the
54. Theory originally developed in 1963.
55. Reference to the Eichmann and Staschynski cases, the conviction of the
Military Juntas of Argentina and case law from the German Supreme Court.
56. Respectively: Guzmán Case, Case No. 560-2003, National Criminal Court,
Oct. 13, 2006 (Peru); Guzmán Case, Case No. 560-2003, Second Temporary
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, Dec. 14, 2007 (Peru).
57. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases,
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 726, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru).
58. Id. ¶¶ 729-36.
59. Id. ¶¶ 737-40.
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predisposition to carry out the unlawful act, which refers to a
psychological predisposition of the direct perpetrator with respect to
carrying out the order that entails the commission of the crime. In
this context, commission of the unlawful act is ensured by the
internalized interest and the conviction of the direct perpetrator that
such act take must place. Finally, the Court ends this part by
addressing the treatment of perpetration by means and superior
responsibility in international criminal law, correctly differentiating
between the former, which is a by commission (orders), and the
latter, which is by omission—that is, when the superior fails to
comply with his duty to prevent, monitor and punish all crimes that
are committed, or may be committed, by his subordinates.60
In applying the above conceptual framework to the specific case at
hand, the Court establishes that the defendant, in his status as holder
of the highest position of the State, of the National Defense System
in particular, and as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,
abused his position of authority by creating an organized apparatus
of power based on the SINA’s central and derivative units, which
included the commission of the offenses of murder and grievous
bodily harm in Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, in the context of the
fight against subversion. Those crimes, in addition to the unlawful
acts conducted in the basement of the SIE, were carried out by the
COLINA group, which was hierarchically subordinate to the
organized apparatus of power under the control and will of the
defendant. Such situation, based also on similar experiences within
Latin America, has been described appropriately by the Court as
“Dirty War,” a concept that is related to the term “Criminal State.”61
Finally, as an additional remark, the Court’s legal analysis is not
only consistent with judgments from other national courts and the
prevailing criminal law doctrine but also with recent decisions of the
60. The mode of superior responsibility (by omission) is contained expressly in
the Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 42, art. 7.3, the Rwanda Statute, supra note 42,
art. 6(3) and Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 28.
61. The Court has held that the phrases “Criminal State” and “Dirty War”
carried out by state organizations can be considered quantitative modes of the
same type of action or modus operandi for carrying out acts such as forced
disappearances, extrajudicial executions and torture. In the former, the widespread
nature of the criminal acts spans different spheres of the State, whereas the latter is
predominated by the sector-based and selective activity of strategic bodies and
special operations. See Barrios Altos, et. al., AV 19-2001, ¶ 747.
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ICC. The Peruvian State is a party to the ICC Statute, and it is in the
process of being incorporated into our domestic law. Indeed, in
applying Article 25(3)(a),62 of the ICC Statute, which is essentially
similar to the content of our Criminal Code, the ICC recently issued
a decision ordering the arrest of the sitting President of Sudan, Al
Bashir, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that Omar Al Bashir has been the de jure and de facto
President of the State of Sudan and Commander-in-Chief of
the Sudanese Armed Forces from March 2003 to 14 July
2008, and that, in that position, he played an essential role in
coordinating, with other high-ranking Sudanese political and
military leaders, the design and implementation of the
abovementioned GoS counter-insurgency campaign;
CONSIDERING, further, that the Chamber finds, in the
alternative, that there are reasonable grounds to believe: (i)
that the role of Omar Al Bashir went beyond coordinating the
design and implementation of the common plan; (ii) that he
was in full control of all branches of the “apparatus” of the
State of Sudan, including the Sudanese Armed Forces and
their allied Janjaweed Militia, the Sudanese Police Force, the
NISS and the HAC; and (iii) that he used such control to
secure the implementation of the common plan . . . .63

62. Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 25. “Individual criminal responsibility.
[…] 3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
[…] (a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally
responsible;” [emphasis added].
63. ICC, Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of
Arrest issued, ¶¶ 7-8 (Mar. 4, 2009) available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc644487.pdf (last visited May 25, 2009). For more details,
see Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, ¶¶ 209-18 (Mar. 4, 2009). The above only confirms what the ICC had
already established in prior decisions. The Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges in the case of Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui is of particular
value in the analysis of what the ICC understood the objective elements of the
modality to be. Indeed, it is indicated first that:
496. A concept has developed in legal doctrine that acknowledges the
possibility that a person who acts through another may be individually
criminally responsible, regardless of whether the executor (the direct
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4. REPARATIONS
In this part, the Court basically seeks to answer the following
question: Is it proper to issue a judgment ordering the payment of
civil reparations ex delicto to the victims and relatives for the acts
perpetrated against them, when there is already an international
judgment that addresses that same issue?64
Upon establishing that the human rights violations affecting the
victims in the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases were evaluated by
the IACtHR from the logical perspective of international human
rights law,65 the Court indicated that, insofar as: i) the victims are
identical, and; ii) they pertain to a single event, having identified the
victims and their relatives as well as the specific reparations, it is not
possible for them to receive—in the Court’s opinion—a double or
additional compensation. The Court asserted that this would result in
the unjust enrichment of the victims or their successors,66 and
therefore a double payment for damages was impossible.67 Based on
perpetrator) is also responsible. This doctrine is based on the early works of
Claus Roxin and is identified by the term: “the perpetrator behind the
perpetrator” (Täter hinter dem Täter).
497. The underlying rationale of this model of criminal responsibility is that
the perpetrator behind the perpetrator is responsible because he controls the
will of the direct perpetrator. As such, in some scenarios it is possible for both
perpetrators to be criminally liable as principals: the direct perpetrator for his
fulfillment of the subjective and objective elements of the crime, and the
perpetrator behind the perpetrator for his control over the crime via his control
over the will of the direct perpetrator.
The paragraphs that follow (500-518) specify that the objective elements of
perpetration through another person are: i) Control over the organization; ii)
Organized and hierarchical apparatus of power; and iii) Execution of the crimes
secured by almost automatic compliance with the orders. See Prosecutor v.
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Sep. 30, 2008) available at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf (last visited May 25, 2009). On the
concept of perpetration by means in the context of macro-criminality, see also
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges, ¶ 332 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF (last visited May 25, 2009).
64. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases,
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 778, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru).
65. Id. ¶ 779.
66. Id. ¶ 780.
67. Id. ¶ 781.
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the case law of the IACtHR,68 the Court, in its best judgment,
rejected the prosecution’s argument whereby it asserted
that the IACtHR had not considered the facts, for purposes of
compensation, in their real aspect—that is, as grave violations of
human rights.69
The Court next examines other reparations claims that are nonpecuniary in nature. In doing so, it acts in accordance with the latest
developments on the issue of reparations in international law, in
which reparations are the broader category, and compensation is
merely one specific type. This has as a correlative, in addition to the
UN Principles and Directives70 and the relevant case law of the
IACtHR71 (cited by the civil party and included in the Judgment), the
express provisions of ICC Statute,72 which are beginning to be
68. Id. ¶ 780. The references are: Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v.
Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
134, ¶¶ 211, 214, 287 (Sep. 15, 2005); Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶¶ 210, 213
(Nov. 29, 2006).
69. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases,
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶¶ 782-86, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema
[Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru)..
70. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, at 789-791, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).
71. Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 87, ¶¶ 29, 33, 38 (Nov. 30, 2001); Case of La Cantuta v. Peru,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶¶ 204,
205, 213, 216 (Nov. 29, 2006). References made in Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and
Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 778, Sala
Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme
Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru)..
72. Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 34.
Reparations to victims. 1. The Court shall establish principles relating to
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation
and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon
request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the
scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims
and will state the principles on which it is acting. 2. The Court may make an
order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations
to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation. […].
Id. (emphasis added); see also, ICC Rules of Procedure, supra note 36, at 97(2).
Taking into account the scope and extent of any damage, loss or injury, the Court
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interpreted by the ICC itself.73 In resolving these non-pecuniary
claims, the Court ruled that the twenty-nine recognized victims in the
Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases did not have ties to the terrorist
acts of the Communist Party of Peru/Shining Path and were not
members of this criminal organization.74 The Court responds in this
part of its holding to the pertinent part of the prayer for relief filed by
the victims, who requested the issuance, as a measure of satisfaction,
of an official statement or court decision to restore the dignity,
reputation and rights of the victims, as well as of the individuals
close to them.75 Finally, the Court found that the payment of
compensation would entail necessarily what it called “double
compensation” by creating, in its opinion, a double payment. As a
general observation, we should not lose sight of the fact that in the
judgments of the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases the IACtHR
determined that the Peruvian State was responsible, and therefore, as
may award reparations on an individualized basis or, where it deems it appropriate,
on a collective basis or both.
2. At the request of victims or their legal representatives, or at the request of the
convicted person, or on its own motion, the Court may appoint appropriate experts
to assist it in determining the scope, extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in
respect of victims and to suggest various options concerning the appropriate types
and modalities of reparations. […]. (emphasis added), available at:
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1E0AC1C-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7B3E8B115E8
86/140167/Rules_of_procedure_and_Evidence_Spanish.pdf (last visited May 25,
2009).
73. We must take into account that the ICC is the first international criminal
court that recognizes the participation of victims as such and not merely as
witnesses, which was the practice of the international criminal courts that preceded
it. Among other decisions on the issue of the participation of victims in the
international criminal proceedings of the ICC, there are the following: Situation in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Situation No. ICC-01/04, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3,
VPRS4, VPRS5 and VPRS6 (Jan. 17, 2006) available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc183441.PDF; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/0401/06, Decision on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defense of the Decision
of the Trial Chamber I on the Victims’ Participation (Jan. 18, 2008) available at
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc409168.PDF (Last visited May 25, 2009);
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Indirect Victims
(Apr. 8, 2009) available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc662407.pdf (last
visited May 25, 2009).
74. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases,
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 827, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru).
75. Id. ¶ 789.
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part of the reparations it ordered the Peruvian State to pay the
respective compensation to the victims; on the other hand, in the case
of the judgment issued last April 7th, we are dealing with a decision
from a national criminal court that, had it included the compensation
order, would have ordered that it be paid by convicted defendant
Alberto Fujimori.
With regard to the Barrios Altos Case, the Court indicates based
on the information submitted that the compensation has been paid to
the victims. With respect to the La Cantuta Case, the Court stated
that although the payment of the money damages to the victims by
the State has not been verified, the Peruvian State—according to the
IACtHR’s Judgment—paid out three million soles between 1996 and
1998; it added that the military criminal court judgment regarding the
La Cantuta Case confirms the payment of the civil reparations.
Nevertheless, the Court does not examine the potential effects, in
terms of the reparations, of the fact that in one case (La Cantuta)
there is a conviction from a military court, whereas in the other case
(Barrios Altos) there is still no such judgment, as the respective
criminal case—concerning the members of the Colina Group—is
pending.76
However, what the Court understood as “unjust enrichment” is
what finally prevented it from granting a “double compensation or
payment” to the victims. In addition to the aforementioned
considerations of the differences (State responsibility before the
IACtHR versus criminal responsibility before the Court), the purpose
of the compensation in question must be specified. The case law of
the IACtHR, which the Court cites as one of its central grounds, does
not prohibit (at least not expressly) additional compensation in cases
of convictions in domestic criminal cases. What the case law of the
IACtHR has sought and understood fundamentally, according to the
notion of “unjust enrichment,” is for exorbitantly high amounts (for
example, millions of dollars to a single victim) not to be awarded; it
has also stressed that compensation (and in general) reparations are
not punitive in nature,77 and must be proportional to the human rights

76. Id. ¶ 777.
77. Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, Reparations and Costs, 1998
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 39, ¶ 43 (Aug. 27, 1998).
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violated.78 In light of the facts and amounts involved in the Barrios
Altos and La Cantuta Cases (especially in the first case), it would
seem that if defendant Fujimori had been ordered to pay
compensation to the victims, it would not have given rise to unjust
enrichment, which is what the Court ultimately intended to prevent.
This assertion would further find support in the judgment rendered in
the Castillo Páez Case and in the provisions of the ICC Statute.79

78. Case of the 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, ¶¶ 283-85 (July 5, 2004).
79. In the Castillo Páez Case, in which the IACtHR ordered the Peruvian State
to comply with the respective reparations (including the payment of
compensation), the First Temporary Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court
ordered the payment of compensation without making reference to any limitation
on “double compensation,” “double payment” or “unjust enrichment”. See,
respectively: Case of Castillo-Páez v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, 1998 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 43 (Nov. 27, 1998); Case of Castillo-Páez, R. N. No. 27792006, Supreme Court, First Temporary Criminal Chamber (Dec. 18, 2007) (Peru)
available at http://www.justiciaviva.org.pe/nuevos/2008/agosto/21/sentencia_cas
tillo_paez.pdf (last visited May 25, 2009). With respect to the ICC Statute (mainly
Article 75), we find that: i) there is no express or implied prohibition against the
payment of double reparations, and; ii) Article 75(6) establishes that: “Nothing in
this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims [including the
right to reparations] under national or international law.” Rome Statute, supra note
34, art. 75.

2010]

JUDGMENT AGAINST FUJIMORI

685

THE JUDGMENT AGAINST FUJIMORI FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: SELECTION OF
KEY PARAGRAPHS
PART ONE: FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Chapter I: Criminal Evidence
§1. Introduction
¶1. Statement of the Case. Facts alleged.
51. [. . .] The facts that would establish this secret and clandestine
strategy or method, of course, do not require that the evidence
produced be supported exclusively, under the requirement of
materiality of the evidence, by written regulations. These facts, by
their very nature, cannot be set forth or ordered through regulatory
documents, even in the denunciation of the creation and actions of an
organized apparatus of power inside the State itself, which carries
out clandestine and substantially criminal operations. The respective
orders and instructions, in the specific context of the case in
question—for acts such as forced disappearances, arbitrary or
extrajudicial executions, grievous bodily harm and kidnappings—are
not drawn up in laws, and it is certainly very unlikely that they would
be set out in writing or through another administrative mechanism
typical of the modus operandi of an administrative or governmental
entity. The decisions that involve human rights violations made
inside an organized apparatus of power, therefore, are not justified or
supported by regulatory instruments. It is precisely the clandestine
nature of the unlawful practice of an organization that rules out, for
obvious reasons, the possibility of verifying its existence and the acts
that it commits by means of regulatory instruments [. . .].
56. [. . .] The Office of the Public Prosecutor aims to prove the
existence of a policy—the strategy for implementing the dirty war.
Such policy would demonstrate the “political element” of the crimes
against humanity. [The Court indicates that such policy may be
proven in the following manner:] The existence of that “policy” can
be proven based on the finding of legal provisions, administrative
decisions or official directives, but they are not a necessary
requirement. Thus, for example, the European Court of Human
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Rights allows for such a practice or policy to be identified through (i)
an accumulation of identical or analogous violations, sufficiently
numerous and interconnected so as to be not mere isolated incidents
or exceptions, but rather a pattern or system; and (ii) the official
tolerance of State authorities. The latter is understood as the fact that
the superiors, in spite of having knowledge of the violations, refuse
to take measures to punish those responsible or to prevent the
repetition of the violations, or they express their indifference by
refusing to conduct an adequate investigation into the truth or
falsehood of the alleged abuses.80
57. In addition, the requirement should be noted (strictly speaking,
criteria that must be followed for the admission of evidence) of
materiality, in addition to pertinence, in a “free evidence” system
such as ours. Such a system establishes the free evaluation of
evidence, that is, freedom of choice and use of the different means of
proof. This means, as a rule, that no special or exclusive type of
evidence is required to prove a particular fact. The procedural
doctrine indicates that through materiality that the law makes it
possible to prove the fact under examination—or part of it—with a
specific piece of evidence. Therefore, it must be duly noted if there
are any prohibitions against evidence or if the law stipulates that a
particular fact must be proven with a specific means of proof. With
respect to the facts alleged, the thema decidendi, in accordance with
the preceding paragraphs, there is no procedural rule that precludes
the establishment of some point of those facts with a specific means
of proof. There are no exclusions, exceptions or limitations with
regard to the matter. Obviously, as noted by FLORIÁN, the evidence
must be lawful, appropriate and conclusive. As such, the evidence
offered in the case shall be examined and weighed pursuant to these
standards.
¶2. The charges and the principle of correlation
[. . .]
¶3. Proceedings with respect to legally admissible evidence.
65. In terms of the submission of facts to the case, a pretrial
investigation (even one conducted at the preliminary stage by the
80. Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5 (1978);
Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1192 (1996).

2010]

JUDGMENT AGAINST FUJIMORI

687

Police or the Office of the Public Prosecutor) may be accorded
weight as evidence, or it may form part of the weighing of the
evidence (a general prohibition is unacceptable) provided that, from
the internal perspective, it meets the legal requirements or formalities
of the venue where it is produced. The defendant’s opportunity to
challenge its production (specific requirements of confrontation),
bearing in mind the peculiarity of the evidence in question, is vital
(objective requirement). Furthermore, there must be some
circumstance derived from the notions of non-repeatability—or
fleetingness or unavailability—and urgency that make it impossible
to reproduce at trial (substantive requirement); that would be the
case, for example, of the irreparable absence of a witness or expert
witness. It must be noted, in this hypothetical of exception, that there
is a set of minimum guarantees in the acquisition of the source of the
evidence as well as in its conservation and in its submission at trial.
This is the procedural requirement, which is satisfied with the
reading of the record, or other equivalent means, under conditions
that allow the defense to raise any objections to those proceedings.
§2. Evidentiary issues.
[. . .]
¶1. Initial objections to the evidence raised by defendant
Fujimori Fujimori’s counsel.
[. . .]
¶2. Evidence offered by the Office of the Attorney General
71. STATEMENTS MADE IN OTHER CASES. [. . .]
4. In principle, there are no internal limits to the transfer of
evidence in the case of official expert opinions, reports and
documentary evidence. It is sufficient for it to be in the
source proceeding in order to be incorporated into the case
underway. The relevant provision states as follows: “Without
need for such grounds to be present. . .”
5. There are restricted grounds or specific limits for the
production of other evidence, including testimony—
statements from defendants and witnesses, confrontation
hearings, identifications, on-site inspections—and objective
and irreproducible proceedings. It is required that the transfer
be indispensable due to the fact that in the case receiving the
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evidence “. . .the production [of the evidence] is impossible
to obtain or difficult to reproduce due to the risk of loss of the
source of evidence or threat to a witness.” This assumes the
verification of a reasonable cause that prevents the production
of the evidence in the case receiving it. Such limit would be
based on the fact that a statement of a witness who failed to
appear at trial prevents the Court from hearing and seeing, in
accordance with the principle of immediacy, and the parties
from being able to make the pertinent challenges. Therefore,
the statement of a witness given in another criminal
proceeding—presumably a connected one—cannot be used
when that witness has not been offered in the current oral
proceedings, and grounds for his irreparable absence have not
been verified. As such, the inclusion of the previously
mentioned statements and declarations is denied.
72. PRETRIAL STATEMENTS MADE IN THE CASE [. . .]
Witness testimony is, by nature, reproducible at trial in order to be
subject to confrontation, and if it is not produced, even though it is
possible to do so, that statement taken during the investigative phase
of the proceedings cannot be used, unless by resorting to its reading
based on some serious absolute or preventive reason. They would
have to be reasons independent of the will of the parties and the
Court—legal or factual force majeure—that prevent the witness from
appearing at trial and entail the exhaustion of all legally provided
possibilities for the reproduction of testimony at trial. Along these
lines, the European Court of Human Rights recalled in the Case of
Isgró v. Italy (Judgment of February 19, 1991, paragraph thirty-four),
that: “The evidence normally must be presented before the defendant
at a public hearing, with a view to adversarial argument, but the use
of statements that go back to the preliminary investigation stage is
not inconsistent in and of itself with sections 3(d) and 1 of Article 6
[of the European Convention on Human Rights, a provision similar
to Article 8.2(f) of the American Convention on Human Rights],
without prejudice to the rights of the defense; as a general rule, they
require that the accused be granted a sufficient and adequate
opportunity to challenge the testimony against him and to examine
the witness, at the time of the statement or subsequently.”
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Consequently, the reading of the pretrial statements81 is
unacceptable if the witness was not requested to appear at trial, and
there is no reasonable and well-founded reason for his absence.
Therefore, the Court will not consider the evidence of the two
witness statements read.
The case of the statements of Army General Pérez Documet is
different. A request was made for the reading of his pretrial
statement in this case at page seven thousand seven hundred and
ninety of the record, of his statement to the police at page fifteen
thousand seventy five [given before the DIRCOTE], of his testimony
given before the First Special Court of Lima at page fifteen thousand
eighty-five, of his pretrial statement given before the Fifth Special
Criminal Court of Lima at page forty-one thousand six hundred and
seventy-one, and of his statement given before the TRC. As this
witness made use of his right to remain silent during the trial, bearing
in mind the charges for these same acts in related cases pending
before the Superior Court of Lima, it is proper to consider these
statements due to this exceptional situation.
Another situation that allows for the consideration of pretrial
statements is that of Army General Rojas García. He testified at trial,
and the questions also emphasized the answers he had given before
the investigating court [page nineteen thousand six hundred and
twelve]. As such, it is important to take cognizance of that statement
not only to measure the degree of credibility of his testimony at trial
but also in order to, in the case of inconsistencies, to be able to use it
in its place.
73. We turn now to the possibility that information gathered by the
communications media can be considered proven, insofar as it
reflects incontrovertible facts of general knowledge or the statements
of political organizations or public figures (or reports on the
experiences of different social actors, which usually involves a
specific perception of an external reality that is perceived and
transmitted by the journalist who participates in it) that have not been
81. The Office of the Public Prosecutor likewise offered the reading of the
pretrial statements given before the Investigating Judge by Orlando Enrique
Moncayo Peña and José Luis Bazán Adrianzén, and the preliminary victim’s
statement of Susana Higuchi Miyagawa. The defense has opposed their inclusion
(Publisher’s note).
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refuted or questioned in the case. Journalistic information operates,
then, as prima facie evidence that if it is not refuted and called into
question, comes to have full evidentiary effects. (The refutation or
questioning, obviously, must be serious and significant, one that is
merely procedural is not sufficient). It is clear that another point of
validity or, rather, of the validity of the information, is that it not be
an isolated news article. The bulk of the journalistic information
incorporated into the case reflects a general, informative content,
commonly accepted by the print media, and it refers to public events
or events of general political relevance. [. . .] It should be noted that
only content that is introduced objectively by the professional author
of the information can be admitted with full probative value; the
value judgments that may be brought into a news article are thus
excluded. In addition, strictly speaking, the defense has not
questioned the legitimacy or origin of the press clippings; rather, it
has questioned their sources. Consequently, journalistic articles can
be a suitable means to verify and prove the acts at issue in the trial;
in particular, the existence of a news item in the newspaper is proof
of the public repercussions of the specific fact or event.
[. . .]
In short, journalistic publications are admissible evidence that can
be weighed together with other evidence in a joint and
comprehensive manner; they are not witness testimony, and therefore
are not subject to the same treatment. As such, they can be weighed
outside the rules governing testimony, and the concept of hearsay
witness does not come into play because it is a matter of objective
news that, furthermore, is in the public domain. This is, of course,
provided that the two above-mentioned conditions are met: they
reflect incontrovertible facts or statements from public figures or
government employees, and they have not been refuted or called into
question.
74. BOOKS OF DIFFERENT WITNESSES. [. . .] Books, and
even interviews, contain spontaneous statements; they are not formal
interrogatories, and since, by their nature, they are not testimony,
they must not be subject to the same procedural rules. The
requirements demanded in the case of a statement cannot be imposed
upon them; nor can it be required that they be produced before the
judge or during the trial. The information or assertions contained in a
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book are public and voluntary and entail the expression of some
knowledge before society. They cannot be ignored based on the
understanding that they are not testimony, which does not mean that
their authors may be called to testify. In that case, there would be
two types of evidence: documentary and testimonial, which require
different procedures. In the case of the latter, on one hand, there
would be the documents, which include out-of-court statements
usually brought into the case through documentary evidence; on the
other hand, the authors would be examined at trial, which is a
different kind of evidence, although they would have to be examined
jointly and weighed together.
Once it is acknowledged that the book is a valid source of
information for the case, documentary evidence would consist of its
being read, nothing more. It is not necessary for it to be confirmed,
or for its author to be questioned about all of the events recounted in
it, or questioned with regard to their terms. A different issue is, of
course, the probative value—with respect to the information included
therein—that should be assigned to the book. Much will depend
upon its content and, later, on whether the information in it can be
confirmed or supported through other means of proof.
75. INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. [. . .] The statements of a
witness must be submitted to a serious credibility analysis, and if the
witness has made statements about the same facts in other venues, it
is appropriate to take them into account and assess them fully.
Undoubtedly, an absence of uniformity in the totality of a witness’s
statements, including those of a defendant or an expert witness, does
not contribute to an initial opinion of merit; nevertheless, it is
absolutely possible for there to be a retraction or change to one’s
version of the events. As such, in this case, in order to determine
which of the versions is most consistent with the events (which is an
issue of credibility, not legality, as an essential element in the
shaping of the court’s opinion on the basis of the facts argued) the
totality of witness statements must be examined internally as well as
in relation to the other evidence in the case. It is a requirement of
reasonableness in weighing the evidence, which is deepened when it
is appropriate to use the pretrial statement, given its lack of
immediacy and the hypothetical greater credibility of the statement
provided at trial. Therefore, it must rest on their objective similarity,
which requires corroboration by other peripheral circumstances or
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evidence. It is incumbent upon the Court to differentiate, verify and
interpret the terms and scope of the contradictions, weighing them
for evidentiary purposes according to its best judgment.
It is therefore feasible, with the due precautions, to confer greater
credibility upon one statement over another, including those given in
other venues and before the prosecution, police and congressional
authorities—as they are, strictly speaking, investigation
proceedings—over those given before the trial Court. This will
depend upon whether such statement is more coherent in terms of the
specific assertions it sets forth, the information it provides, the
presence of other peripheral circumstances or the presence of
external facts or indicia that give it sufficient objectivity (objective
credibility) to make reasonable its favorable assessment as opposed
to the other statement. It is without question, however, that the
witness’s contrasting statements must emerge during the course of
the trial or examination by any other means that guarantee the
defendant’s right of confrontation, and it is sufficient that the
questions and answers given at trial make express reference to such
pretrial statements, so long as the contradictions are made clear so
that a timely explanation may be given.
The fact that the defense attorney was not present during these
statements—those provided during the investigative phase itself as
well as those given in other proceedings—does not render them
excludable, as there is no lack of defense; a statement that is made
spontaneously is still of value and cannot be left out. Indeed, it does
not give rise to a lack of defense because the witness is examined at
trial even though his contradictions are not read and weighed. In fact,
the affiant’s acknowledgement during the trial that he made a prior
statement in such terms could be sufficient for these purposes. As
stated earlier, it is not necessary for there to be effective
confrontation at the time the pretrial statement is given; it is only
required that there be an opportunity for the defendant to challenge
it. It is clear that it is not always legally and physically possible to
meet the requirement of effective confrontation. As such, it is
sufficient to meet the legal and constitutional requirements of that
investigative proceeding. It is the subsequent opportunity for
confrontation at trial that fulfills the requirement of confrontation
and makes up for any observable deficit or omission during the
investigation phase of the proceedings. Meeting these confrontation
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requirements makes it is possible to examine the contradictory
statements and give credence to one witness statement or another to
provide the basis of the conviction.
77. BOOK PUBLISHED BY CONGRESS: TRANSCRIPTION
OF VIDEOS AND AUDIO RECORDINGS.
[. . .]
2. Even though the issue has not been raised, it is appropriate
to specify that the conversations in question, recorded by
order of one of the parties, do not violate the right to privacy
in communications or the right to individual privacy. Both
fundamental rights are contained autonomously in the
Constitution, in Article 2, numbers (10) and (7), respectively.
The right to privacy in communications is procedural in
nature [Final Judgment of May [14th, 2007], Motion for
Nullity No. 926–2006/ AV, Fourth FJ]. It protects speakers
from any form of interception or capture of the
communication by outside third parties, whether government
agents or private individuals. Its purpose is the confidentiality
of the communication process as well as the content of the
communication. However, the right to privacy in
communications is independent of the content of the
communication, which may or may not be private. In this
case, this fundamental right is not adversely affected, to the
extent that the recording was not made by order of one of the
participants in the communication process. If the
constitutional provision protects the communication and not
what is communicated, then no infringement has occurred if
one of the parties to the communication discloses the news,
unless, clearly, the information adversely affects the right to
privacy; there is no confidentiality when some event is
recounted or a remark is made to another party to the
communication.
The right to individual privacy, on the other hand, has a
substantive content or character. As such, the Constitutional
Court has held that the individual may carry out the acts he
deems in his interest in order to withdraw from others,
because it is an area exclusive of others in which he has the
right to prevent intrusions and where every invasion that
disturbs the individual right to secrecy, solitude or isolation is
prohibited in the interest of the free exercise of one’s
individuality outside of and prior to the social realm (STC
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No. 6712–2005–HC/TC, of October [17th, 2005]). This right
affects and protects specific expressions of private life and is
covered by a special protection by virtue of being related
directly to the dignity and development of one’s personality.
In the instant case, the recorded material does not fall within
this personal sphere that is inherent to privacy or subject to
express legal protection, not only because the parties to the
communication revealed their thoughts and points of view
voluntarily and without coercion, but also because the
conversations themselves are of public significance in terms
of the issues discussed. They were derived from the
government functions of at least one of the parties; his
personal or private life was not at stake, and the
communications were conducted on government premises, in
the office of a government employee. Furthermore, if the
communications involve criminal propositions or conduct
that could be a public action crime, there is no constitutional
right to secrecy.
3. The book, procedurally, is a document insofar as it is a
written medium or a representation that expresses a specific
reality that precedes the case and is independent of it; it is
submitted to the case essentially for evidentiary purposes.
Moreover, it is also a public document, as it comes from or
has been placed into circulation by State entities (in this case
the Congress), and it refers to or is derived from audio
recordings and videos that are in the institution’s archives.
4. Given that it is a compilation of written transcripts of
conversations contained in audio recordings or videos, it is a
copy (the original documents would be the actual audio
recordings or videos), which does not cause it to lose its
consideration as a document, since it reflects an idea
embodied in an original document (the audio recordings or
videos).
5. To the extent that what has been offered is, strictly
speaking, the book and not the audio recording or video, as it
is a written medium containing the transcript of a specific
conversation, the manner in which it is properly introduced is
by its reading. It is not by listening or viewing, which is
conceivable only in the case of the presentation of the
respective audio recordings or videos. Furthermore, the book
contains an out of court transcription of documents that are in
a government archive, and it was made by the proper
authority in accordance with the legally provided
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congressional procedure. A copy will be potentially
inadmissible only if one of the parties challenges its
authenticity, in which case it is appropriate to compare its
content to the original document.
6. The defense has not asserted that the content of the
document is false, or that it has been tampered with in regard
to the original source. It has only questioned the materiality
of the book to the extent that the audio recording or video
should have been produced, which—as stated previously—is
not procedurally acceptable. Given the origin of the book
under examination and the way in which it was put together,
it is impossible to deny it the character of valid evidence
relevant to the forming of the Court’s opinion.
[. . .]
81. On this basis, the probative value of the written documents
offered and, previously, of the CD offered by the Office of the Public
Prosecutor regarding what was forwarded by Congress, can be
diminished. It shall be analyzed, therefore, together with the witness
testimony, not in place of it. Merino Bartet has not only revealed
what he did as a SIN advisor, but he has also submitted
accompanying information that he copied from the computers of the
office of SIN advisers—information that he has subsequently
identified comprehensively in all of the other venues and
individually before Congress. The credibility of the witness may very
well rest exclusively on his oral testimony. Therefore, if the CD and
the written documents that were transcribed are also taken into
consideration by the Court in arriving at its decision, this method can
in no way be considered improper in conferring validity upon it or
characterizing it as sound evidence.
The identification made by Merino Bartet, author of the files—
and, by exclusion, of the ones from the Huertas Caballero file, since
files were copied only from two computers in the office that both of
them occupied—has been produced, and therefore they can be
considered proven; moreover, this identification has been made
within the context of his narrative of what he did as a SIN official.
The defense has been able to challenge them one by one, but there
are no grounds to reject them generally. The requirement of
individual identification, especially in a context involving a large
number of documents that came from electronic files, is not provided
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for by law. Some documents have been submitted in a computerized
format that their author has recognized as accurate, and, on having
been identified as such, the defense cannot challenge them
generically. There is no material defect in the identification made by
Merino Bartet and, therefore, the authenticity of those files cannot be
denied.
[. . .]
83. Is the use of statements that Montesinos Torres has given
before other government entities, namely congressional, prosecution
and judicial, precluded? The answer is no. Those statements are fully
admissible as evidence. The assertions they contain shall be
examined individually and with the totality of the evidence produced.
Those statements can be used because there is an exceptional and
irreparable cause derived from Montesinos Torres’s refusal to testify.
He was summonsed but invoked his right to remain silent. It is
obvious that when a co-defendant decides not to testify, in the
exercise of his right, that right is absolute; but once he does so in any
place, he is understood to have waived that right and, therefore, his
statement can be used. The refusal to testify, as is easily inferred,
leaves the parties’ attorneys without an opportunity for examination
and cross-examination. This conduct is not the fault of the State or
the Court, which has summonsed him, but of Montesinos Torres,
who refuses to testify. Therefore, the Court has met its obligation to
summon him to allow the defense the right to confront his statement;
the right existed and was granted, although the witness declined to
testify.
The value of Montesinos Torres’s statements, as that of all other
statements (from other witnesses) that properly may be considered,
inasmuch as they meet the previously specified requirements
(absolute impossibility or serious difficulty that reasonably prevents
the witness’s appearance at trial, that is, irreparable absences), is
clear through documentary, not testimonial, means; this is because
they are not witnesses, strictly speaking, in that they did not appear at
the hearing. However, they have done so—have made spontaneous
statements—in other cases, which is the same, for example, as
having done so in a book, since one is just as much an out of court
statement as the other.
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84. THE RECORD OF CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES [. . .] The
Record of Congressional Debates that was read contains, on one
hand, the presentation of the Ministers of Defense and the Interior,
Army Generals Malca and Briones, on the killings in Barrios Altos;
in addition, it includes the participation of the senators, in particular
the speech given by Senator Diez Canseco Cisneros, who discussed
the so-called “Ambulante” Plan of Operations. It also offered the
Record of Congressional Debates of the Democratic Constituent
Congress during the sessions that dealt with the congressional
debates for the enactment of Laws 26291, 26479 and 26492, the socalled Cantuta Law and Amnesty laws, which are fully admissible as
documentary evidence. Their capacity to be weighed as evidence
does not require the individuals who spoke before Congress to be
brought into the trial as witnesses. As previously specified, not every
statement made by an individual can be reduced to testimonial
evidence. In the case of the Record of Congressional Debates, that is
the source of the evidence, which in turn contains specific
information that was provided by a specific person, fully identified,
in compliance with congressional guidelines or practices. They are
instruments that contain statements, and are weighed as such.
[. . .]
86. It is not simply a question of a pretrial proceeding82 that, by its
very nature, is unrepeatable and unavailable; rather, it was conducted
by the Criminal Judge in the regular exercise of his investigative
authority, under seal, which was lifted after the proceedings were
conducted (as stated in the decisions at page sixty-three thousand
five hundred and eighty-four, of May [3rd, 2002], page sixty-three
thousand five hundred and sixty-three, of April [19th, 2002]), which
is permitted under Article 73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This confidentiality is justified by the need to guarantee the success
82. In relation to the proceeding (conducted by the Judge of the Fifth Special
Criminal Court) to exhibit documents from Army Headquarters–SIE and DINTE,
including documents such as communications referring to the transfer of personnel
from different Army offices, including the CCFFAA, to form the Colina
Detachment under the command of Army Commander Rodríguez Zabalbescoa;
documents which confirm the activities of personnel linked to the Colina
Detachment; Reports from the operative intelligence officer (including the
members of the Colina Detachment) and the return of materials (supplies,
engineering materials and war materiel) lent to the Colina Detachment.
(Publisher’s Note).
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of the investigation and prevents communications in the case that
might cause the individuals involved in the punishable act to flee,
and/or destroy or tamper with the sources of evidence.
The decision that ordered the exhibition of the evidence has a
minimal, but reasonable basis: it identifies the proceeding, specifies
the reasons for it to be carried out, and indicates that it must so
proceed in order to prevent it from being leaked—which would be
feasible if a request is made to the military institution itself. This last
argument is the one that essentially justifies the secrecy of the
investigation: the documents being sought are linked to the criminal
act of a military intelligence detachment that, as is public and wellknown, had officially been denied; further, they belonged to the
archives of an intelligence organization, which by its very nature
made secret court proceedings advisable. It is true that it is a
proceeding that comes from a different, but connected, case. Its
unrepeatable or unavailable nature justifies its use, in view of its
relevance and usefulness to this case. As such, it shall be weighed
under the rules of documentary evidence.
Finally, reiterating what has been underscored throughout this
Chapter, the presence of the accused’s defense attorney or the person
who may be adversely affected by the proceeding and its findings is
unacceptable in these types of urgent pretrial investigation
proceedings. Simultaneous confrontation of the evidence, due to its
very nature and the secrecy that such proceedings involve, was not
possible. The deferred or successive confrontation of the evidence
was possible insofar as all of the parties had knowledge of this
proceeding from the time this Court took the case from the lower
court; the defense knew about it even earlier, and therefore were able
to prepare the necessary defense in response.
[. . .]
88. [. . .] The Manual examined [Manual ME 38-20] contains at
least three points of interest:
1. On page eight, addressing “Basic Considerations,”
subsection d) states: “According to doctrine, intelligence
activities are designed to search for and obtain information,
or to deprive the enemy of it/(counterintelligence). However,
particular to the OEI considered in this manual, they can also
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be directed towards causing harm to the adversary (sabotage,
kidnappings, etc).”
2. On page ten, Section III “Special Intelligence Operations
and Special Counterintelligence Operations,” point 9) Special
Intelligence Operations, number (1) Espionage, states: “It is
the obtaining of secret information, through the use of spies
with a high level of technical training, by which classified
information is obtained for an organization, in violation of the
laws governing the area or country where it is going to be
conducted.”
3. On page thirty-five of Chapter Five, “Planning and
Preparation of a Special Intelligence Operation,” Section I,
General Comments, point forty-one, “Levels of Planning,”
subsection a), reads: “For the planning and execution of
special intelligence operations (OEI), the National
Intelligence Service (SIN) is considered to be the highest
level of planning and decision-making, as the head of the
Intelligence System; as the Central or Sponsoring Agency,
the Army Intelligence Directorate (DINTE) or its counterpart
in other institutions, and as the Executive Body, the Army
Intelligence Service (SIE) or its counterpart in other
institutions.” Subsection b) states: “Planning of the highest
level. At this level, the OEI are the result of needs the
government may have in order to meet its objectives;
likewise, those that may be a product of the needs of the TG
(CCFFAA) are considered to be of the highest level.” With
regard to the execution of the OEIs, point fifty-five,
subsection a) “the determination of objectives,” states: (1)
“Objectives may be imposed if it is a matter of providing
support to the TG in order to satisfy needs of the Operational
Force, or also may be imposed by the SIN in order to meet
the general needs of the National Intelligence System. The
Central Entity (DINTE) shall select its objectives in order to
meet the needs of the SIDE.”
90. [. . .] Although other high-ranking Army officials have not
acknowledged it, whether because they are outside the sphere of
military intelligence or because they did not use it during their
service [such is the case of the SIE chief in [1992], Army Colonel
Pinto Cárdenas; of Army General Luis Salazar Monroe—who stated
that he did not recall having read the Manual, only of having seen the
concepts; of Nicolás Hermoza Ríos; of José Valdivia Dueñas; of
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Salazar Monroe—who stated that he did not use this Manual during
his time as a SIN official in [1992]], it should be noted, according to
the statements of the directors of the DINTE, the Commander
General of COINDE, SIE Chief in [1991], and according to the
proceedings conducted for the production of evidence, that this
manual not only existed and was implemented; it was also officially
approved and, therefore, expressed the official doctrine of the Army
during that period—the same time during which the terrorist violence
had been unleashed and the terrorist organizations were being
confronted. Many of those who deny or diminish the importance of
its existence have criminal cases stemming from the exercise of their
duties. This allows for the rejection of their assessments,
strengthened all the more by the previously highlighted
documentation and presentations.
It is unacceptable in view of the above documentation, and the last
official letter, from the DIGEOPTE, mentions something unheard-of:
that an Army Manual, duly approved, registered and numbered, was
a mere draft that was meant to be confirmed—and even more so, that
such was the case for several years.
91. ME 38–23, the Basic Teams Manual, which addresses the
work procedures of the Basic Intelligence Teams, establishes at page
forty-one that the operational technique to be used is consistent with
that provided in the doctrine contained in Intelligence Operations
Manual ME 38–20. This further reinforces the validity and
implementation of this last Manual; it is impossible to maintain that a
document that has not been approved could be referred to expressly
in another Manual, or even a draft of it.
Point thirty-two, “Countersubversion Teams,” subsection a),
states: “Mission. Prevent, detect, locate, identify, neutralize and/or
eliminate persons, networks or organizations engaged in subversive
activities against military security.” Army General Rivero Lazo,
Director of the DINTE, in the thirty-ninth session, acknowledged the
existence and validity of the aforementioned Manual. He even noted
that he studied it in [1972], when he took a basic intelligence course.
The manual was republished several times, and he exhibited one
from [1999], which is the same as the one published in [1991]. Army
General Robles Espinoza based part of his presentation on this
Manual, to the point of specifying that the president’s
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congratulations for Army Captain Martin Rivas’s promotion enabled
the requirements of this Manual to be met, as it meant having a
higher rank to give orders.
[. . .]
Given these conditions, the veracity of the official letter from the
DIGEOPTE (No. 760/DIGEOPTE/V–3C/07.08 of August [11th,
2008]) is questionable. This letter reported that ME 38–23 was a
draft to be confirmed, which had not been approved by Army
General Pedro Villanueva Valdivia. ME 38–23, a copy of which was
submitted by the Office of the Public Prosecutor during the twelfth
session, had been identified by the highest ranking military
intelligence official. Therefore, beyond the fact that Army General
Villanueva Valdivia does not recognize or does not remember having
approved it, its existence, validity, and implementation are supported
by the evidence. The objection of the defense is overruled.
[. . .]
95. The documents submitted by Marcos Flores Alván in the
effective cooperation proceedings were also included in other
criminal proceedings before the first one ended. One of the essential
features of the effective cooperation proceedings is, precisely, the
verification of the accuracy of the information provided by the
applicant, based on which the judge will determine the admissibility
and scope of the reward benefit. However, the law does not prohibit
the offering or use of documents in general in open proceedings prior
to the end of the original proceedings in which they were initially
submitted. There may be many grounds or circumstances that
determine the advance use of this information—the law does not
impose any limitation—but at the same time it will be incumbent
upon the judge in the case where this information is introduced to
weigh it autonomously and give it the appropriate weight in relation
to the other evidence produced. The inclusion of this evidence,
furthermore, does not adversely affect the defendant’s right, nor does
it give rise to a lack of defense, since he has knowledge of it and is in
a position to see it and offer the appropriate defense. What is
presented before the court conducting the effective cooperation
proceedings, and the decisions that arise therefrom, in no way places
conditions on the presentation of evidence and the analysis and
decision that must be handed down in other cases; obviously, they
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must be weighed and reviewed, compared to and checked against the
particular evidence in those cases.
The documents submitted by Flores Alván must be examined
according to the account that he provided. Some of them—on which
defense counsel’s questioning is focused—are only written
expressions, made in advance, of what he saw and the specific
experiences he had, as well as transcripts of accounts or
circumstances, in the manner of recollections, appointments made by
a superior officer, or relevant events that occurred in the Detachment
to which he belonged. It is clear, for example, that the list of officers
is not, strictly speaking, a document—the fact that it was not
prepared in advance is well known—and that many of the documents
he presented do not meet many of the administrative requirements
imposed by the internal practices and directives of military
intelligence (stamps, signatures, the author’s signs of identification,
the receiving entity, etc.). However, the characteristics of the Colina
Detachment must be taken into account, starting with the typicallycriminal acts that it perpetrated—which would tend to relax the
inclusion of information that might “upset” the continuity of the
Detachment and the integrity of its members—which, for reasons
that will be seen, was the essence of its creation and operation. Its
value, therefore, cannot be ruled out in advance; rather, it must be
submitted to the respective analysis, and only to that extent can the
corresponding evidentiary significance be excluded, if appropriate.
96. “Plan Cipango” [. . .]
1. [. . .] According to its content, the chief of the operation is
Army General Rivero Lazo, the control officer will be Army
Lieutenant Colonel Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa, and the case
officers will be Army Captains Martin Rivas and Pichilingue
Guevara. The chief of the operation shall maintain constant
coordination with Commander General of the Army, the
Chief of the CCFFAA and the Chief of the SIN. The DINTE
shall be in charge of directing the operation, which shall be
under the direct command of the Commander General of the
Army, and shall coordinate its duties with the SIN command
group. In Part One, entitled “Situation,” it sets forth the need
to take active measures—including intelligence measures—to
protect the public from the advance of terrorist subversion.
Part Two, “Mission,” indicates that the DINTE will conduct a
systematic infiltration of intelligence officers in the city of
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Lima, Huaral and Huacho, with a view to detecting, locating
and identifying the members of the Central Committee and
National Leadership of the PCP–SL and the MRTA, in
support of the military and intelligence operations of the
Second Military Region, the CCFFA and the DINTE. Part
Three, “Execution,” specifies that the operation will have
three stages: selection and retraining of twenty-five
intelligence officers, infiltration of fifteen officers into area
companies to seek information, and analysis of appropriate
information in order to convert it into operational
intelligence.
The Part entitled “Appendices” lists five appendices:
personnel, weapons and munitions, equipment, funding, and
diagram of the zone. The provision of weapons and
ammunition (HK–P7 pistols, FAL and others), equipment
(cars and pickup trucks) and funding for operational and
administrative costs shall be the responsibility of the Office
of the Treasurer of the DINTE.
[. . .] 4. The changes observed among the three plans detailed
are not significant. Flores Alván himself has mentioned that
the document was subject to changes once the plans began to
take shape and be implemented. Particularly demonstrative is
official letter No. 5690/DINTE of August [30th, 1992] (page
[8,400]), in which Army General Juan Rivero Lazo addresses
the Commander General of the Thirty-first Infantry Brigade
of Huancayo, and states that with the approval of the Cipango
P/O the Commander General of the Army had ordered the
formation of a Special Team within the DINTE; that the
Cipango P/O is a classified document; that Petty Officer
Second Class military driver Vera Navarrete by virtue of both
decisions was transferred to the DINTE as of January, [1992].
Army General Rivero Lazo (thirty-ninth session)
acknowledged that he signed it, although he denied having
made any P/O Cipango or having knowledge of its content.
Army Colonel Silva Mendoza, Assistant Director of the
DINTE in [1992], acknowledged (in the thirty-second
session) the drafting of the aforementioned official letter—
based on the approval of the Cipango P/O and the existing
documentation at the DINTE—as well as of radio message
No. 260 B4.a02.37, of March [4th, 1992] (page 8,402]),
which requests the forwarding of wages for January and
February and other items pertaining to Vera Navarrete
because his placement in that unit had been canceled.
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5. Consequently, a Cipango P/O did exist, and based on it, the
Colina Special Intelligence Detachment was formed; of this
there is no doubt whatsoever. According to what wiretap
intelligence officer Flores Alván has stated, the above-cited
official letter and the identifications made by Army General
Rivero Lazo and Army Colonel Silva Mendoza are
conclusive with respect to the matter. This conclusion is
strengthened by the documentation obtained by the Judge of
the Fifth Special Criminal Court of Lima, which proves
incontrovertibly the creation of various documents for the
establishment and operation of this Detachment.
97. Marcos Flores Alván turned over to the Office of the Attorney
General twenty-six applications for retirement dated December
[15th, 1991]. The defense acknowledges that they are original
documents and that some members of the Colina Detachment signed
them, but they take issue with them because there is no evidence that
they were forwarded; there is no stamp and signature acknowledging
receipt. The essential matter, however, is the reality of these
retirement applications, which have been acknowledged by several
members of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment, and the
certain fact that it is a typical intelligence procedure—fictitious
separation from service—pertinent to the members of Special
Detachments who undertake specific OEIs whose disclosure could
give rise to institutional problems.
98. [. . .]
1. In this speech,83 the following is of note: (1) Conducting
the war against terrorist subversion requires political
decisiveness, which was the leadership that the politician had
to assume; and this meant assuming responsibility for leading
the war. (2) Now there is a legal framework and there is
political leadership. (3) In this war, which is political and
must be given political treatment, there is a visible part—the
visible troops, who work with the strategic objectives
established to win over the population and to confront armed
terrorists—and there is an invisible part, which is “you,” who
fulfill one of the strategic objectives of the pacification policy
in the military field. (4) The population is now being won
over because the intelligence community has been better
understood and better harmonized, as an Intelligence System
83. Speech of Army General Hermoza Ríos (Publisher’s Note).
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that does not seek premature results and is concerned that the
intelligence be timely and that it get to the right people
quickly. (5) You have great motivation, as Major Martin said,
you are anonymous, but you are motivated by what he talked
about, by pure patriotism. (6) Well, I congratulate you. We
are paying attention to everything that you do, and we are
here to support you in everything. You should not hesitate to
express your needs through your chief, Major Martín,
captain, the DINTE General, as it is our obligation to solve
your problems for all of you. [. . .]
4. It is clear, as Flores Alván acknowledges, that he recorded
the speech given by Army General Hermoza Ríos, and that
what he submitted was a transcript of it. That document is
part of his witness statement, and as such it must be weighed.
In addition, Army General Hermoza Ríos acknowledges that
the words he spoke are essentially those that appear in Flores
Alván’s transcript, and he has also explained its content. The
argument then, is framed in terms of the attendees of that
military meeting, whether it was held for the members of the
Colina Special Intelligence Detachment or for all of the
members of the SIE, and whether the activities of that
Detachment were authorized or supported in general terms.
5. The express mention of Martin Rivas is significant,
including when he is identified as chief of the group. That
reference demonstrates that the meeting was not for all of the
SIE personnel but rather for the Colina Detachment;
otherwise, he would not have singled out Martin Rivas, who,
given his rank, could not have been chief of all the
detachments or members of the SIE. In addition to the
foregoing, we have not only the reference made by Flores
Alván but also those of the rest of the members of the Colina
Detachment.
6. As far as the interpretation of the speech is concerned, it is
clear that he is not praising criminal acts expressly; nor does
he approve of a policy of dirty war mainly under the
responsibility of military intelligence. However, the act of
emphasizing the qualities of the group at a time when it had
already committed several crimes, only demonstrates a real
and institutional support—through his representations—of
the clearly criminal activities of a detachment that, as will be
seen in the following Chapters, was engaged basically in the
elimination of persons under the alibi of their links to
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terrorism. Accordingly, the objections of the defense are
overruled.
102. The documentary nature of the information84 under
examination is beyond debate. Its particularity lies in the fact that it
is written information that reveals a set of communications
exchanged between the Embassy of the United States in Peru and the
United States Department of State, access to which was possible—as
has been explained sufficiently by expert witness Katherine Doyle—
by virtue of an internal procedure under U.S. law, the legality and
admissibility of which is not in question under our own laws.
The communications in question contain not only intelligence
analysis, evaluations of the situation in the country with respect to
the events pertinent to this trial and the dates on which the public
inquiries and the investigations took place, which was covered
intensely by the national press; they also report on interviews or
information provided by various sources, some identified and others
not (mainly they mention their institutional location or position, in
order to assess the degree of reliability of the information). In other
cases, they report on meetings and direct conversations with the
Head of State and with other government officials, a succinct
account of which they set forth, and to which they add their own
assessments.
There is no doubt that such documents constitute evidence that
may be examined by the Court in determining the facts and resulting
liabilities. It should be taken into account, as an initial reference
point for its examination, that they were created by third parties—
United States government employees in the context of their
diplomatic duties—without further personal interest in the events
they summarized contemporaneous to their occurrence. They reflect
information provided—in several passages—by “intelligence
sources” that portrays the exchange of information on this activity.
Naturally, the reality of the facts and the perpetration imputed to
defendant Fujimori Fujimori cannot be based exclusively on those
documents; their mere mention and individual analysis will not allow
for them to be either rejected or considered proven. Consequently,
84. Declassified documents from the U.S. Department of State (Publisher’s
Note).
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the proper weight to be assigned to them is only referential, or rather,
limited, and they necessarily must be contrasted with the other
evidence presented in the case—as does the expert opinion report
written by expert witness Katherine Doyle. They can be used, in any
case, to corroborate the testimony and documentary evidence on the
record; but they have no probative value in and of themselves.
As previously stated, it is clearly unacceptable, in view of the
information contained in a document—insofar as it has been
provided by a specific person—to understand that person to be the
source of evidence and that, as such, to consider that the information
must be introduced into the case only through witness testimony. The
information is contained in the document; it is an expression that was
recorded in that out-of-court instrument. It is true that the individuals
referred to could have been summonsed to appear as witnesses (the
parties, all of them, decided not to do so) and examined at trial, but
in this case such examination would serve two purposes: as
testimony and as an attestation of the authenticity of the document,
that is, as a kind of document comparison.
Internally, the declassified documents establish (1) as an
independent piece of information (made clear by its very fact), the
concern of the United States government over the events and the
reports of human rights violations motivated by the fight against
terrorist subversion; and (2) as a telling piece of information (which
will be confirmed by the analysis to be conducted in due time), the
government line against a serious and transparent investigation to
find out who was involved in the crimes that had publicly come to
light. Likewise, it firmly establishes a very clear fact: the pressure
from the U.S. government, which demanded a consequence to such a
sensitive matter, beginning with the public announcements of the
Peruvian government on the implementation of a policy respectful of
human rights. It also establishes in particular the conversations that
the ambassador had with the defendant, conveying the concern of the
U.S. government. The latter reveals that defendant Fujimori
Fujimori, at a minimum—based on this demand from the U.S.—was
fully aware of the importance of the crimes of Barrios Altos and La
Cantuta, which went beyond the national sphere. It is impossible to
maintain that the defendant was unaware of the consequences of
what had happened, or that he put forth a determined effort to
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establish the facts and punish those responsible for the crimes
perpetrated; judging by what later occurred, he failed to do so.
The documents also demonstrate that the Government of the
United States already had intelligence information, with a certain
degree of solidity—so assessed by them—about the influence of
Montesinos Torres, his special advisory relationship with defendant
Fujimori Fujimori and the role he played in the Intelligence System.
They were also aware, through an unidentified intelligence source, of
the dual policies that Montesinos Torres sponsored: one public and
the other confidential, which included the special operations units of
the Army, trained in extrajudicial killings in the fight against
terrorism. The reality of this—in the case of the latter—is quite clear
in the actions and crimes of the Colina Special Intelligence
Detachment, as will be examined and established in other Chapters
of this judgment. Based on these considerations and the relative
weight assigned to them, the declassified documents are admitted as
documentary evidence.
105. It is important to differentiate the merit of a judgment of the
IACtHR as precedent, the jurisprudential lines it draws in
interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights and its
extension to national law.85 The relevant issues here are the actual
85. The judgment states the following in a footnote:
81. The Constitutional Court has held that treaties provide a framework for
the interpretation of the rights recognized in the Constitution, which means
that the concepts, scopes and spheres of protection enshrined in such treaties
establish parameters that should play a part, if appropriate, in the
interpretation of a constitutional right.
(STC 01124–2001–AA/TC, of July [11th, 2002], FJ 9). Likewise, beyond the
criterion of interpretation of fundamental rights in accordance with international
human rights law, it is understood that the latter concept is not restricted only to
international treaties on human rights to which the Peruvian State is party (IV Final
and Transition Provision of the Constitution) but rather that it also encompasses
the case law on those international instruments that may have been issued by the
human rights protection bodies (STC 04587– 2004–AA/TC, of November [29th,
2005], FJ 44). The IACtHR itself has stated that:
. . . [it] corresponds to a basic principle of the law on the international
responsibility of the State, which is supported by international case law;
according to this, a State must comply with its international treaty obligations
in good faith […] a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification [to escape its pre-established international responsibility].
Case of Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Competence, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 104, ¶ 61 (Nov. 28, 2003). Consequently, this Criminal Court must
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compliance with a specific judgment, which is of indisputable and
direct application domestically (enforceability),86 and the statement
of proven facts that an IACtHR judgment contains, and its general
effects beyond the decision itself. This is especially relevant if it
concerns a criminal case—that is, if the IACtHR’s judgment is
prejudicial with respect to a criminal case it addresses, as would be
the case of the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta judgments as they relate
to this criminal case. The discussion therefore focuses on the Barrios
Altos and La Cantuta judgments. The Velásquez Rodríguez
judgment provides, in any case, a framework for assessing
institutional mechanisms of forced disappearance, the concepts of
which, in pertinent part, will be valuable in organizing the
evidentiary guidelines in factually similar or comparable cases. The
IACtHR has made the following assertions, and clearly so in the La
Cantuta judgment, specifically in paragraphs 80.18, 81 and 96, in
which the following were stated as proven facts:
1) That diverse evidence caused the Colina Group, whose
members participated in the events of the instant case, to
become well-known to the public. Colina was a group related
to the SIN whose operations were known by the President of
the Republic and the Commander General of the Army. It had
a hierarchical structure and its personnel received, besides
their compensations as officers and non-commissioned
officers of the Army, money to cover their operating
expenses and personal monetary compensation in the form of
follow the interpretation of the IACtHR on human rights matters, noting especially
that the criminal matters are linked directly to the scope of human rights on which
there are existing judgments, [and to] the specific compliance with a particular
judgment of indisputable and direct application in our domestic system.
86. The judgment states the following in a footnote:
82. The establishment of the facts and the IACtHR’s legal determination with
regard to them within the scope of its jurisdiction, where it determines the
responsibility of the State, naturally cannot be misrepresented or ignored at
the national level, and must be respected—and enforced—by the domestic
courts. It is the so-called “direct effect” of the judgment of the IACtHR, by
virtue of which the States that have been a party to the case must obey and
comply with that judgment. Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras Case, 1988
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 28-29 (July 29, 1988). Consequently, its
binding nature is not limited only to the judgment; rather, it extends to the
conclusions of law that explain, justify and state the grounds for the measures
taken, as well as indicate the criteria that must be followed, the limits or scope
of the measures, or the proceedings necessary for compliance with the
judgment.
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bonuses. The Colina Group carried out a State policy
consisting of the identification, surveillance and elimination
of those persons suspected of belonging to insurgent groups
or who opposed to the government of former President
Alberto Fujimori. It operated through the implementation of
systematic indiscriminate extrajudicial executions, selective
killings, forced disappearances, and torture.
2) That those serious acts fall within the systematic
mechanism of repression to which certain sectors of the
population were subjected as they had been labeled as
subversive or somehow contrary or in opposition to the
Government, which was known to or even ordered by the
highest command of the armed forces, the intelligence
services and the then-governing Executive, by means of the
State’s regular security forces, the operation of the so-called
“Colina Group,” and a framework of impunity favoring these
violations.
3) That the planning and execution of the detention and
subsequent cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment,
extrajudicial execution, and forced disappearance of the
alleged victims, carried out in a coordinated and concealed
way by the members of military forces and the Colina Group,
could not have passed unnoticed by or occurred without the
superior orders of the Executive Branch and the military
forces and intelligence bodies at that time, especially the
chiefs of intelligence and the President of the Republic
himself.
106. The Peruvian State admitted the facts alleged in the case
brought by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, but
the IACtHR also found that the facts had been proven based on the
evidence on record in the case. The State’s admission was not
immediate—there were prior proceedings at the Court, and the
preliminary stage concluded before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights; rather, it came about after these events, once a
new government was established through the democratic procedures
provided for in the Constitution. The defense has even mentioned
specific evidence that was noted in the judgment of the IACtHR,
which in its opinion are blatantly insufficient; however, such
analysis is inadequate to diminish the merit of the international
decision, given that the IACtHR weighed the evidence and
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conducted a trial consistent with the principles of international
human rights law. Apart from that, there are no reasonable bases or
indicia to consider that the State’s acceptance was fraudulent.
Further, the fact that no decisions have been issued in the national
courts, at this time, finding that the facts at issue in the international
case have been proven, in no way places conditions on the State’s
capacity to admit the charges arising from the international
responsibility attributed to it; there is no national or international
provision or legal principle that prohibits it.
Nevertheless, beyond the intrinsic value of the decisions of the
IACtHR in general and of the judgments in the Barrios Altos and La
Cantuta cases in particular, it is notable that, without prejudice to the
facts proven, their relevance under the criminal law, the
implementation and interpretation of the pertinent criminal
provisions and, if appropriate, the determination of the sentence, are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Criminal Court. The IACtHR
does not determine the guilt or innocence of an individual—the
international court determines the international responsibility of the
State for a violation of treaty provision—and it is in the criminal
court where the evidence necessary for a final judgment on the guilt
or innocence of the defendant will be examined. Otherwise, the
evidentiary phase of the criminal trial would be unnecessary. The
attribution of international responsibility of the State has its own
criteria, which cannot be extended automatically to the field of
criminal responsibility—although they cannot be simply left out; for
that, a judgment is required, which shall be a conviction if the
presumption of innocence is overcome. Such judgment does not
exclude, incidentally, taking into account both international decisions
as an important element, with a persuasive weight that is determined,
in particular, by the common scope of judicial latitude in the court’s
consideration of cases before it, the contextual facts, and the patterns
of State conduct and that of its leaders at a specific time.
107. The same reasoning is essentially applicable with regard to
the judgments of the Constitutional Court handed down in the
amparo or habeas corpus cases filed by the defendants accused of
committing these acts (who are allegedly members of the Colina
Special Intelligence Detachment, linked to it, or members of the SIN,
and are accused of crimes against life, crimes against the rights or
freedoms of others, and crimes against humanity) as well as crimes
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against government and its administration. Thus, the Constitutional
Court:
1) Assumed the so-called theory of coordination, which
would overcome the dualist theory with respect to the
primacy of international law over domestic law or vice versa.
This approach seeks a comprehensive solution and the
building of jurisprudence based on the relationship between
the Inter-American human rights system and national
constitutional law, which gives priority to the effective
protection of the fundamental rights of Peruvian citizens.
2) It found that through the amnesty laws the drafters of the
criminal law intended to cover up the commission of crimes
against humanity, and to guarantee impunity for grave human
rights violations; this is the context in which the criminal
activities of the so-called Colina Group unfolded. The Court
considered those laws null and void, and found that they
lacked, ab initio, legal effects. This was due to the existence
of a systematic plan to promote impunity with regard to
human rights violations, based on these central themes: the
deliberate prosecution of common crimes by military courts,
and the issuance of amnesty laws during that time period—
which in any case revealed the lack of a government
willingness to investigate and punish the perpetrators with
sentences appropriate to the seriousness of the crimes
committed.
3) It accepted what the IACtHR had previously declared
proven facts with respect to the Colina group, that is, its
insertion in the State’s military and intelligence services, and
its compliance [with] State policy through systematic acts of
indiscriminate extrajudicial executions, selective murders,
forced disappearances and torture.
4) It acknowledged, as previously stated, the legal validity of
those facts that have been submitted, examined and proven
before the international human rights protection bodies.
However, in defining this declaration, it acknowledged the
need for a criminal investigation, which entails a range of
action exclusive to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts; it
involves the application of provisions of criminal law and
criminal procedure, but is in no way disconnected from
constitutional law and international human rights law.
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108. Consequently, the merit and importance of the decisions of
the IACtHR and of the Constitutional Court cannot be simply
dismissed. The legal findings they contain must be respected in terms
of the affirmation and interpretation of the treaty rights and
fundamental or constitutional rights of the individual. The criminal
case, so ordered by both courts in protecting the constitutional or
treaty claims, has its own purpose and specific rules; nevertheless,
the essence of what has been determined in international or
constitutional courts cannot be ignored. At the same time, what other
evidence may contribute to the case, and the rules for attributing
responsibility pursuant to the criminal law, cannot be denied either.
¶3. Evidence offered by the civil party.
[. . .]
113. The purpose of Manual ME 41–7 “Unconventional
Countersubversive War,” according to Article 1, is to establish
procedures for the planning and execution of National Territorial
Defense (DIT) operations. Its purpose is to serve as a guide for the
various commanders and General Staffs to standardize procedures
regulating the planning and execution of the operations of National
Territorial Defense. It addresses the general characteristics of
subversion and specific points on countersubversive operations,
within the framework of the National Territorial Defense doctrine
(page one). This Manual, in addition to specifying the channel of
authority in the countersubversive war, indicates in number 74,
“Disruption of the Armed Subversive Groups,” that, “considering
that the Countersubversive War is eighty-percent intelligence and
twenty percent operations, the following actions must be established
in the intelligence and operations fields.” As for the phases of
countersubversive operations, specifically in the intervention phase
(number 78) there is reference to the destruction of the local
Political-Administrative Organization (OPA), which means the
elimination of its members. Section II, Operations against the
Political-Administrative Organization, indicates that the destruction
of the central system is achieved through the elimination of its
leaders, which is considered necessary to put a halt to the advance of
subversion (number 83, General Information). Finally, in Chapter II,
Complementary Aspects, Section I: Intelligence, under “Sources of
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Information” (number 210), the six intelligence objectives are set
forth.
In the eighty-second session, Army General Hermoza Ríos
acknowledged the validity of the Manual and indicated that he was
its main promoter as Commander General of the COINDE, and that
its doctrine did not change when he was Commander General of the
Army. He explained that the essence of the Manual is to gain the
support of the population, and that the terms elimination or
destruction are understood in the context of a direct armed
confrontation. He stated that when there is a “red zone” there is
direct armed confrontation, and in that case, it is within the objective
of pacification to eliminate, confront and eliminate [sic] armed
subjects in combat.
114. Manual ME 41–7 defines an Army field of action within the
context of an unconventional war against terrorist subversion, which
was what Peru underwent in 1990-1992. That Manual, which
complements—and does not contradict—the previously examined
Initial Text, not only emphasizes the role of military intelligence in
the internal conflict but also—beyond gaining the support of the
population (Articles 67(a), 69(a) and 73)—has the essential aim of
disrupting the armed subversive groups, in such a way that provides
for the elimination of commanders, leaders and ideologues in the
field of operations, including those from the OPAs. In addition, in
the case of an intervention in “red zones” (areas controlled by the
subversives or with significant subversive activities), the third step is
the destruction of the OPAs, which aims to eliminate its members. It
is further understood that the destruction of the OPAs is achieved
through the elimination of their leaders.
A selective logic is evident, from a perspective of unconventional
warfare, that is aimed at the identification of subversive elements and
their elimination or death. The Manual, regardless of other
considerations, outlines a rigorous doctrine for confronting armed
subversion, in which part of the strategy is directed at eliminating the
leaders of the armed insurgent organization. Of course, it does not
contain a direct authorization to kill at any cost whomever can be
identified as a terrorist leader—whether national, regional or local.
However, to a great extent it softens the targets and procedures for
their elimination, so as to relax the mechanisms of control and the
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safeguards for conduct that adheres to the canons of international
humanitarian law and respect for constitutional government with a
view to combating terrorist subversion in a manner both effective
and respectful of human rights. Under these premises and limits, the
objections of the defense are overruled.
115. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT NUMBER 001–
X24J.A.6. In the one hundred and twentieth session, in presenting
Issue VIII “The existence of a systematic pattern of human rights
violations,” the civil party submitted four documents: 1) the
previously-cited Special Intelligence Report of November [10th,
2001], from Intelligence Headquarters at the Ministry of the Interior
–Search Bureau, DIRBUS–entitled “Possible extrajudicial
executions – Ayacucho 1991,” (at page forty-one thousand eight
hundred and seventy-nine); 2) a copy of the document entitled
“Congratulations,” dated November [18th, 1991], signed by Army
General Hugo Martínez Aloja, which congratulates several
intelligence officers, including Fabio Urquizo Ayma (at page fortyone thousand seven hundred and twenty-five); 3) a copy of the
document entitled “Congratulations,” dated August [8th, 1991],
signed by Army General Hugo Martínez Aloja, in which he
congratulates Fabio Urquizo Ayma and others (at page forty-one
thousand seven hundred and twenty-six); 4) a copy of the Standard
Personnel Efficiency Report on Technical Officers and
Noncommissioned Officers, dated December [31st, 1991], pertaining
to Fabio Urquizo Ayma [. . .].
118. The documentation that was submitted was provided, as
indicated by the civil party that offered it into evidence, by the
Documentation Center of the Office of the Ombudsman. There are
no valid reasons to doubt that they are documents that were in an
official registry and that they were provided at the request of the civil
party. On the other hand, while the intelligence report submitted does
not contain the document signed with the number one, entitled
“Agent Carrión 1991,” its complete transcript is inserted in the body
of the report, which allows for reliable information of its content
(See pages forty-one thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine (back)
to forty-one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six, with the
exception that the transcription was done on both sides of each page).
There is no doubt as to the fact that it is a military intelligence
document. The intelligence report from the Ministry of the Interior
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reasonably establishes that the crimes it reports were committed by
military intelligence officers and were understood as special
intelligence operations, subject to superior orders and based on a
mindset of elimination of individuals linked to the terrorist
subversion of the PCP–SL. Apart from that, the document found at
the residence of operative intelligence officer Favio Urquizo Ayma
recounts a type of Army intelligence conduct—centered in this case
in Ayacucho, the Department of Peru that was hit the hardest by the
terrorist subversion of the PCP–SL—and the design of missions to
eliminate or murder citizens considered to be affiliated with
terrorism and instrumental to its criminal objectives. From this
perspective such document, which is fully admissible as evidence,
has the following evidentiary significance: it contributes to the
determination that means of elimination of persons considered
intelligence targets or objectives were used, institutionally and from
the Army. The intelligence report from the Ministry of the Interior
has established, based on the police intelligence techniques, (1) the
reality of a modus operandi of a Special Intelligence Detachment in
Ayacucho; (2) that information was exchanged about the reality of
the deaths in question; and (3) that one of the operative intelligence
officers who perpetrated the crimes was Urquizo Ayma. The first and
the last points are relevant to the instant case in order to demonstrate
that, behind the official speeches, the authorities opted for an
unlawful and legally unacceptable way to fight terrorist subversion.
What occurred in Ayacucho, at least, in [1991], would be a
demonstration, a statistically solid example, of the phenomenon of
illegitimate violence that emanated from the State itself.
[. . .]
123. The Final Report of the TRC is a public document. The TRC
was an entity created by the Executive Branch with a specific,
preestablished purpose, of prominent public importance, and its
members were appointed by an official act of government. They had
the status of government employees, and therefore the activities they
conducted and the documentation that the Commission created are
official in nature. The court’s assessment of that documentation will
depend upon the characteristics of the facts it covers, the scope and
nature of its conclusions and the evidence it provides.
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1. It is clear, on one hand, that with regard to those facts that
must be litigated, something presented on its own merit
cannot be considered legally proven. That is what this
Supreme Court held in Case No. 1598–2007/Lima, FJ 17, in
ruling that, “. . .the conclusions of the above-cited Report
[Final Report of the TRC] are not binding upon the court,
other than to acknowledge its undisputed legal weight and
source of reference.”
2. However, the criterion will be different with respect to
contextual facts, that is, those concerning the general
situation of the subversive phenomenon and the conduct of
State agents in confronting it. The characteristics of the Final
Report, the material it analyzed (which it compiled, organized
and compared) and the methods used (its interdisciplinary,
scientific nature, the verifications that the sources warranted
and the database that was built for that purpose, as a result of
the task imposed by the creation of the TRC) make it possible
to grant it—or essentially its verification of factual
situations—undisputed probative value, unless specific
evidence or consolidated judicial information diminishes its
value, which has not occurred in the instant case. This
Supreme Court, in Final Judgment No. 918–2006/Junín, of
June [7th, 2006], in Point Three of the Conclusions of Law,
assuming this criterion, first, declared that the TRC report is a
public document, and second, upheld part of the statement of
proven facts in the description of the plan of attack near the
town of Pichanaki, which resulted in the killing of numerous
members of the community of Delta in the Pichanaki district.
3. From this perspective, the IACtHR in numerous judgments
in which Peru has been a party has recognized the evidentiary
merit [of the TRC report]. Thus, in its judgment in the Case
of Cantoral Huamaní et al., of July [10th, 2007], the Court
stated in paragraph ninety-two: “. . .The Court has given
special weight to the CVR [TRC] report as relevant evidence
in the determination of the acts and international
responsibility of the Peruvian State in several cases that have
been submitted to its consideration.” In paragraph two
hundred and twenty-four of the La Cantuta judgment, it
stated: “. . .the work undertaken by said Commission
constitutes a major effort and has contributed to the search for
and establishment of truth for a period of Peru’s history.
However, and without failing to recognize the foregoing, the
Court deems it appropriate to specify that the “historical
truth” contained in said report does not complete or substitute
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the State’s obligation to also establish the truth through court
proceedings. . .”
4. The Constitutional Court, along the same lines as the
IACtHR, assumed the probative value of the Final Report of
the TRC and, on its merit, declared, for example, that that
Report proved that the acts attributable to the group that
called itself the “Colina Group” represented a widespread and
systematic pattern of human rights violations, expressed in
such acts as the disappearances of La Cantuta and of
journalist Pedro Yauri, as well as the murders of numerous
students at the National University of Central Peru and the
Barrios Altos massacre [STC 2798–2004–HC/TC, of
December [9th, 2004], paragraph twenty-five, Case of Vera
Navarrete].
124. In conclusion, based on the Final Report of the TRC, it can be
affirmed with certainty that the numerous forced disappearances and
arbitrary executions perpetrated during the years 1990-1993, those
attributed to State agents, constituted a widespread and systematic
practice, and in certain circumstances—especially in the areas
declared to be under a state of emergency—selective. Furthermore, a
standard modus operandi was followed, basically in the case of the
forced disappearances [see footnote ninety-eight].
125. In his book Fuerzas Armadas – Lecciones de este siglo,
[Armed Forces: Lessons from this Century], Army General Hermoza
Ríos presents four summaries of the terrorist activities from [19901996]. If the years [1990-1992] are taken into account, it adds up to a
total of eight thousand two hundred and fifty-nine (8259) violent
terrorist acts (chart at page 21). However, by comparison, the chart
on pages 175-176 (which is broken down by location of the attack
rather than by type, which the first chart highlights) shows,
contradictorily, that the total number of terrorist attacks in [1992]
was one hundred and forty-seven (147), in spite of the fact that three
thousand six hundred and twenty-two (3622) violent terrorist acts
had been counted previously. This inconsistency diminishes the
convincing force of the information it provides, and therefore it is
impossible to refute successfully the figures and analysis of the TRC.
[. . .]
128. It is clear that the PCP–SL declared “strategic equilibrium”
and that it stepped up its terrorist attacks or actions in Lima—there is
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no contradictory opinion on this point—in 1992, when the
democratic constitutional order was disrupted. But it is also obvious
that the PCP–SL failed to meet its objectives, and that the State had
begun years earlier to defeat it strategically. The PCP-SL was unable
to attain hegemony in the countryside, much less besiege the cities; it
neither managed to attain political equality nor to dismantle the State
based on its own forces. The considerations of Merino Bartet,
Degregori Caso and Fernández Dávila Carnero are solid and have not
been successfully refuted by other, contrary statements, such as those
of Jiménez Baca and Jhon Caro [even the president of the CCFFAA
at that time, Army General Hermoza Ríos, and the SIN Chief, Army
General Julio Rolando Salazar Monroe, support this line of thinking:
there was no strategic equilibrium, which is why the assertions in
Hermoza Ríos’s book can be qualified as propagandistic and mere
justification, without any real basis, of the actions taken by the
regime at that time]. Therefore, based on this assertion, any
justification of the changes to the institutional system lacks solidity
and, on the contrary, reveals intentions other than the publicly
declared extreme need to save the country; furthermore, it is not
possible to declare the supposed salvation of democracy by denying
it in practice and taking control of its basic institutions.
[. . .]
130. The following are pertinent highlights of the reports87
presented orally:
1. The report of the Inter-American Commission stated that
the armed conflict that broke out in Peru beginning in [1980]
led to the declaration of a state of emergency over a large
area of Peruvian territory, and that this conflict caused law
enforcement personnel to employ methods that violate human
rights. It stated that the United Nations Working Group on
enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons as well as
the Peruvian government itself have registered more than five
thousand complaints involving disappearances ([1983-1990]),
and also reports the commission of attacks on personal safety,
individual freedom, due process and freedom of expression,
without any perpetrators being punished accordingly. The
Commission’s report also states that, according to the figures
87. Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Amnesty
International (Publisher’s note).
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detailed by human rights bodies, forced disappearances and
summary executions continued during the defendant’s
regime. It states that as a result of the coup d’état various
individual rights were violated, and that this event resulted in
several very serious acts, such as the death of prisoners at the
Castro Castro Prison, the disappearance of numerous people
in El Santa, at La Cantuta University, of Pedro Yauri, of
attorney Wilfredo Terrones Silva and professor Teresa Díaz
Aparicio of the National University of San Marcos.
2. The 1991 Amnesty International report found that three
hundred people disappeared during that year after being
detained by the law enforcement personnel. It stated that a
National Commission to guarantee respect for human rights
was proposed, but that such Commission never materialized.
It further stated that three hundred new cases involving the
disappearance of detainees were reported, of which eightynine were freed, twenty-four turned up dead; nothing was
ever heard about the rest. Finally, it said that frequent reports
were received of abuse and torture, as well as the rape of
rural women, and that no official investigations had been
opened into those matters.
3. The 1992 Amnesty International report indicated, in
addition to several individually identified acts involving
human rights violations, that more than three hundred people
had disappeared and at least sixty were executed
extrajudicially by law enforcement personnel or by
paramilitary groups. Dozens of cases of torture and abuse
were reported, and the government had still failed to shed
light on thousands of human rights violations documented
since [1983]. The report stated that in the month of
September the government issued a presidential directive on
respect for human rights acknowledging that the
disappearances of five thousand people had been reported
since [1981]. However, no effective results were seen in
terms of investigating and punishing the State agents
involved in these illegal acts, in spite of the international calls
and exhortations to do so. The directive simply conveyed the
fact that forty-eight servicemen had been disciplined, which
meant that law enforcement personnel enjoyed near total
impunity, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence of
their responsibility.
4. The 1993 Amnesty International report stated that at least
one hundred and thirty-nine people had “disappeared” and at
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least sixty-five were executed extrajudicially by law
enforcement personnel. Reports were also received of
widespread torture and abuse. It stated that large regions of
the country remained under military control, and that cases of
forced disappearance and extrajudicial executions continued
to be reported, without any results in terms of their
investigation. It stated that Amnesty International’s requests
for the establishment of specific facts, such as those
surrounding the deaths at the Castro Castro Prison and La
Cantuta, and requests to investigate the numerous cases of
human rights violations, were not accepted.
131. It is clear that the Reports of the IACHR and Amnesty
International are, strictly speaking, written documents. They record
an expression of intellectual content; they represent the physical
materialization of a thought. Both entities, one of which belongs to
the Inter-American human rights protection system, and the other
being a non-governmental human rights organization, transmit
through their reports a specific knowledge of the human rights
situation in a particular country and a particular context. Neither the
legal requirements for their existence nor the requirements for their
validity as documentary evidence are subject to debate. In terms of
their evidentiary effectiveness—the accuracy of their content—it
must be noted that the statistics or figures they provide, intrinsically
vital as far as the “contextual facts” are concerned, are essentially
consistent with those presented by the TRC, the evidentiary solidity
of which has been affirmed at this point. The reports indicate the
source, although in general terms. They contain information provided
by non-governmental organizations, public complaints and their own
documents on specific cases. It is sufficient, with respect to the
matter, that the information is consistent with the records of the
TRC, which are extensively documented and have not been
disproved. Furthermore, there are two notable pieces of information
that have already been confirmed: a) former president Alberto
Fujimori’s own government acknowledged the forced disappearances
that had taken place in the country, and that there were five thousand
such cases; and b) in spite of his declarations of oversight over
human rights crimes committed by State agents, those crimes were
never investigated, explained and punished, either in specific cases
or with respect to the general trend. Consequently, the objections of
the defense with regard to the questioned reports are overruled.
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¶4. Evidence submitted by the defense.
[. . .]
134. [. . .] There are discrepancies in his pretrial statements88 with
regard to certain matters concerning the Intelligence Note, as he first
stated that he had not discussed its content with defendant Fujimori,
but later mentioned that he had done so, and that he had even
delivered it personally to defendant Fujimori Fujimori. Nevertheless,
it is a discrepancy that—although it does not prove that Vice
President San Román Cáceres informed defendant Fujimori Fujimori
immediately of what had taken place in Barrios Altos and that
Fujimori had access to the above-cited Intelligence Note—neither
does it deny the reality of that information and the media’s
knowledge of it from at least December of [1992], although there is
information indicating that that Note had already been circulating
months earlier.
Finally, on the issue of the discrepancies among the statements of
a single witness, that is, the diversity of statements, it is essential that
they be subject to confrontation and verification at trial. From that
point forward it is the responsibility of the adjudicating court to
undertake the reasoned and reasonable weighing of the credibility of
the various individuals, in accordance with the principle of
immediacy. The existence of contradictions, retractions or
corrections to parts of an account of the facts does not signify the
absence of prosecution evidence. It is unacceptable to maintain that
for such reason the evidence and the information that it contains is
cancelled out or rendered ineffective. It is an issue pertinent to the
weighing the evidence; it affects the Court’s opinion in its weighing
of the evidence, not the weighability itself. Accordingly, it is
incumbent upon the Court to compare different versions and draw a
conclusion according to the ordinary principles of experience with
regard to its respective veracity, bearing in mind its internal
consistency as well as its consistency with the other evidence in the
case. In the instant case, witness San Román Cáceres was examined
at trial and attention was called to what he said in his different
statements given before other (investigative, prosecution and
congressional) government entities. Some parts of his witness

88. Reference to the statements of Máximo San Román Cáceres.
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statements—only some passages of his detailed account—are
inconsistent and, given the absence of positive proof to strengthen
the account given at trial, it is not possible to give full credit to the
latter. Accordingly, the Court concludes that such divergence, in
light of the totality of the evidence produced [with a view to an
assessment of all of the evidence together, which is the evidentiary
method that forms the adequate basis, grounds and explanation of the
conclusive judgment reached] cannot be disregarded.
139. The effective cooperation procedure governed by Law No.
27388, which has been incorporated into the new Code of Criminal
Procedure, established the mechanism of plea bargaining. This has
given rise procedurally to so-called “rewards-based criminal law,”
which rests on the concept of the arrepentido [cooperating witness
under the Repentance Act]. Its philosophy is determined by the need
to fight impunity and break the law of silence prevalent in organized
crime, as well as to serve as a tool for the prevention of crimes
involving grave social harm. One of the principles on which this
special procedure is based is effectiveness, so that the cooperation the
criminal offers the justice system is useful. Notably, the cooperation
and the accompanying information must be relevant—that is, it must
lead to the discovery of criminal acts and prove the involvement of
other individuals. The information must be authentic, complete and
accurate, and the judgment that is issued, insofar as it grants benefits
to reward informants who have committed crimes, must
appropriately reflect the severity of the admitted or uncontested
charges, and the proven value of the information produced by the
cooperating witness. Accordingly, one of the essential phases of the
proceeding in question is the corroboration of the information by the
Office of the Public Prosecutor (art. 6, para. 2 of the Regulations).
Based on the aggregate of information on the alleged criminal
participation of the “repentant” defendant [arrepentido]—essentially,
the investigations or cases pending against him—he decides
voluntarily to cooperate with the government, and either admits to
the charges or does not contest them. The court’s supervision of the
Cooperation and Benefits Agreement is limited on this point. It
requires only the voluntariness of the defendant’s submission to the
proceedings and his assisted knowledge of their scope, as well as
indicia of criminality or “probable cause” of his involvement in the
crimes of which he is accused and based on which he is negotiating a

724

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:657

benefit as a reward for his cooperation. Another aspect of the judicial
oversight, beyond the appropriate legal authorizations concerning the
subject and purpose of the proceedings, has to do with the benefits
granted and the obligations imposed, with the criterion of
proportionality among the weight of the information corroborated,
the severity of the charges and his responsibility for the act.
The defense, with respect to the judicial supervision of the
Cooperation and Benefits Agreement, questions first of all the
court’s classification of the facts as criminal offenses in terms of
what has been admitted with respect to some facts: the arrepentidos
said that they took part in specific crimes as backup—that is, they
did not fire the shots that killed the victims; nevertheless, they were
convicted as perpetrators or co-perpetrators. [Another arrepentido
stated that he had been a driver, that he transported the officers to
carry out the criminal act. Likewise, one of the operative intelligence
officers acknowledged having participated in the events but asserted
that he did not shoot at any of the victims, notwithstanding the
accusation of another member of Detachment, who in turn was
incriminated by the former]. This classification is not relevant to
conclude that the position of the prosecutor and the Court was
fraudulent. A criminal act was found to exist, it was determined that
the cooperating witness took part in it, and he was convicted in a
criminal trial without his opposition. It is possible to consider, based
on what the cooperating witnesses have stated, that they took part in
the offense not as co-perpetrators but rather as accomplices.
However, such classification does not invalidate the judgment or the
cooperation itself, since they took part in the act in either case—
which the defense does not question. Further, it can be assumed that
their account of their own criminal involvement downplays their role
in the act.
141. On the other hand, it is true that the cooperating witnesses
denied the charges at a certain point prior to the effective cooperation
proceedings, and assumed a defensive stance from which they
radically rejected the accusations against them. Such situation, as has
been emphasized repeatedly, in and of itself does not invalidate their
subsequent testimony or statements. For this the Court must bear in
mind the reasons for the change in the witness’s version of the
events, the explanations provided and the respective internal
consistency and comparative analysis, as well as the presence of
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other objective, external elements that enable corroboration. In
addition, the fact that some arrepentidos do not admit certain charges
in no way influences the fate of the effective cooperation proceeding.
This charge is simply excluded from the scope of the proceeding and
is subject to the results of the adversarial proceedings in progress.
Likewise, the fact that a cooperating witness who does not oppose a
charge is included in the corresponding agreement and is approved in
the judgment does not invalidate the proceeding or give rise to the
inference that the judgment was obtained fraudulently; the law and
its regulations authorize this judicial course of action. The focus is
not on this matter, but rather on the evidence of criminality—
unquestioned by the arrepentido—with respect to the charges that
were admitted or uncontested.
142. The cooperation judgments have approved the agreements
because they find that they meet the legal requirements and pass the
proportionality test. They are final judgments, whose legality,
proportionality and judicial merit cannot be denied or dismissed by
this Court. Whether or not certain information is considered
corroborated in the effective cooperation proceeding is not subject to
review in this case; any defects it may have cannot be litigated in the
adversarial proceedings. Notwithstanding, it is clear that what these
judgments acknowledge with respect to the content, existence and
validity of specific information—that they affirm that it has been
corroborated—does not predetermine the assessment [or] the
findings of fact that the Court must render in the adversarial
proceedings that may take place as a result or in relation to the
information offered by the arrepentido. It is clear that in the criminal
court the judgments are not prejudicial to other future judgments in
other cases. Obviously the statement of proven facts has clear merit
as a public document, but those facts do not predetermine or
anticipate similar judgment in other criminal cases. Regarding “Plan
Cipango,” those judgments of course will not be mentioned as proof
of its existence; rather—as it indeed occurred—an independent
assessment shall be made in terms of the evidence presented (see
paragraph 96).
Consequently, there are no grounds for the evidentiary exclusion
of the effective cooperation judgments, without granting or
acknowledging prejudicial effect. The position of the arrepentidos
with respect to their prior statements is an issue that goes to the
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weight of the testimony, not the legality of its assessment. The
objection is overruled.
[. . .]
§3. Audio and video evidence.
[. . .]
¶1. Evidentiary Objections.
148. “[. . .] Regardless of whether this video document89 was
stolen, it lacks constitutional relevance, as in any case it has been
proven that one of the parties at the scene of the interview—a SIN
employee, obviously authorized by and known to the interviewer and
the interviewee, especially if the interview took place at that
institution’s headquarters—was the person who recorded the event.
Beyond any defect in the video specifically, the “questionable”
editing of its content for purposes of putting together a specific video
document is consistent with a news report. A very clear assumption
of “mitigation of the link” has arisen, as the interviewer affirmed the
reality of the prior conversations and the advance participation of
Montesinos Torres, who was giving advice or instructions to Army
General Picón Alcalde as to how he should testify.
It is of interest for evidentiary purposes to note, on the one hand,
the presence of Montesinos Torres in an interview that, according to
the SIN strategy, was necessary in order to reinforce specific
messages; and on the other hand, the statement of an important figure
cited in Army General Robles Espinoza’s public denunciation, in the
context of legal persecution against Robles Espinoza and a smear
campaign in which the Army was involved, en masse, through its
senior officers. There is no question that the interview took place at
the SIN headquarters; that Montesinos Torres took part, at least in
the prior stages, and was telling the interviewee what to say; and that
he emphasized the drastic action of the military court, while Army
General Picón Alcalde was convinced that the denunciation was
unfounded. Journalist Guerrero Torres has acknowledged what
Montesinos Torres said, although he has stressed that he neither
interrupted the interview to speak nor controlled the interview.
89. Journalist Alejandro Guerrero Torres’s interview of Army General José
Picón Alcalde. (Publisher’s note).
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However, that information is meaningless for purposes of the
evidentiary issue and the information sought. Consequently, the
objection of the defense is overruled.
The question is also raised of whether the rule of impartiality has
been violated, as the video that was viewed was put together
expressly for use in this case. What is relevant, however, are not the
journalist’s remarks or the additions to certain events that were
filmed previously—which is what, strictly speaking, violates this
requirement (which is very well-known in Italian procedural
doctrine); what is useful in evidentiary terms, or rather, the typically
documentary consideration for complying with the applicable
procedural requirements, is the scene that contains a specific piece of
information, aside from the fact that commentary or other film clips
were added later. If the information is self-sufficient, and is able to
capture a specific message, without any danger of confusion or
distortion, it is improper to invalidate its evidentiary potential. In the
instant case, in light of the above paragraphs, this has been satisfied:
Army General Picón Alcalde testified against his classmate and
close personal friend, Army General Robles Espinoza, outside his
own realm; he was not at CSJM headquarters. He was following his
own motives, and was under the influence of Montesinos Torres, de
facto chief of the SIN (the institution that led the smear campaign
against General Robles Espinoza), which even led him to issue an
opinion in the case of La Cantuta that no members of the Army were
involved in the crime.
150. The defense challenges the lawfulness of the audio
recordings90 claiming the violation of two fundamental rights:
privacy and the right against self-incrimination. First, there is
mention in the audio recordings of family issues, health and personal
problems; it is therefore alleged to have private content. In addition,
they mention facts that implicate the speakers—some of whom have
denied the charges—as the possible perpetrators of a crime; this is
relevant especially since the right against self-incrimination arises
when, in facing criminal prosecution, an individual decides whether
to confess, contest the charges or remain silent. The topics covered in
90. Audio recordings turned over by journalist Uceda Pérez, which came from
the recordings made by operative intelligence officer Sosa Saavedra (Publisher’s
note).
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the conversations recorded by one of the parties to it (operative
intelligence officer Sosa Saavedra) deal with the amnesty, their ties
to the Army and the promises of support they had received. Of
course, but still in that context, they mention personal problems and
the need for financial support as a result of their imprisonment—
information that, incidentally, is not relevant for these purposes and
bears no significance in the elucidation of this case. It is it clear,
from a substantive perspective, that the important topics covered in
that conversation do not affect those exclusively personal areas that
belong to a sphere of privacy shielded from the acts and knowledge
of others. Everything said in the conversations, including the
mention of financial needs and health problems—presented in
general terms, without the specificity that could entail the
communication of compromising information, or information not
meant to go beyond the circle of people present—lies outside the
very restricted sphere of one’s own individual privacy.
The remarks and statements that one person makes to another in a
voluntary conversation, free of duress, do not violate the right to
privacy; nor can its recording be called fraudulent. There is not even
a reciprocal right to confidentiality or a mutual duty to imply that the
person to whom a communication is conveyed has an obligation of
discretion or silence.
The right against self-incrimination, which is an instrumental right
included in the right to a defense, functions with respect to state
agents and prevents defendants—or people who may become
defendants—from being forced or tricked into making a statement
and admitting criminal responsibility. Such is not the case with
regard to conversations held between individuals in which ideas are
transmitted and information or expressions are exchanged
voluntarily.
151. The defense also questions the relevance of the audio tapes
because they are not original, and it has not been verified that they
are true copies of the originals. According to the assertions of
Ricardo Uceda Pérez at page thirty-seven thousand seven hundred
and twenty-seven of his writing, operative intelligence officer Sosa
Saavedra gave him the originals of the audio recordings. He obtained
copies, one of which is the one he sent to the Court. In that writing,
and in his testimony at trial, journalist Uceda Pérez stated that Sosa
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Saavedra turned over the audio recordings to him voluntarily, and he
made a copy, which he used as a source for his book Muerte en el
Pentagonito [Death at the Pentagonito (Army Headquarters)]. The
conversations themselves have been acknowledged by Navarro Pérez
and Chuqui Aguirre, who was the most direct in doing so; he
identified not only his own voice but also those of everyone whose
voice appears on it. Rivero Lazo has identified his voice in some
parts—he claims not to have known that he was being recorded, and
that is why the conversation is natural—while Sosa Saavedra admits
that he is the one who recorded the tapes and turned them over to
Uceda Pérez, but states that he did not authorize him to turn them
over; he has the originals. Pichilingue Guevara denied recognition of
the recorded voices. It is therefore inferred, from the statements of
Uceda Pérez and from the identifications made at the hearing, that
the conversations contained in the audio recordings did in fact take
place. As such, the determination of its authenticity is confirmed.
Sosa Saavedra does not allege that the audio recordings presented by
Uceda Pérez are false; he only questions the fact that Uceda Pérez
had turned them over. However, as previously indicated, there is no
duty of mutual confidentiality between the parties to a conversation.
Chuqui Aguirre endorses them absolutely. There are no objections
from Navarro Pérez or Rivero Lazo. Although Rivero Lazo states
that in part, while listening to them, he went by the subtitles because
he had trouble hearing (recently stated and not alleged at the time he
testified), such circumstance is not a determining factor to reject the
authenticity of the audio recordings. Furthermore, it should be made
clear that the clean-up and subtitling that was ordered with respect to
those audio recordings (as noted on the record in the corresponding
session) did not involve any changes or manipulation. The parties
knew about both “versions” (the one turned over by Uceda Pérez and
the materials returned subsequent to the technical procedures), and
had the opportunity to review them and, if appropriate, to object to
them. The questioning is dismissed. The audio recordings are fully
admissible as evidence.
153. THE AUDIO RECORDING ENTITLED “FUJIMORIMONTESINOS CONVERSATION.” [. . .] As stated earlier, the
confidentiality of communications, whether telephonic or other, can
be violated only by third parties who intercept communications held
by others. This means that there is a particularly intense need for
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their protection, especially in view of technological advances that
could facilitate their vulnerability and jeopardize the very system of
fundamental rights. The special importance of this right demands
great care in ensuring that it only can be overcome through a court
order, which must be rigorously proven, as must any assertion that
one of the participants in the conversation was the one who recorded
and disseminated it. Consequently, if one of these circumstances is
not proven adequately on the record, that is, that the recordings were
obtained lawfully—the burden of proof being on the party offering
the evidence—they will be inadmissible as documentary evidence.
Army General Hermoza Ríos did not record the conversations that he
had with Montesinos Torres, and his inference that Montesinos
Torres recorded and disseminated them lacks categorical evidentiary
support. It has not been proven that the conversations were
intercepted with judicial authorization, which would be relatively
easy to prove. Therefore, the audio recording in question is excluded
from the evidence.
[. . .]
155. AUDIO RECORDING ENTITLED “STATEMENT OF
VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS TO TELEMUNDO.” This is, in fact,
from a statement that Montesinos Torres recorded surreptitiously—
without the knowledge and authorization of prison authorities—and
turned over to the press, which saw to its distribution. According to
the news report of Canal Dos [Channel 2] that was attached to the
audiotape from Telemundo, the Ministry of Justice disclosed the
measures taken in light of what had occurred, including the
disciplinary action taken against the prison warden, and provided an
account of the events, indicating that a list of questions was sent to
Montesinos Torres for him to answer. This fact is insignificant to the
exclusion of the statement, since it does not affect the essence of the
statement as far as its voluntariness and authenticity as a document
are concerned.
In that statement, Montesinos Torres questioned why the
defendant [Fujimori] was not facing up to the charges against him
and stated, among several issues, the following: 1. That the
intelligence services operate in secret and always act along the fluid
line between legality and illegality, often breaking the rules. 2. That
he worked under the orders of President Alberto Fujimori Fujimori,
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followed his instructions strictly so as to make it possible for him to
remain in government, increase his power and consolidate his
political plans, even attaining his reelection for the 2000-2005 term.
3. That, therefore, as political leader and head of state, he must
answer for what his subordinates did or failed to do, including the
commission of acts that go against the rules in force.
It should be noted that every video or recorded tape is an audio or
video document, as the case may be, and must be assessed as such.
Furthermore, this recording was in the public domain and was at no
time denied by Montesinos Torres. Its authenticity is not in question.
As noted earlier, the fact that Montesinos Torres was not crossexamined at trial, for a reason not attributable to the Court, does not
prevent the analysis of prior statements (in which, clearly, he waived
his right to remain silent); they are known to the parties, who have
had the opportunity to introduce evidence to dismiss them, minimize
them, or even discredit their effects. Insofar as it is documentary
evidence, its content—Montesinos Torres’s statement—can be
examined as an out-of-court statement, although cross-examination is
not applicable because the documents would be read or viewed or
listened to. As such, the objection is overruled.
[. . .]
159. [. . .] The document91 has been viewed in the proper
proceedings, and it has been identified by two of the people who
took part in the meeting. Consequently, all possible limitations to the
document viewed are overcome by the express acknowledgement of
its participants. Furthermore, it is clear that this document was sent
by Congress to the Office of the Public Prosecutor once it was
announced that a criminal complaint would be filed against the
defendant, and that Office in turn attached it to its formal complaint
as evidence. Consequently, the objection is overruled.
160. [. . .] With respect to the matter, it is clear that it is a fluid
dialogue between Montesinos Torres and Briones Dávila and Luisa
María Cuculiza, and that in referring to the matters of Barrios Altos
91. Vladivideos marked with numbers 880/881 [This is footage of a meeting
held at the SIN on April [29th, 1998], which includes two separate events: the first
is a conversation among Luisa María Cuculiza, Juan Briones Dávila and Vladimiro
Montesinos Torres; and the second is a conversation among the three
aforementioned individuals and Alberto Fujimori Fujimori].
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and La Cantuta, he mentions the SIE expressly and rules out the SIN.
It is also clear that he pointed to the chair where the highest ranking
official sits—which is the place the defendant occupied and sat in
when he entered the Chamber—and stated emphatically “everything
comes from here.” In all of his statements he clearly rejected the
SIN’s perpetration of the act, so it is possible that this statement was
meant to indicate the defendant and the Intelligence System.
Nevertheless, it is a phrase or accusation that is not very clear on the
matter of who gave the order for the two criminal acts, or for all of
the ones Montesinos Torres cited at the meeting. In any case, those
words and that gesture are not unequivocal statements that defendant
Fujimori Fujimori had given the criminal orders, taken part in them
or known of the course of events. They allow for several
interpretations, such as those that have been given by the people at
that meeting, the prosecutor, the civil party and the defense. As such,
they require other supporting evidence that will be examined at the
appropriate time; on their own, they are neither sufficient nor
categorical as incriminating evidence.
¶2. Evidence offered by the Office of the Attorney General
161. VIDEO ENTITLED “LOS SIAMESES” [“THE SIAMESE
TWINS”] [. . .] The objections as to relevance must be overruled,
because what is relevant in these cases are the sources of these film
scenes. They are public, from a journalistic source, and publicly
known because they were broadcast on various television news
programs, including open signal television such as channel 2,
Frecuencia Latina. The important point, it must be stressed, are the
defendant’s statements—not the additions and news commentary.
They help show the content of the defendant’s statements at a certain
point, but there is no serious risk of misrepresentation or possibility
of confusion with respect to them. Furthermore, the images and
words have been acknowledged by the defendant. In addition, it is
obvious that some phrases concerning who served in his government
from the time he took power must be weighed with the totality of the
evidence produced and, if appropriate, their convincing force and
their merit as incriminating circumstantial evidence must be
determined.
162. VIDEO ENTITLED “MESSAGE FROM MARTIN RIVAS”
[. . .] In this “message” Army Major Martin Rivas states that the acts
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attributed to him—Barrios Altos and La Cantuta—were a
government decision; otherwise, it would be impossible to explain
the Cantuta Law, the rolling out of the tanks, the antiterrorist laws,
the amnesty laws, let alone for so much to be done just to defend one
Army major. He states that the amnesty laws did not protect him;
rather, they protected those in government and those responsible for
the State policy implemented, the responsibility for which lies, in any
case, with the President of the Republic as Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces and his advisor who governed with him,
Vladimiro Montesinos Torres [. . .] There is no doubt of the
authenticity of the video footage in question. Martin Rivas himself
has acknowledged it. The argument that he was deceived and that it
was simply a rehearsal does not withstand even the least analysis.
Martín Rivas knew that he was being filmed and that the footage
would be used by journalist Jara Flores; that was the testimony of the
journalist at trial. His statements are convincing and well thought
out, and are aimed not only at explaining a very serious event but
also to defend himself from the charges against him. Furthermore, it
is a video document. As such, it is subject to the rules of
identification and a determination of authenticity, overcome
successfully in this case. It has already been established that, as such,
it serves not only to judge the credibility of his testimony at trial but
also, if appropriate, it can replace it if the evidence of the case so
determines. The reasoning for this has already been stated repeatedly
in this Chapter. The objection is overruled.
163. AUDIO RECORDING OF THE INTERVIEW OF
OPERATIVE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER JESÚS SOSA
SAAVEDRA CONDUCTED BY JOURNALIST MARÍA ELENA
CASTILLO, OF THE NEWSPAPER “LA REPÚBLICA.” In these
statements, Sosa Saavedra mentions that the special intelligence
detachment in question did exist, although not with the name
“Colina” but rather “Lima.” He acknowledges that that is what it was
called, that there are even documents under that name, and that it was
Martin Rivas who gave it that name. He states that the first operation
was Barrios Altos and that it was ordered by Montesinos Torres, to
whom they reported on the job done. Martin Rivas, Pichilingue
Guevara and Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa went; he states that they, as
members of the military, had not wanted to work for Montesinos
Torres but rather for the Commander General of the Army. He states
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that the rest of the operations were ordered by the Commander
General of the Army, General Hermoza Ríos, and that he even
congratulated them and offered to have a luncheon for them. He
states, nevertheless, that the order for La Cantuta was to make
arrests, but that Martín Rivas ordered them to kill; he states that the
group answered administratively to the DINTE, which is why
Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa was present as the coordinator between the
Detachment and the DINTE. He states that Martin Rivas would
coordinate directly with Army General Hermoza Ríos, and that the
Colina Detachment was formed in the COFI, while Montesinos
Torres was first starting to gain power.
[. . .]
The defense questions the audio recording because it is
documented testimony, and testimony can only be introduced
through a live witness. This objection, asserted repeatedly throughout
this phase of the trial proceedings, is baseless. It must be emphasized
that tape recordings are governed by the rules of documentary
evidence. And if the person interviewed acknowledges his voice and
the content of what is stated therein, it is improper to exclude it from
the evidence. Sosa Saavedra says that he does not recall everything
that he stated there, especially the quote against Montesinos Torres.
However, what has been set out above is convincing, there is no
evidence whatsoever that any phrase was added or that the statement
was misrepresented; and as far as the reference to Montesinos, it is
simply a retraction, although without any explanation to justify the
change in story. The objection is overruled.
[. . .]
165. [. . .] In the instant case,92 the place where the meeting was
held (the SIN) the content of the presentation, the status of the
attendees (pro-government members of Congress) and the role of
Montesinos Torres, who boasts of his power and his connection to
former president Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, are all of note. This
scene demonstrates the significant role that Montesinos Torres
played, in spite of his formal title, in the real operational structure of
the regime and its view of the countersubversion strategy.

92. Interview with Sosa Savedra by Mabel Huertas on Día D (Channel 9).
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166. [. . .] The defense questions the procedure by which the video
evidence is introduced93 when it is testimony, and also complains of
the lack of requisite impartiality. These objections, however, are not
sound. It is indisputable that the videos are documentary evidence,
and that their fundamental content, which has been subject to
identification, is the statement of Army General Hermoza Ríos. Its
authenticity has not even been disputed, and its content and message
are very clear: he confronted the public inquiries and the questions
raised before Congress, he branded it an offense to the military
institution, and declared that he would not allow it. From there, as is
well-known to the public, there was a reaction from the military,
which included a parade of tanks and public demonstrations of
support for the senior officer, in spite of the evidence of criminality
with respect to the perpetration of the serious acts condemned. The
objection is overruled.
¶3. Evidence from the civil party.
[. . .]
¶4. Evidence from the defense.
[. . .]
§4. Other evidentiary arguments from the defense.
[. . .]
¶1. Congressional Proceedings
175. With respect to the congressional procedure of acusación
constitucional [similar to impeachment proceedings], it is relevant to
bear in mind two specific provisions: (i) Article 100 of the
Constitution, which establishes that “the defendant shall have the
right, in these proceedings, to defend himself pro se and with the
assistance of counsel before the Permanent Committee and before
the full Congress;” and (ii) Article 89 of the Regulations to
Congress, which provides three basic stages of the acusación
constitucional procedure, and recognizes that the defendant may be
assisted or represented by counsel. Article 89 further provides that
the debate of the acusación constitucional before the full Congress
shall not be suspended due to the defendant’s or his attorney’s
93. Video containing the public statements of Army General Hermoza Ríos.
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unjustified failure to attend, as determined by the Congressional
Board. In such case, upon verification that notice was properly
served upon the accused and his defense counsel, the acusación
constitucional shall be debated and voted upon.
176. The meaning and scope of the acusación constitucional
procedure have been defined by the Constitutional Court. In STC
number 0006–2003– AI/TC, of December [1st, 2003], it was
classified as a duly regulated political legal proceeding, conducted
before Congress. In such proceeding, the legislative body must have
determined the likelihood of the facts alleged in the accusation, and
found that those facts are consistent with the legal definition of a
crime or crimes committed by a public servant, previously and
unequivocally established under the law, and as such warranting
criminal prosecution. It is a preliminary impeachment hearing to
shed light on accusations of the alleged legal and criminal liability of
high-ranking government employees pursuant to Article 99 of the
Constitution for crimes allegedly committed in the performance of
official duties. Once Congress has determined that, in its opinion,
there are sufficient facts evidencing the commission of such crimes,
it acts as the prosecuting entity. It sets aside the official rights and
privileges of the dignitary, suspends him from the performance of his
duties, and brings him before the criminal court.
[. . .]
177. The political nature of the Congressional trial (without
prejudice to the assessment of whether there is evidence of
criminality in the conduct attributed to a high-ranking government
official), and its effect of relieving the defendant of the official rights
and privileges vested in him, and given its role in relation to the
regular criminal courts as a mere prosecuting entity—understood in a
broad sense—is clearly established. Such is also the case insofar as,
from a procedural law perspective, the decision of Congress is
established as a condition or requisite for it properly to proceed; it is
a procedural element that determines the initiation and validity of the
criminal case, but nothing more.
Consequently, because of their political effects, it is not possible to
equate such proceedings with a criminal court case. The criminal
case establishes the facts of an event—its goal is to shed light on it—
and the responsibility of an individual. If appropriate, it determines
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the application of the criminal law and the imposition of a sentence
or preventive measure, without prejudice to the civil reparations. The
congressional investigation only yields political consequences or
effects at the heart of the bodies of the Legislative Branch; it does
not impose criminal sanctions. However, strangely, from the
perspective of comparative law, the Congressional resolution to
bring the acusación constitucional, which has a criminal content, has
binding effects for the initiation of the criminal case—but that in no
way “transforms” the preliminary impeachment hearing into a legal
or court case.
From this perspective, not all of the requirements or guarantees of
a court case can be transferred to the preliminary impeachment
hearing. Of course, the right to a defense must be respected in its
essential content: knowledge of the charges, the assistance of
counsel, participation in the investigation proceedings, the
opportunity to present arguments and to contest the charges. In the
case of the congressional proceedings, as previously stated, the
defendant has the right to defend himself pro se and with the
assistance of counsel before the Standing Committee and before the
full Congress. In the preliminary impeachment hearings before
Congress, as opposed to the criminal case, due to the conflicting
rights and the effects that the sentence entails, the defense is limited,
with regard to the assistance of counsel, to the right to name his own
attorney. This right cannot be hindered or impeded; however, it is not
an obligation of the State to appoint an attorney in the absence of the
defendant’s designation, as it is in a criminal case [ECtHR Judgment
of January [21st, 1999], Case of Van Geyseghem].
Along these lines, the Regulations to Congress recognize legal
defense as a right, not as an obligation of the State that requires the
legislature to appoint an attorney if the defendant fails to do so.
Furthermore, they consider it an elective right in that the defendant
may choose not to name an attorney. In the case that an attorney has
been named, his failure to appear does not suspend the proceedings,
and proof of the service of notice to the defendant is sufficient to
meet the legal requirements for the defendant to be able to assert his
right. That has been done in the instant case. To assert the
interpretation, as the defense has, that the proceedings are null and
void due to the absence of appointed counsel in view of the voluntary
nonappearance of the defendant’s own attorney, when the law does
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not require it—and does not even allow it—would be to open the
door to the failure of any investigation.
178. Irrespective of the above, the main point is that we are not
dealing here with congressional acusación constitucional
proceedings leading to the criminal case, but rather with proceedings
held in Congress that lack such procedural or court nature, whose
documentary character is beyond all discussion. As already stated
repeatedly: it is improper to require criminal trial guarantees and
evidentiary rules in proceedings that do not, because of their nature,
require them. The congressional proceedings (statements, expert
testimony, identifications, the production of different kinds of
documents and information) are out-of-court sources of evidence.
They are incorporated into the case and examined therein according
to the means by which they are introduced—in this case as
documentary evidence. As such, they do not require prior
confrontation, because sources of evidence never do. The objections
of the defense are therefore unacceptable. All of the congressional
investigative proceedings, by their nature documentary, insofar as
they have been subject to debate, may be used by the Court.
¶2. The pretrial investigation proceedings and the right to the
assistance of counsel
179. [. . .] It has been known since the beginning of the case that
defendant Fujimori Fujimori was in Japan; the Investigating Judge
specified that he fled the country to avoid prosecution by the
Peruvian justice system. In spite this fact, he was not declared a
fugitive immediately nor, therefore, was he assigned court-appointed
counsel. The Court notes that the right to a defense is a guarantee
and, as such it is the State’s duty properly to provide it. If it fails to
do so, the pretrial investigation proceedings will not be admissible as
evidence.
[. . .]
181. However, the following must be reiterated: (i) that the right to
a legal defense recognizes within its scope the principle of
interdiction in the case of a lack of defense, which at the heart of the
case means the exclusion and censure of a deprivation or limitation
of the essential opportunities provided by all the rights instrumental
to a defense, including the right to be assisted by counsel; (ii) that
observance of the interdiction in the case of a lack of defense is
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directed at the court and prevents its orders from harming the
defendant’s legal situation arbitrarily; therefore, if the lack of defense
is created by the defendant’s own reasons and volition, entails an
attitude voluntarily adopted by the defendant, or is due to the lack of
diligence or expertise of his defense counsel, it does not exist as
such; (iii) that, in the instant case, the defendant knew of the
existence of a criminal case against him—a fact he has not denied—
and decided not to comply with the judicial summons in the case,
which academically and legally is called not absence but rather
contempt of court; (iv) that the ruling of absence or contempt is a
procedural act that creates such status, and its issuance requires that
all necessary means be exhausted to put the defendant on the right
path, at which point he is assigned court-appointed counsel; (v) that,
in the instant case, once the investigating court officially verified the
defendant’s deliberate avoidance and his willful failure to comply
with the court summons, he was formally declared in contempt of
court and a fugitive (there are two such orders in this consolidated
case) and he was assigned a court-appointed attorney; (vi) that,
therefore, a material lack of defense was not an issue in the pretrial
investigations because the lack of representation at that phase was
due to the defendant’s own attitude; moreover, the Chambers of the
Investigating Judge did not deny access to the proceedings or hinder
the assistance of a private attorney, which the defendant failed to
name; (vii) that the opportunity for confrontation, central to the lines
of defense required in the investigating court, was not diminished or
maliciously impeded, and therefore the pretrial investigation
proceedings cannot be preliminarily rejected or considered irrelevant
in terms of their admissibility according to the circumstances of the
case.
Chapter II: Alberto Fujimori’s assumption of the presidency and the
bases of his regime
§1. The presidential election.
¶2. The new government strategy
[. . .]
190. The foregoing demonstrates that significant changes were
made beginning on July [28th, 1999], starting with the preeminence
of the SIN and the central role of Montesinos Torres in the definition
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of those changes. In this new functional and political aspect, the SIN
was authorized to conduct operational intelligence, thus rendering it
more accountable to the President of the Republic. Its most important
regulatory reference initially was Legislative Decree No.746, which,
incidentally, was not the only reference, given the dynamics of an
entire process involving the cooptation of the Armed Forces and the
PNP and the significant role—undoubtedly excessive and
illegitimate—of the SIN [. . .]
§2. The coup d’état of April [5th, 1992]
¶1. Circumstances and prior acts.
[. . .]
197. The coup d’état was not impromptu. There were several prior
meetings between the high command of the Armed Forces and the
National Police and Alberto Fujimori and his presidential advisor,
held on April 3 and 4, 1992, and attended by the following
individuals: Nicolas Hermoza Ríos, Salazar Monroe, Carmona Acha,
Velarde Ramirez, Robles Esponiza and Pizarro Castañeda. All of
them, as previously stated, were Heads of the Armed Forces and the
Police and have acknowledged their attendance at said meeting
(Operative Point 197, p. 197-199).
¶2. The Message to the Nation and the deprivations of liberty
[. . .]
199. Defendant Fujimori Fujimori ordered the Armed Forces and
the PNP to take immediate actions to guarantee the measures
announced and to ensure order and national security. This is
evidenced by the fact that that the Army, Navy, Air Force troops, and
National Police, took control of the city of Lima and the main cities
in the provinces. Congress was occupied, as were the Palace of
Justice, media facilities and public areas, while political figures and
well-known journalists were deprived of their liberty.
[. . .]
¶4. Immediate measures and consequences
206. The coup d’état that defendant Fujimori Fujimori ordered on
April 5, 1992, in spite of the fact that on July 20, 1990, he had taken
a solemn oath to defend the Constitution and promised to fight for
democracy, was a clearly unconstitutional and criminal act with no
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mitigating circumstances. This act resulted in the installation of a
dictatorship. There is no justification for the criminal illegality of his
conduct, nor any legally or constitutionally relevant motive that
would prevent the political censure and criminal prosecution of its
participants. The rejection of the coup d’état internationally was
unanimous. The pressure that the OAS and the most important
democracies brought to bear upon the de facto regime resulted in a
set of commitments and agreements for the restoration of democratic
order.
Chapter III: The President of the Republic and the control of
terrorism
[. . .]
§2. The President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and
the PNP
[. . .]
216. The head of state as commander in chief of the Armed Forces
and National has discretionary powers. Therefore, the president—the
operator or agent of such authority—enjoys the freedom to choose
the course of State action, and his decision is an exclusive
manifestation of his power. As held by the Constitutional Court, the
constitutional framework does not establish specific conditions,
precautions or procedures with regard to these types of powers,
unlike those that are regulated. Rather, the constitutional framework
sets forth only the respective allocation of powers. As such, the
manner, timeliness, convenience or inconvenience of that allocation
is subject to the political criterion of whomever exercises the
authority. For this reason, the acts that fall within the purview of the
head of state’s authority are not justiciable, unless the courts
responsible for the oversight and defense of constitutionality declare
their own jurisdiction over the issue.
[. . .]
¶2. Actual exercise of leadership of the Armed Forces
220. Presidential military authority, in the terms set forth above,
was a recurrent invocation and practice of defendant Fujimori
Fujimori in his relations with law enforcement personnel, when
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facing the public, and in the context of the fight against terrorist
subversion.
§3. The military powers of the President of the Republic
[. . .]
¶2. Political command authority over the military
224. Assuming these guidelines, several general and senior
officers of the Armed Forces and the PNP testified at the trial. Their
testimony established the constant exercise of Fujimori Fujimori’s
political authority over the military as commander in chief of the
Armed Forces and National Police. This authority was expressed
outwardly through binding governmental or presidential directives
relative, mainly, to the fight against terrorist subversion. Thus,
among others, it is necessary to highlight the statements of Army
Generals Cubas Portal, Rojas García, Rivero Lazo, Luis Salazar
Monroe, Robles Espinoza, Hermoza Ríos and Briones Dávila, as
well as that of Army Colonel Pino Benamú.
¶3. Effective command authority over the military
[False]
227. The foregoing leads to the conclusion that whomever has
command authority unfailingly has operational command. That is to
say, this person has the power to give orders and the ability to
exercise that power over a specific unit, with the consequent duties
and responsibilities that come with it. Nevertheless, whomever has
operational command does not always have authority or strategic
command in the strict sense of the term over a specific unit.
Now, effective military command, or operational command stricto
sensu is commonly held by professional servicemen, given the
technical characteristics required for its efficient exercise. In the case
of the head of the Peruvian State, this expression of military power is
not entirely perceptible, since this power amounts to a function that
involves merely the execution of policies and strategies designed and
shaped by the political military leadership—that is, by the entity in
charge of the National Defense and Security System, whose highest
decision-making body is the National Security Council (which in the
previous decade was called the National Defense Council) and which
is presided over by the President of the Republic.
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¶4. Military powers of the commander in chief
228. In view of the foregoing, it can be asserted that the
Constitution grants the head of state military powers for national
defense that are developed prominently in terms of political authority
over the military. Nevertheless, the constitutional provisions do not
specify the scope of effective military command or operational
command, strictly speaking, that he could exercise when a number of
factors are combined.
The subordication of the Armed Forces and the National Police is
established immediately because the Constitution refers to a category
of leadership. As such, the premise is one of operational command
arising from the interaction of hierarchical steps in a vertical line.
Moreover, by classifying such leadership as “supreme,” the
operational command that it embodies is the maximum possible in
the Armed Forces and the National Police. In this way, the chain of
operational command (not of political command authority)
culminates, by express constitutional mandate, in the institution of
the President of the Republic.
229. However, this operational command must be expressed
lawfully only in the areas where the military command relationships
do not operate, so as not to infringe upon the authority of others—
that is, to not act in disregard of the command authority of others. It
is, consequently, an authority with which to respond to assumptions
of fact, and to fill in the gaps that result from the command structure
of the clearly defined system of powers. Therefore, the orders issued
by the President of the Republic in the exercise of his role as
commander in chief or maximum operational commander of the
Armed Forces and National Police hierarchies, do not necessarily
require any particular formality. They may be written, verbal,
express or implied. It should be made clear that the procedural
requirements of an order are reserved exclusively for the military
command relationships within the organizational structure of the
specific military units, which are frequently governed by a strict
procedure that establishes the observance of legal formalities for the
order and a written record of it.
¶5. Defendant Fujimori Fujimori as Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces
[. . .]
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232. Consequently, all of Alberto Fujimori Fujimori’s activities as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the PNP that have
been reviewed and proven on the record demonstrate the military
authority that the constitution confers upon the head of state. It is
proven, then, that defendant Fujimori Fujimori undoubtedly
exercised political authority over the military as well as effective
military authority, thus outwardly expressing his command authority
and maximum operational command over the Armed Forces and the
PNP, at a strategic political level, and at a tactical and operational
level, which included specific personnel or units.
[. . .]
§5. The President of the Republic and the SIN
¶1. Regulatory changes.
[. . .]
241. The major change, from a regulatory standpoint, was
consolidated with the enactment of Legislative Decrees No. 743 (the
National Defense System Act), and 746 (the National Intelligence
System Act), both of November 12, 1991. The general thrust of these
changes are that the SIN, accountable directly to the President of the
Republic, is now considered the central and governing organization
of the SINA, which is composed of (in addition to the SIN) the
intelligence agencies of the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign
Affairs, Economy and Finance, and Education, the intelligence
bodies of the defense sector, and the intelligence bodies of other
government ministries and entities. It has the status of a government
ministry, is a budget sector agency and adopts its own regulations. It
produces national, field and operational intelligence, and is
responsible for integrating the intelligence gathered in the political,
economic, psycho-social and military fields—while still producing
the first three kinds—for the President of the Republic and the main
agencies of the National Defense System. Principally, it can conduct
operational intelligence actions according to the different disturbance
factors affecting National Security and National Defense (Article
10).
According to Legislative Decree No. 743, the SINA is part of the
National Defense System (Article 11(c)). SINA’s role is to provide
the President of the Republic and the main National Defense System
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agencies the intelligence required for the planning and conduct of
National Defense (Article 19). The SIN Chief is the highest ranking
official of the SINA, and is appointed by the President of the
Republic (Article 19). [. . .]
¶2. Explanations based on the exercise of power
243. All of the foregoing is explained by defendant Fujimori
Fujimori’s interest in positioning Vladimiro Montesinos Torres as
the great coordinator of the intelligence system and the one to
channel his decisions into the military sphere. Fujimori Fujimori did
this because he required the centralization of military power and
control of the intelligence and military spheres, in order to carry out
his countersubversive strategy and to establish a system for the
exercise of power that served his political objectives.
[. . .]
Chapter IV: The Armed Forces and the Government of Alberto
Fujimori Fujimori
[. . .]
§2. Organization and operation of the Armed Forces
[. . .]
255. In conclusion, the power that Army General Hermoza Ríos
held as of December 19, 1991, in the previously mentioned positions
(Commander General the Army, president of the CCFFAA and Chief
of the COFI), was well-known and definitive, at least formally. He
concentrated the dominant power of the military in all the operations
against terrorist subversion, and was in practice the highest military
chief, to whom, in this field, all of the armed forces institutions were
subordinate. However, this unity and concentration of military
power, of course—as established in the preceding Chapters—was
under the supreme leadership of the commander in chief, that is,
accountable directly to the President of the Republic, defendant
Fujimori Fujimori. Moreover, the President had positioned
Montesinos Torres as an operator and intermediary in his relations
with the Armed Forces, when Montesinos Torres was also the de
facto head of the SIN, and with it the entire SINA.
[. . .]
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§6. The absolute interference of Army General Hermoza Ríos in the
Armed Forces
[. . .]
272. There is also no doubt that Army General Hermoza Ríos, in
his capacity as Commander General of the Army, was authorized to
exercise his power to intervene in all spheres and functional levels of
the Army.
[. . .]
273. All of these events, without a doubt, would not have been
able to take place without the knowledge, approval and active
involvement of the senior military commander. His rank and the
military post or position that he held, and the very operation of the
military structure (hierarchical, disciplined and extensively
formalized, with rigid levels of internal information and specific
control of the activities of its members), would have made it
impossible for everything that took place—and it was a lot, in terms
of extent, intensity and time frame—to have occurred behind his
back and, moreover, without his malicious interference.
274. In light of Hermoza Ríos’s major interference, the Court
rejects the explanation that he was ignorant of what occurred. The
degree of his power within the Armed Forces demonstrates that it
was near absolute. The Court also takes into account, as information
that reveals his knowledge and participation in the events, the
absence of immediate sanctions and corrective measures. These two
points, taken together, reveal with abundant clarity the degree of
involvement of the highest levels of the military in the commission
of the crimes at issue in this case.
Chapter V: The National Intelligence Service
§2. Placement of Vladimiro Montesinos Torres within the SIN
280. It is clear that Montesinos Torres attained, his position
position because President’s Fujimori Fujimori order. The defendant
initially sought to appoint him as SIN Chief, but given the objections
of the president of the Council of Ministers, Hurtado Miller, he opted
for the position of advisor to the Office of the Senior Director of the
SIN. At first it was informal, and later, when faced with public
outcry, it became formal. Defendant Fujimori Fujimori was not
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unfamiliar with Montesinos Torres’s history, through journalistic
information as well as directly (Bulletin No. 001–SIE407 addresses
this issue). Furthermore, his background could not be overlooked, as
the appointment of a government employee to an important position
with major ramifications for public policies on political matters,
intelligence and security necessarily required sufficient investigation
of his résumé and his public and professional career.
§3. Influence of Vladimiro Montesinos Torres in the SIN
[. . .]
282. The testimony of Degredori [sic] Caso, Máximo San Román
Cáceres, Benedicto Jiménez Baca, Pino Benamu, Robles Espinoza,
Hermoza Ríos, Human Azcurra and Jara Flores only corroborate
Montesinos Torres’s control, as a direct representative of defendant
Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, in the spheres of Defense, the Interior and
Intelligence, where, at least during the early years of the regime at
issue in this case, an atypical model of national government was
consolidated.
284. In view of the above-cited statements, it can be concluded
that the nominal SIN Chief during that period of time was Army
General Salazar Monroe, while the actual Chief, who in fact assumed
the authority inherent in the position, was presidential advisor
Montesinos Torres.
¶2. Involvement in the regulatory restructuring of the SIN and
the National Defense System
[. . .]
288. It is clear, then, that under the direction of Montesinos Torres
(who in fact was a direct subordinate of defendant Fujimori Fujimori,
to whom he was accountable, to the exclusion of other top
government officials), operational intelligence became an activity
that fell within the purview of the SIN. This was achieved through
Legislative Decrees 743 and 746. This activity had in fact already
begun in January of [1991], as will be explained in detail below,
but—as previously explained—was not provided for legally in
Legislative Decrees No. 270 and 271, which only authorized the SIN
to produce strategic intelligence (See Article 2 of Legislative Decree
No. 271).

748

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:657

It is therefore reasonable to consider that the ultimate goal of
Legislative Decree No. 746, beyond making the operations more
integrated and efficient—that is, authorizing the execution of special
intelligence operations pursuant to its Article 10(c)—was to
concentrate and direct the totality of the State’s intelligence activities
and to impose the interference of the SIN at all levels of government,
even under penalty of criminal sanctions. Indeed, Article 16 of
Legislative Decree No. 746 established that the intelligence bodies of
the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Economy and Finance,
Education and Defense had a mandatory obligation to provide the
documentation, information and intelligence requested of them; the
same applied to other ministries, public agencies, and local and
regional governments.
[. . .]
291. The set of rules established by the SIN was compatible with
the needs of the countersubversive strategy of the Armed Forces: the
increase of power and the discretion to act. The proposals of the SIN,
which became rules with the force of law, consisted precisely of
elevating the status and importance of the SIN within the SINA, to
enable it to centralize and control the activities and budget of the
police and military intelligence services.
¶3. Management of the SIN’s Budget
[. . .]
293. It has been proven, consequently, that by the end of [1990]
Montesinos Torres already had institutional control over the military
and intelligence. He participated as a personal representative of
President Fujimori Fujimori in meetings with the Minister of
Defense and the CCFFAA. In fact, he had become the spokesman of
the Armed Forces before the President of the Republic, which meant
that the senior military officers did not have direct access to the
president but rather had to go through Montesinos Torres. This was
confirmed by Merino Bartet [. . .].
§4. The SIN and special intelligence operations
[. . .]
300. In conclusion, it was from and beginning with the SIN—
under the direction of Montesinos Torres—that the state apparatus
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was organized and restructured to deal with, among other things, the
fight against terrorist subversion. An organized apparatus of power
was set up for such purposes, to the point that it directed the totality
of the State’s secret services, and centralized the intelligence
activities and gave them new importance.
It bears repeating that presidential advisor Montesinos Torres,
among other undertakings: (i) suggested and obtained the
appointment of senior military officers of the Army and the PNP (the
appointments of Army Generals Hermoza Ríos, Salazar Monroe,
Zegarra Delgado, Torres Aciego and others are relevant, as well as
that of PNP General Cuba y Escobedo); (ii) proposed, from the SIN,
the laws pertaining to the SIN and the SINA, including those
concerning defense and public security; (iii) concentrated, from the
SIN, the intelligence information from all spheres of national
activity, which would be provided to President Fujimori Fujimori,
and for which an intelligence channel was established to facilitate the
receipt of the intelligence produced by the appropriate agencies of
the Armed Forces and the National Police, including the SIN itself;
and (iv) acted on behalf of the President of the Republic and, on his
instructions, intervened in the ministries and other organizations
involved in national defense and public security.
Chapter VI: The National Intelligence Directorate and the Army
Intelligence Service
[. . .]
§2. General Rivero Lazo, Director of the DINTE
¶2. Administration of the executing unit. Funding of the
Colina Detachment
309. The transfer of the Executing Unit of the SIE to the DINTE
indicates that the financial control of the activities of the Army
intelligence agencies was the responsibility of the DINTE. The
execution and control of expenditures were even demonstrated
through extraordinary budget allocations and special payments that
were made to the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment. The new
director of the DINTE, Army General Chirinos Chirinos, wanted to
control this specific area of the DINTE in relation to the Colina
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Detachment, but was unsuccessful in his attempts, as discussed
below.
¶3. Participation of the DINTE in the creation of the Analysis
Group
310. Army General Rivero Lazo acknowledged that he became the
head of the DINTE on January [2nd or 3rd, 1991], and that ten days
later he received an invitation from the chief of the SIN to coordinate
intelligence tasks. There is no doubt that immediately after Army
General Rivero Lazo became the director of the DINTE, an Analysis
Group was formed at the at the request of the SIN to examine
documents in the possession of the GEIN [Special Intelligence
Group] of the DIRCOTE, and that it was controlled by the DINTE as
well as the SIN, at their respective levels; it is understood that at that
time the SIN began to control the SINA.
[. . .]
312. Consequently, the DINTE was tied to the Analysis Group
and, in a way, controlled its work, although the SIN—which had
already assumed de facto leadership of the SINA—was the one that
created it and, obviously, exercised complete control over its work.
¶4. Participation in the events in Barrios Altos
313.There is sufficient evidence of the involvement of the DINTE
in the arbitrary executions in Barrios Altos. The statements of Army
Colonels Pino Benamú and Silva Mendoza are important in this
respect.
¶5. Participation in the crimes at La Cantuta
314. There is no doubt that he [Rivero Lazo] was involved in the
acts perpetrated at La Cantuta University on July [18th, 1992]; his
involvement was as Army Intelligence Director.
On this point, it is important to note the statement of Army
General Pérez Documet, Commander General of the DIFE, who was
in charge of the Civic Action Base at La Cantuta. This Army General
stated that on July [18th, 1992], the Commander General of the
Army, Army General Hermoza Ríos, called him on the phone and
ordered him to support Army General Rivero Lazo, Director of the
DINTE, by providing the assistance of Army Lieutenant Portella
Núñez. This order was carried out. He stated that Army Major
Martin Rivas came to his office at around seven o’clock in the

2010]

JUDGMENT AGAINST FUJIMORI

751

evening, saying that he had come on behalf of Army General Rivero
Lazo. Rivas explained to him that they needed Army Lieutenant
Portella Núñez because he had served at the Civic Action Base at La
Cantuta, and they needed him to identify certain individuals who
were going to be interrogated. Accordingly, General Pérez Documet
ordered the Army Lieutenant to provide the support that Army
General Rivero Lazo needed. He stated that that the next morning he
was informed that Army Major Martin Rivas had taken students and
a professor from La Cantuta University, killed them, and buried
them. He further stated that on July twentieth of the same year, Army
General Rivero Lazo called him and suggested that he remove Army
Lieutenant Portella Núñez from Battalion No. 39, where he was
serving, and to keep him near his office. When he asked Rivero Lazo
the reason for this suggestion, he answered that it was necessary to
instruct Army Lieutenant Portella Núñez as to what he would say
about the events of July [18th, 1992]. He stated that he told Army
General Rivero Lazo in response that if he wanted to instruct Army
Lieutenant Portella Núñez, he should request that he be posted to the
DINTE. He stated that the following day General Hermoza Ríos
called him into his office and rebuked him for his lack of
cooperation. Pérez Documet stated that he told Rivero Lazo that he
had always cooperated, but that he could not get involved in what
took place at La Cantuta. This response undoubtedly annoyed
General Hermoza Ríos, who for that reason ordered him to leave.
¶6. Participation in the subsequent acts of concealment
315. The DINTE intervened in all of the institutional mechanisms
that were conceived of to deny the events of Barrios Altos and La
Cantuta, and to question the public information that pointed in that
direction. [. . .]
§5. Special intelligence operations
Approval and execution by the DINTE and the SIE
321. The DUFSIDE—updated by the DINTE in November of
[1994], when Army General Hermoza Ríos was the Commander
General of the Army, contains all of the rules and provisions issued
by the DINTE that were in force up to that time. It prescribed that the
SIE was the only agency authorized to plan and execute special
intelligence operations, but that its execution necessarily required the
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approval of the DINTE. The SIE, as the executive body of the
DINTE, was directly responsible for seeking information for Basic
Intelligence Training (EBI), and for providing it to the DINTE and to
the bodies of the SIDE, according to the DINTE’s orders.
Army Colonel PINO BENAMÚ stated that the SIDE was
governed by the DUFSIDE, that it was a regulatory document,
formally and officially in force in the year [1991]. He stated that all
of the officers who went to work at the SIDE agencies had to read it,
and that they even would sign a confidentiality agreement, given that
it was a highly classified (“secret”) document that was under no
circumstances to be removed from the headquarters to which the
officer had been assigned [this is indicated in number 4.c of the
DUFSIDE instructions].
[. . .]
Chapter VII: The Colina Special Intelligence Detachment
§1. Background
¶2. The Analysis Group
325. The existence of the Analysis Group has not been denied by
any of its members, or by the agencies to which they belonged.
[. . .]
326. The Analysis Group was formed at the request and under the
control of the SIN, without detriment to the overriding involvement
of the DINTE, between January and August of [1991]. The trial
testimony of Cuba y Escobedo, Jhon Caro, Miyashiro Ayashiro,
Vidal Herrera, Jiménez Baca, Rivero Lazo, Salazar Monroe,
Rodríguez Zabalbescoa, Martin Rivas, Pichilingue Guevara, Flores
Alvan and Pino Benamu confirm the existence and purpose of the
Analysis Group.
327. The following points stand out from the above individuals’
testimony:
1. The Analysis Group was made up of members of the SIE,
the SIN and Naval Intelligence.
2. The Analysis Group was established at the request and
under the control of the SIN, under the responsibility of
Montesinos Torres, who exercised complete control over its
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work, without being dissociated from the DINTE. It started
with the SIE members and their chief, Army Lieutenant
Colonel Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa. Defendant Fujimori
Fujimori was not unaware of the existence of the Analysis
Group, as was also established in Chapters IV and VI of this
Part Two.
3. The meetings and the agreement to form the Analysis
Group were coordinated from January of [1991], and its
presence within the GEIN of the DIRCOTE was imposed by
the SIN. Its objective was to obtain intelligence information
on the PCP–SL, as established in Chapter IV of Part Two of
this judgment. In June of that year, when the Team withdrew
from the GEIN, the written Manual—in fact the initial
original text—was turned over to the then-PNP Commander
Jiménez Baca. The document served as the basis for his
presentation before the Army High Command, as discussed
below.
¶3. The meeting of the Army High Command
328. The meeting of the military high command at the Peruvian
Army Headquarters was held in June of [1991]. Those who took part
in it have not denied that it took place. The date on which it was
probably held, bearing in mind the first presidential memorandum
and the date on which the Colina Detachment was formed, was June
twenty-sixth. Army General Rivero Lazo, Army Lieutenant Colonel
Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa and Army Majors Martin Rivas and
Pichilingue Guevara also confirm this.
[. . .]
330. Consequently, Army Captain Martin Rivas’s presentation to
the Army High Command was not an everyday presentation. Its
importance has been underscored by then Army Chief of Staff, Army
General Hermoza Ríos, who at the end of that year was appointed
Commander General of the Army and at the beginning of [1992] was
named president of the CCFFAA.
It is notable that the very dynamics of the meeting of the Army
High Command rule out the possibility that on that occasion they
would have simply been made aware, without further detail and
analysis, of what was happening and of the institutional and
operational news from the large units. This is true especially if the
PCP–SL and the MRTA had suffered several setbacks in the fight
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against subversion, while at the same time they were dispersing their
activities in a disorderly manner, which required an operational
response that had to be prepared by the CCFFAA. Army Captain
Martin Rivas even specified that the order was given to expand the
initial original text; although it was thought that the analytical focus
was correct, the military responses were criticized because it was a
descriptive document. Therefore, the text was completed in
November of [1991], although clearly parallel to the activities of the
Colina Detachment.
Army Captain Pichilingue [Guevara] stated that that signified the
exchange and verification of information and data.
[. . .]
§2. Formation of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment
334. Memorandum No. 5775–B–4.a/DINTE of August [22nd,
1991], signed by the Director of the DINTE, Army General Rivero
Lazo (the document contains handwritten notes, which Army
Colonel Silva Mendoza identified as his own), can be classified as
the official document that consolidated the creation of the Colina
Detachment. This document ordered the SIE Chief to arrange for the
presence of personnel for August [23re, 1991], at the SIE
Maintenance Storehouse in Las Palmas. They would be under the
command of Army Lieutenant Colonel Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa. The
memorandum lists the names of nine operative intelligence officers,
including Suppo Sánchez, Carbajal García, Arce Janampa, Coral
Goycochea, Alarcón Gonzales, Caballero Zegarra, Gamarra Mamani,
Salazar Correa and Benites León [under the heading that corresponds
Benites León there is an indication of “no” and Yarlequé—who
ultimately became a member of the Detachment—is indicated].
Further, it orders the delivery, for Monday, August [25th, 1991], of
various items of equipment, weapons and ammunition, including six
HK P–5 pistols, six HK P–7 pistols, twenty grenades, two desks, two
mattresses and other items, plus two cameras, three Walkie Talkies,
sleeping bags, night vision goggles, six pairs of handcuffs and six
coveralls.
[. . .]
339. There were also changes within the Detachment, without
detriment to its financial support, as is normal in any fully active

2010]

JUDGMENT AGAINST FUJIMORI

755

institution. It should be noted that in the documentation created with
respect to such matters, in many written communications, there is
express mention of “Desto Colina.” This means, clearly, that the
Detachment was a unit, strictly speaking a Special Detachment,
within the SIDE.
[. . .]
341. Another element of the Colina Detachment’s activities was
the creation of the shell company Consultores y Constructores de
Proyectos América Sociedad Anónima, or Conpramsa. This
company was incorporated on November [13th, 1991], and the
shareholders are listed as Army Captains Martin Rivas and
Pichilingue Guevara, Army Commander Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa,
and Army General Rivero Lazo. On September ninth of the
following year, there was a capital increase and partial amendment of
the bylaws, in the minutes of which operative intelligence officer
Juan Pampa Quilla acted as the attorney. The officers involved stated
that it was a business that belonged to Army Captain Pichilingue
Guevara and his family, to whom a loan was given, and that their
appearance as shareholders in the company was a result of the
nonpayment of the loan. Such statements are, in and of themselves,
implausible. The four shareholders did not state that they were
active-duty servicemen; they signed the minutes and the document
recorded by the notary; they were members of the DINTE, and they
were linked to the Colina Detachment and to Plan Cipango. In
addition, wiretap intelligence officer Flores Alván explained that
Conpramsa was a front for the Detachment. He stated that he went to
work there in about November of [1991], that he rendered his service
at that company, and also that when the events of La Cantuta took
place he was left operating the company’s equipment (the company
had communications equipment). He further stated that in June of
[1992], the company’s business name was changed to Proyectos
América, which was in operation until [1993], because a scandal
broke when it became public knowledge that the company belonged
to the Colina Detachment.
§3. The mission of the Colina Detachment
342. Wiretap intelligence officer Flores Alván, who transcribed
Plan Cipango, stated that it created the Colina Special Intelligence
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Detachment. It established the mission that the SIE or the DINTE
was to carry out an orderly, systematic infiltration of intelligence
officers in the city of Lima, as well as in the towns of Huaral and
Huacho for purposes of detecting, locating and identifying the
members of the Central Committee and the National Leadership of
the PCP–SL and MRTA, respectively, in support of the military and
intelligence operations of the Second Military Region, the CCFFAA
and the DINTE. This formal document, which resulted in an entire
administrative movement involving the deployment of personnel,
budget allocations, logistics, and a structured level of coordination at
the command level, placed the DINTE in charge of the Operation,
and the SIE in charge of providing logistics and administrative
oversight and control. In the appendix, Army General Rivero Lazo
was assigned as Chief of the Operation, Army Lieutenant Colonel
Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa was named the Control officer, and Army
Captains Martin Rivas and Pichilingue Guevara were the designated
Case Officers. This structure is even similar to that set forth in
Section III of Manual ME 38–20, under “Intelligence Networks,”
specifically the “Indirect Control Network.” According to this form
of control, the executive body delegates control and leadership over
the officers directly to the case officer, and maintains overall control
of the network. The Manual provides that this shall be the usual
method for the establishment of the networks, because of the
advantages of the decentralization of command and the security of
the network [See No. 30.b. Section III. of ME 38–20, Intelligence
Networks]. Indeed, in the text, a central agency is considered before
the executive body—which essentially would be the DINTE or the
SIN. The documents created as a result of the activities of the Colina
Detachment, which were provided by the arrepentido wiretap
intelligence officer Flores Alván, recount that, at least between
March and August of 1992, briefing notes, reports and official letters
were issued with express reference to Plan Cipango. These three
documents support the assertion that Plan Cipango defined the
activities of the Colina Detachment. The Court has before it not only
the assertions of specific operative intelligence officers but also
documents created by the Detachment itself or by reason of its
activities.
343. The initial assertion of the operative intelligence officers is
the same as what is indicated in Plan Cipango. However, some of the
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members of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment maintain
that only after the killings or arbitrary executions of Barrios Altos
did they understand that the Detachment’s mission was to eliminate
people. This information can be dismissed, given the preparations
made for the execution of the crime, the fact that they carried
offensive weapons, and the manner and circumstances in which the
arbitrary executions in Barrios Altos took place. Furthermore, there
was no punitive or disciplinary response from the institution as a
consequence of the events, and many other crimes were carried out
subsequently that involved forced disappearances and extrajudicial
executions—to the point that they even carried picks, shovels and
lime with them in order to bury their victims in secret. This
corroborates the statements of operative intelligence officers Ortiz
Mantas, Gamarra Mamani and Coral Goycochea, and even that of
operative intelligence officer Tena Jacinto. They all knew about the
Detachment’s basic mission: arbitrary executions, forced
disappearances and extrajudicial executions, in a common pattern.
[. . .]
§4. Internal structure and reporting relationships of the Colina
Detachment
[. . .]
348. [. . .] The Colina Detachment had to report its activities to the
SIN, specifically to Montesinos Torres, as soon as it conducted any
OEIs. There are express references by members of Colina
Detachment to Montesinos Torres’s involvement or leadership. The
statements of PNP Colonel Jiménez Baca and PNP General Vidal
Herrera corroborate this, as they maintain that all activities pertaining
to the control of subversion had to be reported personally to
Montesinos Torres.
§6. Meetings of the Colina Detachment and the rewarding of its
members
350. The Colina Detachment held one of its most important
meetings on June 27, 1992, at the invitation of the Commander
General of the Army himself, Army General Hermoza Ríos. That
meeting signified for most of its members an incentive for the work
they had been performing; by that time they had already carried out
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approximately six special intelligence operations. They felt that they
had the backing of the most senior military chief and head of the
countersubversive operations, as he was president of the CCFFAA
and chief of the COFI. Flores Alvan, Lecca Esquen, Hinojosa Sopla
and Hermoza Ríos testified about this meeting.94
[. . .]
§7. Internal operations in the development of OEIs (sections 352 to
355 of the Court’s holding)
353. The activities of the Colina Detachment, consequently, were
decided at levels much higher than the Detachment itself, especially
in the cases of OEIs that resulted in the deaths of individuals. The
positions and individuals cited in their planning and preparation go
beyond even military intelligence itself, and reside at levels that are
clearly higher. Not only was it a matter of defining the target of the
attack and carrying out the actions necessary for their realization—
with all of the attendant internal organization, prior planning,
effective training, readiness for attack, and discipline and order in its
execution—but also of reporting and submitting to oversight and
subsequent evaluations. A mission accomplished is not reported in
order for the superior simply to be informed; rather, it is for a set of
activities that go beyond the mere control of the specific actions
taken.
354. The special intelligence operations carried out by the Colina
Detachment consisting of arbitrary and extrajudicial executions and
forced disappearances (known to date) were the following:
1. At the tenement house in Barrios Altos, on November 3,
1991.
2. In the district of Pativilca, in the towns of Caraqueño and
San José, on January 28, 1992.
3. In the district of El Santa in Chimbote, in the urban
settlements of “La Huaca,” “Javier Heraud” and “San
Carlos,” on May 2, 1992.

94. See this same section of the Court’s holding, which has been omitted from
this summary, for the content of these individuals’ statements (Publisher’s note).
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4. In the city of Huacho, against journalist Pedro Herminio
Sauri Bustamante, on June 24, 1992.
5. In the same district of Huacho, against the Ventocilla
family, on June 24, 1992.
6. In Chorrillos, in Metropolitan Lima, in the urban
settlement of “Pescadores,” against Fortunato Gómez
Palomino, in May or June of 1992.
7. At La Cantuta University, on July 17, 1992.
8. In Ate–Vitarte, in the vicinity of the Carretera Central
[Main Highway], on an unspecified date in 1992.
355. The following individuals were the targets of special
intelligence operations consisting of surveillance and tracking:
1. Members of the Asociación de Abogados Democráticos
[Association of Democratic Attorneys], including attorneys
Crespo, Cartagena and Huatay.
2. The chief of the Annihilation Command of the PCP–SL in
Metropolitan Lima and other alleged members of that
terrorist organization, including Comrade Joel and Angélica
Salas de la Cruz.
3. Left-wing political leaders Yehude Simon Munaro and
Javier Diez Canseco.
4. Army General Robles Espinosa (tracking with a view to
detention). Operative intelligence officer Mesmer Carles
Talledo, accused of being a PCP–SL infiltrator within the
SIDE, was also arrested and interrogated. Surveillance was
also conducted in volatile areas with a strong presence of
terrorist individuals, such as the urban settlements of
Huaycán and Raucana in Metropolitan Lima. Operations
were conducted to seize explosive material in the possession
of terrorists (one unsuccessful case occurred on July 26, 1992
in Matucana); and there was an intervention in
Chanchamayo.
The acts described above will be discussed later in greater detail in
the Chapter on other crimes of the Colina Detachment.
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Chapter VIII: Special Intelligence Operations
§1. Scope of the concept of Special Intelligence Operation.
356. Special Intelligence Operations [hereinafter OEI] were, as
explained at the trial by Army Colonel Silva Mendoza (SIE chief in
1991), “special and secret operations to meet specific, important
intelligence and counterintelligence objectives for purposes of
obtaining information and/or causing harm to the adversary.” He
added, from the perspective of his military experience, and invoking
subsection (g) of Article 4 of ME 38–20, Special Intelligence
Operations Manual, that the phrase “cause harm” means to strike,
take down, and eliminate—that is, kill. He further stated that
document analysis cannot be called OEI, which was noted in regard
to the congratulations that former president Alberto Fujimori
Fujimori bestowed upon the group of officers that included Martín
Rivas, Pichilingue Guevara and Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa.
For his part, Army Colonel Pino Benamú,95 Assistant Director of
the Internal Front of the DINTE in 1991, stated—without getting into
security details—that special intelligence operations were performed
by a multi-purpose group with officers with special qualifications
(wiretapping, physical penetration) who could engage in espionage
and terrorism, and whose mission was to obtain information or cause
harm to the adversary.
357. The operative intelligence officers, tried for the same acts that
defendant Alberto Fujimori Fujimori is accused of, admitted
conclusively in their trial testimony in this case that they belonged to
the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment. They further
acknowledged that it was a group designed to conduct OEIs resulting
in death, which were called for and directed by Army Major Martín
Rivas. [. . .] (The Court has received various statements—at least 13
statements—that support this assertion.)
358. The similarity in the planning and execution of the OEIs
described by the operative intelligence officers who were members
of the Colina Detachment is not by chance. Such description, in
general terms, fits and is consistent with procedures regulated
precisely in Manuals—Army doctrines that set forth, in theory, the
95. Statement of Army Colonel Pino Benamú at the thirty-fifth session.
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form, structure and conduct of the OEIs—and in Directives with
nuances tailored to their needs.
The following are the four official texts relevant to the case:
1. Special Intelligence Operations and Counterintelligence
Manual me 38–20 [. . .].
2. Basic Teams Manual me 38–23666,
Intelligence of the Peruvian Army [. . .].

in

Military

3. Manual me 41–7, Unconventional Countersubversive War
[. . .].
4. Sole Operational Directive of the Army Intelligence
System (hereinafter DUFSIDE) [. . .].
359. The senior Army officials who have testified confirmed that
the previously cited Manuals and the Directive did in fact govern and
were used by the different bodies within the institution [. . .]. ( the
Court considered the statements of: Army General Robles Espinoza,
Army General Ramal Pesantes, and Army Colonel Pino Benamú).
360. It follows from the above that, indeed, an organization was
devised clearly for purposes of conducting special intelligence
operations. Its management, planning and operation—including that
of the Intelligence Team itself—undoubtedly was governed by the
Manuals and the DUFSIDE, inevitable in the military culture. it must
be stressed that this structure, or rather, organizational system with
respect to the OEIs was based on Manuals (which are instruments
that set forth the doctrine that specifically summarizes and
consolidates an institutional practice, explains its operation and
rationalizes or orders or defines the conduct of its members) and
Directives (which in the case of the Colina Detachment were used to
form the group and, to a certain degree, to govern its activities and
internal logic). The participation of the DINTE and of the SIN is
evident [. . .].
§2. The Colina Detachment and the Execution of OEIs.
[. . .]
363. The OEIs of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta were developed
based on a plan that had the assistance of higher levels of authority.
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A. OEI in Barrios Altos:
1. This operation was likewise led by then-Army Captain
Martin Rivas—backed by Captain Pichiligüe Guevara—and
executed by the Colina Detachment. Their immediate
superior, after Army Colonel Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa, was
Army General Rivero Lazo, Director of the DINTE in 1991.
2. The next highest level, above Army General Rivero Lazo,
was the SIN, specifically its de facto Chief Montesinos
Torres. The following evidence (testimonial and
documentary)—essentially consistent in their accusations and
results, and therefore plausible—provide an account of the
above: [. . .] (The Court considered the statement of operative
intelligence officer Sosa Saavedra; an unnumbered, unsigned
and undated Intelligence Note turned over by Maximo San
Román; a report entitled Sociedad para el crimen
[Partnership in Crime]; and statements from wiretap
intelligence officer Flores Alván, operative intelligence
officer Chuqui Aguirre, and journalist Hume Hurtado).
B. OEI at La Cantuta University:
1. This operation was led by Army Major Martín Rivas,
backed by Army Captain Pichilingüe Guevara. The next
highest level of authority above Army Colonel Navarro Pérez
was Army General Rivero Lazo, Director of the DINTE.
2. Army General Rivero Lazo’s immediate superior was
Army General Hermoza Ríos, as Commander General of the
Army in 1992, who ordered that things be facilitated for the
Colina Detachment so they could take action against the nine
students and one professor from La Cantuta University. This
intervention, which will be explained in detail later, has been
substantiated by the following DIFE members who, in one
way or another, acted in compliance with the order: Pérez
Documet, Miranda Balarezo, Córdova Rodríguez, Berteti
Carazas, Velarde Astete and Aquilino Portella [. . .].
3. The other authority that took part in the planning of this
OEI, according to the Manuals and testimony, was the SIN,
principally Montesinos Torres [. . .]. (The Court considered
the statements of journalist Jara Flores, journalist Cruz
Vílchez, defendant Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, and Army
General Hermoza Ríos).
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4. It can be further inferred, as will be addressed in greater
detail in the corresponding Chapter, that although defendant
Fujimori Fujimori did not say anything in particular about the
OEIs, and specifically denied his involvement in this OEI, it
was clear that he was aware of everything that happened, and
of the very management of this operation. This is particularly
so, bearing in mind that as President of the Republic,
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, he was the highest
ranking official of the National Defense System and the
person to whom the SIN, which was immediately accountable
to him, reported its activities directly, and that he had even
given Montesinos Torres sufficient power to control that
institution and the entire SINA; this is all the more true if,
once the first indications of the crime came to light publicly
and consistently, he headed an extraordinary effort to cover it
up and to persecute those who denounced it.
364. A particularly important piece of information related to the
execution of this OEI and the participation of the President of the
Republic concerns the memorandum (at page five hundred and
eighty-one) of July 30, 1991, sent to the Minister of Defense. This
document states: “[. . .] said members of the Armed Forces have
taken part in successful special intelligence operations that have
enabled significant advances in the fight against subversion” [. . .].
Reference is made to work that was done on documentary
information obtained in GEIN operations against Shining Path
leaders. They prepared a report based on that information, and the
results were presented by Army Captain Martin Rivas at Army
Headquarters. It is notable, however, given the regulatory definitions
pertinent to the OEIs and the statements made by Army Colonel
Silva Mendoza (SIE Chief in [1991]), that a document analysis
project cannot be considered a special intelligence operation. As
such, it must be inferred that the work performed may have had to do
with other acts. [. . .]
365. FUNDING OF THE OEIs
1. Vladimiro Montesinos Torres admitted his criminal
responsibility for the offense of illegal assumption of
authority. He stated that he engaged in such conduct by order
of the President of the Republic Alberto Fujimori, and with
the knowledge of the presidents of the Council of Ministers
and the SIN chief. He also acknowledged that he handled
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funds from the budget item “reserve one and two” as well as
of other allocations made to the SIN, although he denied that
this management of funds took place since 1991.96 Army
General Salazar Monroe was the one who had indicated that
such was the case from the time he became head of the SIN
in [1991].
2. Army General Salazar Monroe, chief of the SIN, stated
that Montesinos Torres managed certain budget items called
“Reserve one” and “Reserve two,” that they were turned over
to him by order of the President of the Republic, and that it
was Montesinos Torres who was directly accountable to the
president. In addition, he inferred that the Colina Detachment
would receive extra acknowledgements and bonuses; he has
no doubt about this because he has now seen Montesinos
Torres’s payment of different public figures recorded on
video. He further added that it was common knowledge that
the SIN would give money to the newspapers, and that the
money was distributed by Montesinos Torres.97
3. Army Colonel Pino Benamú stated that he had knowledge
that the SIN used to finance intelligence operations; that
Montesinos Torres managed the SIN’s budget; that he did not
know the details, but that Montesinos Torres would have the
funds available and have them sent to the intelligence offices
of the institutions; that General Rivero Lazo told him at the
beginning of his tenure at the DINTE that they were going to
have a good year of work because they were going to receive
resources from the SIN.
4. Operative intelligence officer Chuqui Aguirre mentioned
that Montesinos Torres took part in the evaluation of the
Colina Detachment’s objectives [. . .].
5. Operative intelligence officer Marco Flores Alván
indicated that Montesinos Torres had a lot of power within
the Army and told them at that time that the doors were open
to them for anything they might need.

96. Pretrial statement of Montesinos Torres, at 46, 644, Case No. 14–2001
(Peru).
97. Pretrial statement of Army General Salazar Monroe, at 30, 675, Fifth
Special Criminal Court of Lima (Peru).
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6. Declassified document No. 1990LIMA12513 (at page
6,298) recounts a report sent from the Embassy of the United
States in Lima to the U.S. Secretary of State in Washington.
The report indicated that a former Navy intelligence officer
had informed the Embassy that the plan (an anti-subversive
plan composed of two phases; the first of which was public
and emphasized human rights, while the second phase was
confidential and would include special army operations
trained in extrajudicial killings) was supported by presidential
advisor Montesinos Torres, although it was also mentioned
that Montesinos Torres was losing support because of the
denunciations against him.
366. It is clear that the execution of a series of OEIs over a long
period of time and based on a Plan of Operations with a broad
scope—the only way to explain the validity, operation, and activity
level of the Colina Detachment—had to have been financed with
extraordinary funds. The receipts and account statements that have
been admitted into the court record demonstrate at least part of the
scale of the Colina Detachment’s activities. The statements in their
entirety point to funding from the SIN channeled to the DINTE itself.
There are numerous witness statements that coincide in this respect,
in which Montesinos Torres is always present in a leadership role.
On this basis, and according to the accounts that had to be settled, is
clear that the President of the Republic had at least a general
knowledge of the events. This assertion is strengthened by the
special and intense connection and reporting relationship of
Montesinos Torres to defendant Fujimori Fujimori.
Chapter IX: Barrios Altos attack
§1. Proof of the charge.
367. On November 3, 1991, at about two o’clock in the afternoon,
a neighborhood chicken barbeque was held at the tenement house at
No. eight hundred and forty (840) Jirón Huanta, Barrios Altos – in
the city center of Lima, in order to raise money to repair the
property’s water and drainage system. The barbeque was organized
by local residents, in particular by Filomeno León León and Manuel
Ríos Pérez. The leaders of the Colina Special Intelligence
Detachment [of the SIE–DINTE] became aware of this activity days
earlier through operative intelligence officer Douglas Hiver Arteaga

766

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:657

Pascual, also known as Abadía [PCP–SL infiltrator]. They
considered it to be a mode of operation of the Shining Path, to pass
on information to its leaders and top officials, as well as to raise
funds for the organization. As such, with the knowledge, approval, or
acquiescence of the highest ranking members of the Army, the SINA
and defendant Fujimori Fujimori, they decided to make a surprise
raid on that tenement house and kill those who might be involved
with the terrorist organization, which was very active in Lima. (As a
result of the armed attack, nine people were killed and four were
seriously wounded) [. . .].
[. . .]
§4. Comprehensive assessment of the evidence produced.
[. . .]
441. Furthermore, it is indisputable that it was a “crime of state.”98
The actual perpetrators were military intelligence officers who
belonged to a special intelligence detachment, and this was even
inferred from the beginning of the police investigation, in both the
psychological report and in the report signed by PNP General Jhon
Caro (Report No. 095–DIRCOTE). In terms of their administrative
placement, they were tied to the Peruvian Army and to the DINTE,
as well as to the SIN, on a more extensive, functional level—as is
deduced, in essential terms, from the anonymous Intelligence Note
that Vice President San Román Cáceres received regarding the
existence of the Colina Detachment, the commission of the Barrios
Altos crime, the incorporation of the Detachment into the SINA and
the involvement of Montesinos Torres as the most important figure
in the operational model of the Intelligence System at that time. The
perpetrators, over and above operational command, under the
responsibility of Army Captain Martin Rivas at the scene of the
crime, obeyed superior orders that were clearly and reprehensibly
illegal, and therefore excluded from any justification or exoneration.
They proceeded according to a typical and planned military
operation of elimination of alleged subversives—so clear, in fact,
that plans were even developed for some officers to provide false
information at the scene of the crime, which explains the initial and
98. Trial statement of expert witness José Antonio Martín Pallín in the ninetyfourth session (Peru).
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confusing news information that was disseminated immediately
following the events [a demonstration of this method is seen in the
news article in La República on November 5,1991]. These were tasks
for which they had been assembled, and with that goal they prepared
or trained at La Tiza, a military facility, not part of the SIDE
structure, for which there must have been express permission from
the highest levels of the military institution. They departed from La
Tiza to carry out the crime and returned there after having
accomplished the assigned “mission.”
442. The manner and circumstances of the commission of the
crime have been demonstrated with the abundant prosecution
evidence discussed: the prior information obtained through an
infiltrated officer about the place and the people who would be there;
the indispensable surveillance conducted in advance and in the
moments prior to the attack; the use of government vehicles with
tinted windows and emergency lights for the execution of the
mission; the studied and decisive attitude exhibited [for which they
trained once the target was established]; and the presence of a
military troop transport vehicle right in Plaza Italia, which enabled
them to surprise the police officers guarding the DIRIN police
facilities and the San Andrés police station and to gain access to the
scene of the crime without impediment. This evidence paints a
picture of the characteristics of the attack and its military logic. The
order to attack, or “green light,” was given when the operation was
devised, and again shortly prior to the attack; that order came—as it
only could—from senior levels, to the SIN itself. The multiple
references to Montesinos Torres are relevant in this respect. There
was still an administrative structure designed for that purpose, the
central focus of which was the very establishment and operation,
within the SIDE, of the Colina Detachment, tied fundamentally to the
SIN. The members of the Detachment remained at the Army
facilities because of their status as active duty servicemen. They had
their headquarters and carried out their military training at the SIE
storehouse and at La Tiza Beach, respectively. These facts are so
well known that it is reasonable to think [as indicated in the article
Sociedad para el Crimen and by Vera Navarrete, among others, in
his supplemental statement of September 27, 2001, as well as by
Flores Alván, at the fifteenth session of the trial proceedings, and
Chuqui Aguirre in the testimony he provided at the one hundred and
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twenty-fifth session of the parallel case, Case No. 28–2001], in spite
of the specific tendency toward secrecy in intelligence activities, that
the existence of the Detachment itself and the suspicion surrounding
its activities were not unknown to the members of the military
institution. Indeed, as evidenced in the documentation seized by
court order, and that produced by cooperating witness Flores Alván,
specific administrative procedures typical of the Army were followed
for the extra payments that they would receive, the transfers, the
equipment, and other allocations or acquisitions.
443. It is true that the members of Special intelligence Detachment
“Colina” have denied the charges since 1993. It is stated on the
record that the first statement from a member of the Colina
Detachment, Nelson Rogelio Carbajal García, provided in his pretrial
statement in the case before the military criminal court for the
Barrios Altos Case [page 2,523], was produced on April third of that
year. However, beginning in 2001, and in the years following, many
of them retracted and admitted the existence of the Colina Special
Intelligence Detachment and their assignment to it.
[. . .]
During the trial, of the eighteen witnesses accused of being
members of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment, the
following testified and admitted said criminal affiliation: Flores
Albán (fifteenth session), Alarcón Gonzáles (sixteenth session), Tena
Jacinto (sixteenth session), Suppo Sánchez (seventeenth session),
Chuqui Aguirre (eighteenth session), Sauñe Pomaya (nineteenth
session), Lecca Esquen (twenty-first session), Paquiyauri Huaytalla
(twenty-first session), Hinojosa Sopla (twenty-second session), Ortiz
Mantas (twenty-second session), Atuncar Cama (twenty-third
session), Gamarra Mamani (twenty-fourth session), Coral Goycochea
(twenty-fifth session), and Sosa Saavedra (eighty-fifth session). The
following individuals denied the charges: Pino Díaz (twenty-fifth
session), Vera Navarrete (twenty-fourth session, in spite of the fact
that on September 27, 2001, he admitted that he had been assigned to
the Colina Detachment; then, after that date, he again retracted his
statement as of April 24, 2002, in his pretrial statement before the
ordinary court (at page [30,874]), Pichilingue Guevara (twentyeighth session) and Martin Rivas (twenty-ninth and thirtieth
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sessions). Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa refused to testify at this trial and
also denied the charges in other venues.
444. The retractions in question, which recount the existence of
the special intelligence detachment and its members and the Barrios
Altos operation, are more coherent and are consistent with the
evidentiary results. Added to this is the content, discussed and
assessed in the corresponding Chapter, of the documentation found
by the Criminal Court Judge at the Peruvian Army Headquarters,
which is conclusive on the matter. The information that the members
of the Colina Detachment have introduced by way of retraction (in
addition to the incriminating testimony of Sosa Saavedra, the last
member of the Detachment to be captured by the police) regarding
their material assistance in the acts is consistent with the statements
of the victims and eyewitnesses, as well as with the news reports and
journalistic investigations. The denials of Martin Rivas, Pichilingue
Guevara and Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa have been weakened by the
totality of the prosecution evidence previously set forth. There is
relevant incriminating circumstantial evidence that proves their
material assistance, not only in terms of the general justification
(supposedly ideologically based on the concept of “low-intensity
warfare”) of such atrocities offered by Martin Rivas and included in
the book Ojo por Ojo [An Eye for an Eye], but also the
acknowledgement he made before journalist Gilberto Hume Hurtado,
and the results of the investigations of journalist Uceda Pérez, set
forth in his book Muerte en el Pentagonito, and journalist Cruz
Vilchez in the article Sociedad para el Crimen.
445. There is no reasonable cause that would explain false selfincrimination on the part of the members of the Colina Special
Intelligence Detachment, let alone cooperation judgments that are
effective or satisfied without reasonable incriminating bases—there
being no material grounds whatsoever to weaken their potential—
especially if their statement not only involves third parties, but also
harms them personally. Experience tells us that no one incriminates
himself falsely, in spite of a conscious certainty of being able to
withstand a conviction, unless there is a higher motive, ethically
more valuable, that explains it. That has not been proven in this case.
Likewise, it is unreasonable to think that out of mere hatred or some
other contemptible motive, with the exclusive purpose of involving
third parties, a person would be willing to undergo a term of
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imprisonment for extremely serious crimes. Naturally, the
“positivized” legal rule provides—on the practical basis of what is
called “insufficiently reliable evidence”—that if third parties are
involved, objective information and specific evidence to corroborate
the co-accusation are essential. In this case, there is no doubt that the
intelligence officers who admitted to the facts did so in light of the
numerous pieces of evidence that, in one way or another,
incriminated them with a solid degree of probability. The
investigations, pushed forward steadily after the fall of defendant
Fujimori Fujimori’s regime, began solidly to approach the full
discovery of what the Colina Detachment had done and the orders it
had carried out. The degree of involvement of the different military,
intelligence and other government authorities was so deep and
serious that, as the Court understands it, it caused those at the lowest
level of the criminal culture established at the SINA to break the
silence—a crucial step in uncovering organized structures and
learning of their criminal mindset. They decided to reveal what had
happened and, in so doing, obtain benefits in exchange for
cooperation.
446. In conclusion, the Barrios Altos massacre was carried out by
the members of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment. It was
its first mission involving the physical elimination of people. Based
on this objective piece of information, which has been proven
conclusively, it is evident that the Detachment carried out this
operation (so understood by the military intelligence sectors)
following military guidelines and obeying higher orders, which, due
to its very nature and the level of those who made it, had to be part of
a larger plan. It is not too much to assert, as Martin Rivas noted in
his statement to journalist Humberto Jara, that this order took shape
pursuant to the emergence of the Colina Detachment, as the
beginning of a type or mode of response to the urban actions of the
PCP–SL and of a criminal policy to eliminate evading the legal
route, all those persons whom the intelligence services understood to
have organizational ties to the terrorist movements. The operations
that would later take place—La Cantuta and others to which the
members of the Colina Detachment have confessed—only confirm
this institutional practice, so absolutely contrary to the requirements
of the Rule of Law; it is further confirmed by the acts of concealment
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that took place once the circumstantial evidence of such operations
and of the involvement of the Colina Detachment began to mount.99
Chapter X: Attack at the National University of Education “La
Cantuta”
§1. Proof of the charge.
[. . .]
449. On Thursday, July 16, 1992, at around nine fifteen at night,
members of the PCP–SL blew up two vehicles loaded with some five
hundred kilos of ANFO on Tarata Street in the Miraflores district.
This terrorist attack killed twenty-two people, injured more than a
hundred, rendered some two hundred residences uninhabitable,
destroyed several buildings and, obviously, caused serious alarm
among the public.
[. . .]
450. As a consequence of the terrorist attack on Tarata, it was
decided at the highest levels of power to conduct an immediate
response action that would be the responsibility of the Colina Special
Intelligence Detachment. That is how Army Major Martín Rivas
designed and executed the respective plan of operations. The same
day on which the operation began, July 17, 1992, operative
intelligence officer Hinojosa Sopla was ordered to conduct a
reconnaissance of the University and take photographs of the place.
He was detected, intercepted, and beaten by some students, although
he was protected immediately by infiltrated operative intelligence
officer Tena Jacinto, who was able to free him without further
trouble.100
[. . .]
99. In arriving at these conclusions, the Court found it relevant to take into
consideration the following: § 2. Evidentiary information, supra ¶¶ 368-81, from
the various statements of victims, as well as of eyewitnesses, hearsay witnesses,
police officers, generals, and the members of the Colina Detachment themselves. It
likewise took into account § 3. Individual assessment of the evidence, supra ¶¶
382-439, such as expert witness evidence, documentary evidence, effective
cooperation judgments, journalistic reports, the books, the video and audio
evidence and the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
100. That decision resulted in the incursion into La Cantuta University, in which
nine students and a professor were victims. (Publisher’s note).
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§4. Comprehensive assessment of the evidence produced.
[. . .]
531. What stands out about these facts is the level of involvement,
in order to facilitate and realize the crime, of several Army units or
organizations, without whose participation the murders in question
would not have been able to be perpetrated. Particularly relevant in
enabling the incursion into La Cantuta University was the assistance
of the commander general of the DIFE, the prior order of the
commander general of the Army, and the active participation of the
director of the DINTE and his immediate subordinate, the deputy
director of the Internal Front. This involvement was even manifested
in the events that took place in the immediate aftermath, with the
transfer of two lieutenants from the DIFE, who happened to play an
important role in the unfolding of the criminal events: Portella
Núñez and Velarde Astete. The former was sent to the DINTE—
something unusual for a young officer untrained in intelligence
matters—and the latter was transferred to Paratrooper Infantry
Battalion 39, away from the leadership of the Civic Action Base at
La Cantuta.
[. . .]
532. [. . .] The foregoing, consequently, reveals not only the level
of institutional influence of the Colina Special Intelligence
Detachment—which undoubtedly went beyond the SIDE—but also
the personal and material involvement of the senior Army
commanders and, likewise, of the SIN, which, given the logic of the
real operation of the system and its decision-making authority in
matters concerning the fight against terrorist subversion, was not
unconnected to the events.
[. . .]
533. One piece of information that must be determined is whether
the order received by the operational chief of the Colina Detachment,
Army Major Martin Rivas, was to kill or simply to detain the victims
of La Cantuta.
[. . .]
Consequently, bearing in mind the string of serial crimes
perpetrated by the members of the Colina Detachment, the training
and preparation inherent in their logic of military intervention of
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intelligence targets, the extent of the operation in question (it
involved the mobilization of several sections of the Army), the
subsequent concealment maneuvers (which came from the highest
levels of the Army and, later, as will be seen in another Chapter of
this judgment, from the SIN and the regime as a whole), the absence
of immediate reprisals against Army Major Martin Rivas, the
continuation of the Detachment’s operations, and the assertions of
several officers that rule out any possibility to the contrary, it is clear
that the order, from the outset, was to kill the victims of La Cantuta.
534. With respect to the authority that ordered or approved the La
Cantuta operation, regardless of what will be set forth in the
corresponding Chapter on defendant Fujimori Fujimori, (according
to the statements of the members of the Colina Detachment) [. . .] [:]
535. There is no doubt of the involvement of the highest levels of
authority at the DINTE and the Peruvian Army Headquarters—but
not only of the Army, there is also no doubt of the involvement of
the SIN, as the highest body and authority within the SINA. Army
General Hermoza Ríos himself affirmed before the Court that he
found out about the events the day after they happened, from
Montesinos Torres, who informed him that members of the SIE had
conducted a special operation at La Cantuta and that the orders
received had been exceeded; he had already informed the President
of the Republic of this fact, which was confirmed by the director of
the DINTE, Army General Rivero Lazo, and he allowed him to
report it to the Minister of Defense, Army General Malca Villanueva.
[. . .]
Consistent with these conclusions, what Army Major Martin Rivas
stated to journalist Humberto Jara Flores is significant. He noted on
that occasion that an action of the magnitude of the La Cantuta
operation, according to the logic of response that entailed devising an
attack as brutal and damaging as the Tarata attack, could not have
been authorized but by the highest authorities of the State (including
Hermoza Ríos, Montesinos Torres and Fujimori Fujimori). This
account, aside from his denial at trial, is consistent with the facts and
the evidence in the case. That is to say, i) the Colina Special
Intelligence Detachment operated based on a specific plan and with
organizational guidelines and control from the highest levels of the
Army and the intelligence agencies; ii) the operations it carried out
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did not take place in isolation or due to the harsh words of an Army
captain or major, but rather corresponded to a military and political
objective of greater significance; iii) the most relevant mission of the
Colina Detachment was the physical elimination of alleged
subversives—all of it actions revolved around this objective—in
terms of both the need to destroy the leadership elements (or those
that played a strategically important role in the subversive
organization at a given time) and the demand for a precise response
to terrorist actions in which they could have been involved, or the
hierarchical position or functional level that the alleged subversive
might hold. This mission thus sought the destruction of terrorist
leaders and top officials, thereby allowing the terrorist organization
to expand and cause harm. Such objectives, obviously, could not
have been met without an organization within the State that was
subject to and compliant with orders from specific high-up
government positions—civilian and military—and which, when the
time came, defined the guidelines for protecting or covering for their
most important members. This explains, in the end, everything that
was done to prevent the establishment of the facts. It explains the
fact that only following international condemnation and the fall of
the political regime in question was it possible to conduct broadranging investigations and prosecutions.101
Chapter XI: Kidnapping of Gustavo Andrés Gorriti Ellenbogen
[. . .]
§4. Comprehensive assessment of the evidence produced.
555. Aside from the fact that the immobilization of an individual
in a domicile, or a closed space, strictly speaking, is already an
illegal deprivation of liberty and a kidnapping [. . .], common

101. In arriving at these assertions, the Court took into account the following: §
2. Evidentiary Information, supra ¶¶ 457-76 such as the journalistic documents,
documents submitted by former SIN advisor Rafael Merino Bartet, declassified
documents from the U.S. State Department, audio documents, court decisions and
reports of the TRC, judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
the reports of Amnesty International. The documentary evidence also includes the
books. The testimonial evidence included the testimony of witnesses linked
directly or indirectly to the events, servicemen, civilians, statements from members
of the Colina Detachment, journalists, and others.
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experience indicates that the kind of illegal deprivation of liberty that
numerous individuals were subjected to [. . .] in the basement of a
military intelligence agency [. . .], first of all, was not carried out
based on the unilateral decision of a subordinate of the President of
the Republic, outside the sphere of his knowledge and decision; and
second, had to have formed part of a previously designed plan, in
which there must have been i) an analysis of the advisability and
usefulness of doing it; ii) the identification of the affected persons
according to their activity and degree of “dangerousness” to the
objectives of violating the constitutional order; iii) the definition of
the intervention teams; iv) the coordination and specification of the
detention centers or places; v) the establishment of a reasonable time
for the victims to remain under such conditions of deprivation of
liberty, and so on.
556. The coup d’état, obviously, was not a sudden decision caused
by an initial move by Congress to review Legislative Decrees issued
on matters of intelligence, the Armed Forces and National Security
or Pacification. It was a carefully thought-out measure, which
entailed an authoritarian concept of the exercise of government
power. It involved the Armed Forces and the SINA, directly under
[Fujimori’s] command as President of the Republic, and was carried
out after an entire process of reorganizing the military and
intelligence structures. At the same time it entailed taking absolute
control of all State authority without the participation of the
opposition and of persons who did not share the president’s political
ideas. In this context of the alteration of the entire political system it
is clear, in view of his position at the apex of the State structure, that
he not only entrusted the operational design of the corresponding
intervention measures to those who, by reason of their duties, were
located within the state apparatus and had professional knowledge
and control over the intelligence bodies and means of military
repression, and were followers of his political strategy and ideology;
he also, undoubtedly, had to approve of them, since a measure of
such magnitude and relevance could not remain entirely in the hands
of his subordinates. This hierarchical structure of the state
apparatus—or a sector of it, specifically—of which the defendant
availed himself establishes, as a consequence of the events, the fact
that he knew about and authorized, at least broadly speaking, all of
the measures carried out, including those restrictive of individual
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freedom. He exercised organizational control—especially of the
Armed Forces, the SIN and the PNP—by virtue of his position as
President of the Republic, which included being Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces, and placing individuals who served his
authoritarian agenda in key positions within the military and
intelligence system. He thus controlled the Armed Forces and the
SINA particularly intensely, which enabled the disruption of
democratic order and the resulting enforcement of the measures that
deprived the liberty of those he understood to be his opponents or
who, at the time the new regime was installed, might hinder or
seriously upset his plans. It is reasonable to understand that the coup
d’état would not otherwise have been able to unfold and later be
affirmed. It is important to stress that the deprivations of liberty of
several individuals at the time of the coup d’état were not lifted once
the press reported them [. . .]; rather, those persons remained
detained for several more days. Furthermore, no investigation was
conducted into these acts, which were carried out allegedly
unbeknownst to, and against, the will of the head of state, let alone
was anyone ever punished for planning and giving the order to
kidnap and hold the victims incommunicado. That explains,
reasonably, that the measures in question were not unusual or outside
the design of the coup. The events that took place prior to the
execution of the plan of operations for the coup, when all of the
intervention measures were taken against individuals and
government institutions, and in the period immediately afterwards
[. . .], reveal clearly that there could have been no ignorance of the
detentions[.] [I]ndeed, the events reveal that they took place
precisely because they were included as a necessary part of the plans
to attack the constitutional system.
[. . .]
Chapter XII: Kidnapping of Samuel Edward Dyer Ampudia
[. . .]
§4. Comprehensive assessment of the evidence produced.
568. [. . .] The use of agencies that did not have the power to make
arrests—which is the case of the intelligence bodies or secret
services of the State—and the clear abuse of power that it signified,
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points to the existence of an unlawful institutional mechanism guided
by provisions other than the ones that corresponded to it legally.
[. . .]
571. The intervention of the State intelligence bodies [. . .]; the
failure to conduct a disciplinary investigation, in light of a model of
official conduct, of the exercise of power that was so clearly harmful
to the internal institutional system governing the SINA and the Army
[. . .]; the fact that government authorities through other agencies, in
this case the National Tax Authority [SUNAT], would pursue a
criminal prosecution against the victim [. . .]; the seriousness of the
events; the persistence of the harm done to the victim; and the
obvious persecution—unreasonable by any reckoning—against an
individual, could not go unnoticed at the highest levels of national
authority. What happened to the victim is not an isolated act [. . .]; it
involves a number of connected events, a chain of events, to negate
an individual in his social relations. Therefore, it is impossible to
analyze them in an isolated manner.
572. [. . .]Fujimori’s knowledge [. . .] can also be inferred,
concurrently, from what took place after the events [. . .]. The
defendant himself [. . .] publicly approved tax and criminal
persecution [. . .] without ordering the appropriate investigative,
disciplinary and criminal measures, and justified implicitly what
happened to [the victim], and approved the arbitrary persecutions
that the State implemented under his leadership.
[. . .]
574. The defense has questioned the evidentiary rules that support
the analysis of the circumstantial evidence, asserting that the hearsay
testimony lacks effective probative value [. . .]. The questioning is
based on the subsidiary nature of the hearsay testimony, on the fact
that the direct witness could have testified but did not, and on the
absence of additional information, duly proven, to corroborate the
account of such witnesses.
On this point, it is appropriate to specify the following:
1. A hearsay witness, in principle, is not prohibited under our
laws of criminal procedure. The law, as a consequence of the
principle of the free weighing of the evidence, or the use of
the court’s best judgment, does not exclude its validity and
effectiveness [knowledge of the facts may have been obtained
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by verbal communication, by means of information
technology, by having heard a conversation between other
persons to which the witness is not a party, and so on]. There
is no cause for inadmissibility based on the origin of the
testimony he may provide, and there are no limitations with
respect to the proceedings in which they can be used. The
problem, essentially, is the veracity and credibility of his
testimony. It must be made clear, however, that hearsay
testimony on its own cannot be considered indirect or
circumstantial evidence or indicia, let alone be limited
exclusively to identifying the person who actually has direct
knowledge of the facts about which he is testifying, nor used
simply to confirm the statement of the main witness. The
scope of such testimony is defined according to what he
knew, the circumstances of the source of such knowledge, the
personal characteristics of the hearsay witness and of the
eyewitness, and so on.
2. It is obvious, however, that if the testimony of a hearsay
witness is unique or singular, in the sense that there is no
direct or circumstantial corroborating evidence, it cannot be
considered by the adjudicating court in order to justify a
conviction. Such testimony is considered “inadvisable” as
evidence; that is, it involves serious risks, as its indirect
nature can mean a significant loss of reliability. Additional
criteria of reliability of the testimony in question are required
beforehand, and to favor the principle of immediacy, to wit:
(i) it must be, preferably, primary information heard by the
witness himself—which is part of what is required in the
absence of the witness’s direct perception of the facts; and (ii)
the statement of the eyewitness—whose identification must
be provided by the hearsay witness—must have been
unobtainable for just cause. Eyewitnesses, therefore, have
absolute preference [eyewitness testimony is accorded not
exclusiveness, but preference, which is overcome when there
is just cause for the absence of that witness]. In this case, due
to the subordinate character of hearsay testimony, it is a
matter of finding (a) the presence of a proven, exceptional
situation of effective and actual impossibility or serious
impossibility of obtaining the direct statement of the main
witness (death, unknown whereabouts, residence abroad,
minor witnesses requiring special protection, and so on); and
(b) the assumption of the pursuit of serious and organized
crime, which makes it difficult to obtain eyewitnesses. As
such, it is necessary to acknowledge the reasons or grounds
for the inadmissibility of such testimony when a proven
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presumption of the unavailability of the eyewitness has not
been established, in which all legal possibilities for obtaining
his testimony have been exhausted.
[. . .]
4. Beside the fact that before the examining court [. . .] the
presumed source of knowledge did not support the assertions
of the hearsay witness, it is relevant to note that this does not
rule out flatly the value itself and the consequent positive
assessment of the hearsay testimony, although greater care is
required in its assessment. It is necessary to turn to other
information or facts, to other means of proof, such as direct
or circumstantial evidence, even if not testimonial in nature.
The Court must turn to complementary sources that point in
the same direction and lead unequivocally to an evidentiary
result obtained through indirect or circumstantial evidence.
The reasonable caution to which it is subjected is its
particular characteristic; that is its nature of complementary
evidence. From this point forward the solution is reached in
each specific case based on the circumstances of the fact
alleged and the evidence in that case.
[. . .]
Chapter XIII: Other crimes of the Colina Special Intelligence
Detachment
[. . .]
¶2. Comprehensive assessment.
[. . .]
586. This plurality of criminal acts, the cover of the military and
intelligence apparatus that necessarily had to have been provided for
the perpetration of the crimes, and the subsequent cover-up and
persecution of those who denounced the events, also convinces the
Court that the crimes in question were not isolated acts; nor could
they have been committed without, at least, the criminal intent of the
highest military and intelligence authorities. As such, killing people
was not a deviant act of subordinate Army officers or superiors. It
was decidedly a strategic institutional mindset—in short, a specific
policy of repression in order to confront terrorist subversion in
certain spheres outside democratic and constitutional law. Of course,
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it is not that the entire military and police apparatus was engaged in
this criminal mission; rather, a very clearly defined sector of it,
focused on some divisions and functions of the SINA, was geared
toward this highly selective mission that concentrated on specific
areas and individuals. It was neither massive nor rash, but rather
selective and limited to particular individuals and to specific
situations or triggering contexts.
[. . .]
588. The investigation of the TRC [was] conducted according to
its own method, which certainly is not the investigative method
inherent to the criminal case [focused on specific, individually
identified acts, and meant to establish—confirm or rule out—the
criminal involvement of specific individuals]; nor does it adopt the
same requirements the court does in forming its opinion as to the
degree of certainty when it discusses the operation and activities of
the Colina Detachment [. . .].
Chapter XIV: Acts subsequent to the crimes of Barrios Altos and La
Cantuta
[. . .]
§3. General assessment.
[. . .]
625. The Constitutional Court, citing the United Nations Set of
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
Through Action to Combat Impunity, defined impunity as “the de
facto or de jure inexistence of the criminal responsibility of
perpetrators of human rights violations, as well as of civil,
administrative or disciplinary liability, because they escape all
investigation that would lead to their accusation, arrest, prosecution
and, in the case of conviction, the imposition of appropriate
sentences, including compensation for the harm caused to their
victims.”102 As follows from what has been set forth in this Chapter,
that was what in fact happened in Peru. Real mechanisms were used,
and various provisions were issued to hinder or impede the
102. STC No. 2488-2002-HC/TC, at Conclusion of Law No. 5, Constitutional
Court, Mar. 18, 2004 (Peru).
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establishment of the facts and, when the time came, to prevent the
full enforcement of the punishment imposed. Moreover, as
previously established, such a vast plan of action, one that was
consistent over time, can only be explained by the involvement of the
country’s leader.
What occurred following the commission of the crimes only
confirms one of the common features of a crime of state [. . .].
According to expert MARTÍN PALLÍN, [. . .] the common feature of
a crime of state is the existence of a plan or design in which, as the
case may be, law enforcement personnel and, in general, the top
leaders of the State participate. This criminal plan not only provides
for the execution of the crimes anticipated but also takes the
measures necessary to prevent physical signs or traces of them and to
erase the direct evidence. Should circumstantial evidence be
discovered that points to the involvement of state agents, of the state
apparatus, it provides for the obstruction of the investigation with
every type of means within the State’s reach—deny its existence,
deny public information, assert the confidentiality of government
information, and so on—and if the investigation cannot be halted, it
provides for interference in the punitive consequences, whether by
turning to symbolic punishments or making use of amnesty.
Chapter XV: The participation of Alberto Fujimori Fujimori
[. . .]
§3. The directive power of defendant Fujimori Fujimori
633. The President of the Republic, as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces, has broad military authority that emanates from the
Constitution itself (both the prior Constitution and the one currently
in force), which assigns him the power of ultimate authority over all
the executive bodies of the National Defense System. As such, (i) he
presides over it; (ii) he organizes, distributes and stipulates the use of
the Armed Forces and the PNP; (iii) he makes use, from a general
executive level, of the Armed Forces—in short, he establishes
defense policy and, more specifically, military policy, even as the
military command in the strict sense of the word provides the
pertinent information and advice (for which purpose suitable

782

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:657

agencies are formed); and (iv) he exercises effective command over
them, he directs them, and his provisions or orders must be obeyed.
The primacy of the republican principle leads to the subordination
of the Armed Forces to the constitutional system, and in the
presidentialist regimes command over them is incumbent upon the
President of the Republic. If the national political model is that the
President of the Republic is Head of State, Chief of Government,
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and, furthermore, the
personifies the nation—a presidential model that has a strong
Executive—it is inconsistent with the defense argument that the
President of the Republic must limit himself solely to issuing general
policies, being part of an advisory group without his own powers,
and not giving specific orders to the Armed Forces. This role of
presidential leadership, command and authority—as an expression of
the principle of civilian supremacy—is confirmed by the key fact
that the Armed Forces are not constitutionally autonomous bodies;
they are part of the Executive Branch, which entails the exercise of
its authority to order, coordinate and direct the actions of the Armed
Forces, and to define the strategic objectives of defense and military
policy. It also means that the president of the CCFFAA and the
commanders general of the institutions of the armed forces are
appointed and removed by the President of the Republic, and that in
a state of emergency he can order that the Armed Forces assume
control of national order—without that excluding, incidentally, the
effective political leadership incumbent upon him as head of state—
which authorizes him to order specific measures that allow the
restriction of rights by the Armed Forces.
(i) One notable factor in this sphere of powers of the President of
the Republic is the political factor, by virtue of which the strategies
that define and shape the National Defense System—presided over
by the head of state—are established by the top agencies. In turn, the
executing bodies are the Armed Forces and the PNP, of which the
President of the Republic is likewise the chief.
(ii) Another relevant factor is the discretionary nature of such
activity, based on which [the president] can choose the course of
action that is appropriate to take, and define its content. This can be
explained by the fact that this power of the Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces and the PNP, bearing in mind its inherent
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characteristics, is not regulated or limited by law. This absence of
regulation only enables greater political discretion in his military
authority and in the field of national defense, although clearly it is
not a matter of unlimited discretion that shields unlawful acts.
[. . .]
635. The military power that the Constitution confers upon the
head of state is developed at the level of political command over the
military. He represents the highest decision-making body, and the
Armed Forces are subordinate to him in his capacity as commander
in chief. The Head of State, as is evident, has effective authority with
respect to the Armed Forces and therefore, they must obey the orders
that he issues within the scope of ordinary and constitutional legality.
The members of the armed forces obviously cannot question them or
fail to carry them out, save, of course, in the case of exceptions
derived from the constitutional system itself and from the clear
illegality of an order.
The defense insists upon asserting the differences between the
political command and the effective or military command of the
President of the Republic. The latter, as IGNACIO DE OTTO notes,
is a requirement that is merely practical, not constitutional. It carries
with it the understanding that the technical characteristics of military
activity mean that it is normally entrusted to professional
servicemen; it is seen, as is clear, in the practical relations between
governments and the institution of the military. Aside from the
manner in which the effective Armed Forces/Government relations
were located within the regime presided over by the defendant, the
word command and its derivatives, CASADO BURBANO alerts us,
is used in a political sense, when, for example, talking about supreme
command, high command, high commander or commander in chief,
to refer to purely political duties. The president’s orders to the
Armed Forces do not necessarily require specific formalities.
Therefore, in the varied and broad scope of his presidential
involvement, the orders he issues can be verbal or written, express or
implied, publicly known or confidential—which was precisely the
recurrent practice of the defendant.
[. . .]
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§6. Analysis of circumstantial evidence and determination of guilt
658. As established from the beginning [Part Two, Chapter I, § 1],
and as follows from all of the foregoing thus far in this judgment, the
factual conclusions are based on CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE,
which is used to establish the manner of occurrence of a fact not
directly proven, based on another fact, known and proven in the case,
using for this step the criteria of logic and experience. This is
sufficient for the Court to begin performing its duty to weigh the
evidence pursuant to Article 280 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The correction of this method of proof, or, more specifically, the
Court’s method of weighing specific facts or circumstances duly
verified in the case, which is fully accepted by the Supreme Court
[En Banc Decision No. 1–2006/ESV–22, of October 13th, 2006],
which declares that Final Judgment No. 1912–2005/ Piura, of
September [6th, 2005] is binding precedent], and which is no more
uncertain or subsidiary in nature than direct evidence, must meet a
set of substantive and procedural requirements. It highlights, on one
hand, (i) the existence, as a general rule, of a plurality of predicate
facts or circumstantial evidence, duly proven in accordance with the
requirements of evidentiary law (the circumstantial evidence must be
able to be considered procedurally accurate, which means that it is
reliable); they must also be peripheral or concomitant with respect to
the factual information to be proven, and be interrelated with the core
fact, which is the requirement of relevance. The probative quality of
the circumstantial evidence is fundamental, must be well established
in the case, and its power of indication must be such that it leads
straight to the fact that is meant to be established. This analysis also
highlights (ii) the rationality of the inference obtained—between the
circumstantial fact and the consequent or criminal fact there has to be
a natural connection, or a logical or causal link, an absolute harmony,
that enables the inference to be made without any other possible
reasonable alternative. It is appropriate, therefore, to identify the
different indicia or incriminating pieces of information pursuant to
the requirements of reliability and relevance, which entails the
determination of the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence
selected based on the probative activity undertaken. This in turn will
shape the Court’s opinion with regard to an inference, the
reasonableness of which must be supported general principles of
experience, rules of logic or scientific principles. As a procedural
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requirement, both elements or requirements must be stated clearly in
the judgment.
659. Two precautions must be taken into consideration:
1. The weighing of the circumstantial evidence, obviously, must
not be done by isolating the incriminating indicia individually. They
must be weighed as a whole, and the logical inference must be based
on them. Naturally, an additional requirement is the absence or
insufficiency of contrary circumstantial evidence (predicate facts that
support evidence to the contrary, the occurrence of which—if
proven—prevents logically accepting that the fact in question
actually occurred).
2. The validity of the general principles of experience, which tie
the predicate fact to the consequential fact and lead to the
understanding that the conclusion is derived from the evidence
examined: (i) must be based on general knowledge or scientific
knowledge; (ii) there must be no applicable general principles of
experience that are equally well-founded, that is, it must not be
possible to reach alternative conclusions that enjoy the same degree
of probability; and, (iii) the conclusion arrived at through the
circumstantial reasoning must not contradict other facts declared
proven. If the conclusion regarding the existence of the fact and the
culpability of the defendant is unequivocal—or objectively
unequivocal, which excludes an interpretation of the circumstantial
evidence that leads to the understanding that the events may have
occurred differently from the main fact—then it must be understood
that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome,
and therefore that the conviction is justified substantially with full
respect for the principle of the prohibition against arbitrariness.

PART TWO: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Chapter I: Crimes committed
§1. The crime of aggravated kidnapping: Gorriti Ellenbogen – Dyer
Ampudia.
[. . .]
680. The criminal offense of kidnapping violates the legally
protected right of freedom of movement, which is nothing more than
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the victim’s ability to be able to fix freely his position in space,
moving or staying in a desired place.
The basic elements of the offense, in terms of an objective
statutory definition, requires the perpetrator to deprive the victim of
his individual freedom without a justified right, reason or authority to
do so.
1. The perpetrator can be any person, including a government
employee.
2. With respect to the substantive definition of the offense in
question, it is required that a person be deprived of his ability
to move from one place to another—to decide the place he is
going to be or not be located—even when the victim is
allowed a certain area of movement that he cannot physically
overstep, the offense is constituted precisely due to the
existence of such preventive limits. The Court has ruled in
similar terms in Final Judgment of June [9th, 2004], No. 975–
2004/San Martín. Deprivation of liberty may arise,
indistinctly, by different means, and can materialize in
different forms. It is necessary, of course, that the agent act
unlawfully—which includes all those cases of excess in the
exercise of a right, authority or position—and that the act in
question is performed without the consent of the victim.
3. The normative element of the legal definition is the
intrinsic illegality of the deprivation of liberty; Article 152,
paragraph one, of the Criminal Code states: “. . .without a
justified right, reason or authority.” The victim must not have
given his consent, and it must be an imposition that is
unjustified in light of the general causes for justification, in
factual or legal situations that determine their existence, or
because such causes do exist, the perpetrator deprives another
of his liberty in an abusive manner, beyond the justified need
or through procedures prohibited by law.
[. . .]
685.
2. [. . .] Under the Criminal Code of [1991], there is no
independent legal definition of the criminal offense of arbitrary
deprivation of liberty committed by a government employee or
public servant as mere de facto event occurring outside the course of
a legal proceeding. The regulation contained in the Code does not
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include a dual systematization that differentiates conduct relevant to
the deprivation of liberty according to the status of the perpetrator.
The status of the perpetrator as a public servant represents, in
principle, neither a privilege nor a specific aggravation.
Consequently, with the sole exception of unlawful or arbitrary
detention by a judge, justified by virtue of being within the
framework of a legal proceeding—external de facto circumstances—
the Criminal Code currently in force has left the regulation of all
deprivations of liberty exclusively to Article 152, whether carried out
by private individuals or public servants.
3. The legal definition of general abuse of authority, first of all,
does not protect an individual’s freedom of movement; rather, it is
meant as a precaution to ensure the proper discharge of the public
servant’s duties. Second, it does so subsidiarily, only with respect to
crimes committed by public servants. Kidnapping is legally
classified as a common crime—its perpetrator could be anyone—
insofar as there is no criminal law concept that considers the
deprivation of freedom of movement (potential and individual
freedom of movement) committed by a public official. Accordingly,
it is not possible to maintain, as it was under the previous Criminal
Code, that it is classified as an offense that can be committed only by
private citizens. It should be emphasized that the subsidiary nature of
the offense of general abuse of authority stems from the fact that all
crimes against government and its administration committed by
public servants always presuppose the violation of an official duty;
they assume an abuse of authority. In addition, the offense defined as
abuse of authority is formed by the violation of the duty to adhere to
the law to which the public servant is bound, in the specific sphere of
his activity. It does not require that the arbitrary act adversely affect
private interests, as would be the case of the freedom of movement
of citizens; that circumstance, in any case, is an additional harm not
covered by the offense of abuse of authority. It must be taken into
account that an act that infringes upon freedom of movement
comprises all acts committed by the perpetrator “without a right,”
which is at the core of the crime of kidnapping. Therefore, the
implementation of Article 376 of the Criminal Code would, by any
reckoning, be insufficient to encompass that criminal conduct, as it
covers an area that goes beyond mere abuse of office. Such “abuse of
authority” more properly should be assessed as a constituent element
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of a kidnapping offense committed by means of the violation of
institutional powers.
[. . .]
687.
2. [. . .] Individual freedom, which entails the fundamental
right not to be detained by the police except where there is a
well-founded court order or an in flagrante delicto arrest, was
specifically suspended, and not repealed, when the state of
emergency was declared (or, strictly speaking, extended)
[. . .]. Under those conditions, it is not that the state of
emergency does away with the legally protected interest of
individual freedom; there is only a type of authorization so
that under certain conditions an individual’s freedom may be
restricted, for which there would be some grounds of
justification pursuant to law (Article 20(8) of the Criminal
Code). Therefore, the legally protected interest remains in
force and must continue to be respected, except where proper
within the legally authorized limits. However, the legal
guarantee of habeas corpus cannot be suspended, as
emphatically held by the IACtHR in Advisory Opinions No.
8/87 [. . .] and 9/87 [. . .]. From this same perspective, it
should be noted that the powers arising from the control
measure under the state of emergency were limited to the
control of terrorist actions, to all those persons who
reasonably could be linked to these criminal acts and to the
organizations that promoted and supported them.
3. A state of emergency, by its very nature, is declared for the
defense of the constitutional government and the system of
values it recognizes and protects, to deal with emergency
situations and thereby to preserve the highest values of a
democratic society, as stated in paragraph 20 of Advisory
Opinion No. 8/87. A state of emergency cannot be invoked
for purposes of a coup d’état—in order to establish and
consolidate it, which in itself amounts to the denial of
Constitutional government—let alone with respect to citizens
who are not linked to terrorist subversion.
[. . .]
689. [. . .]
1. As held by the Supreme Court in Final Judgment No. 3840
97/Ayacucho, of October 9, 1997, a perpetrator by means
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must be held responsible to the degree that the main act
coincides with his intent; he must not be responsible for the
excess committed by the agents he used, as he does not have
power or control over the act. [. . .]
[. . .]
691.[. . .]
1. The understanding of what cruelty is must not be formed
based on the classification of manslaughter as murder. In
each case [. . .] it must start with the basic criminal concept
and, thus, it is possible to determine when the criminal goes
beyond the discomfort that the perpetrator “normally” causes
to commit the basic crime in question. Cruelty is a
circumstance (physical/psychological or emotional) that must
be assessed normatively. Its reference is always the conduct
of the perpetrator, in its objective and subjective aspects—
that is, the addition of other harm, strictly unnecessary, to the
victim, outside the harm of the kidnapping: the absolute
restriction of freedom of movement; the perpetrator’s
assumption of the unnecessariness of his action; and the
deliberate nature of the excess, of causing unnecessary
suffering to the victim.
2. The endangerment of the life or health of the victim
requires the performance of acts—à propos of the act of
kidnapping or of the conditions in which the victim is held—
with sufficient magnitude or relevance to cause a specific risk
to his physical safety or health. Subjectively, the key is the
perpetrator’s awareness of the danger to the victim brought
on by the acts carried out to kidnap him or keep him detained.
The intent of the perpetrator must encompass not only the act
itself of kidnapping and holding the victim, but also the
understanding that the actions carried out are creating a
situation that entails real risks to the victim; that is, the
perpetrator must be aware of the danger.
[. . .]
694.[. . .]
1. Cruel treatment, as previously described, is not only an
attack on the physical safety of the individual; it also
diminishes his mental or emotional welfare—understood as
the freedom of self-determination and of action according to
one’s decision, which rejects all conduct that entails a feeling
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of degradation or humiliation, ridicule or indignity. It is,
under our criminal law, a specific aggravating circumstance
that, as such, requires something additional in view of all
conduct that involves the illegal deprivation of a person’s
liberty, of his possible and individual freedom of movement.
2. International human rights law prohibits torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.103 If torture
is excluded, which is considered an aggravated and deliberate
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
(United Nations Declaration against Torture of 1975), in that
it is impossible to draw a precise dividing line between such
categories of acts, it is clear that cruel treatment, inasmuch as
it is inflicted by a public official or other person in the
exercise of public duties, at his instigation, or with his
consent or acquiescence—a “qualified” perpetrator—can be
defined as such an act that deliberately causes pain and
suffering but which, due to its level of intensity, is not
sufficiently severe to be classified as torture or bodily harm.
In international case law, as REMOTTI CARBONELL
explains, the use of criteria of seriousness and harmfulness
have been imposed, qualified by endogenous and exogenous
factors, all of which must be evaluated in each specific
case.104 However, those references to international law must
103. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 5, U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (adopted by
Legislative Resolution No. 13282 of Dec. 9, 1959); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 7, U.N.Doc. A/6316 (Dec.
16, 1966) (adopted by Executive Order No. 22128, of Mar. 28, 1978 and ratified
by the Constitution of 1979); and Organization of American States, American
Convention on Human Rights art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S 123 (adopted by Executive Order No. 22231, and ratified by the
Constitution of 1979). The following have been added to these general provisions:
United Nations Convention against Torture, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(Dec. 10, 1984) (adopted by Legislative Resolution No. 241815, of May 24, 1988);
and Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67 (adopted by Legislative
Resolution No. 25286 of December 4, 1990).
104. Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 162 (1978)
(criterion adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in the Case of Ireland
v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR Judgment of January 18, 1978, which also
recognized that the “seriousness” is due to its “relative” nature, and depends “on
all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical
or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim,
etc”); Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33,
¶ 167 (Sep. 17, 1997) (the IACtHR adopted the same standard, in discussing the
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be defined according to the normative requirements of the
legal definition of aggravated kidnapping, and the set of
circumstances they include. Accordingly, they establish the
necessary normative level or magnitude for a particular act to
be classified as “cruel treatment.”
3. In this case it is necessary to bear in mind that the people
who deprived and kept the victims deprived of their liberty
were State agents carrying out superior orders [. . .]. The
victims were taken to illegal detention centers [. . .]. No
legally provided, regular procedure was followed—especially
with regard to notice of charges and official, public
information as to their whereabouts, and legal status—and
those measures were taken in the context of an altered
constitutional order or in the exercise of power of an
authoritarian government [. . .].
4. The State agents involved acted with glaring illegality and
arrogance. They used their authority in a manner that was
contrary to their obligations as State agents [. . .]. It took
place in the context of an authoritarian regime, in which the
victims could not expect treatment that was predictable or
formally protected by the pre-existing legal standards,
especially since they were taken to and held at an improper
institution, which belonged to the secret services of the
State— profoundly intimidating in and of itself—which made
them even fear for their fate. It is obvious, as the IACtHR
noted, that the victims’ feelings of fear, of fear for their fate,
was aggravated not only by the very illegality of the
deprivation of liberty or act of kidnapping—which deepened
its intrinsic vulnerability—but also due to the circumstances
in which it was carried out, derived from the place of
detention, the people who kept the victims in custody, and
from the characteristics of the political regime that supported
them.105
The cruel behavior of those who ordered and carried out the act of
kidnapping and the authorities and custodians who maintained the
kidnapping—this additional aggressive conduct, perfectly known to
the perpetrators and assumed by the victims, the intensity and
various degrees of treatment, the physical and psychological effects of which vary
in intensity according to the endogenous and exogenous factors that must be
proven in each specific situation).
105. Loayza-Tomayo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33, ¶ 57.
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seriousness of the harmful action, the multiplicity of participants in
the commission of the acts—was expressed (i) in the form of the
detention carried out by State agents—dramatic in the first case and
with an absence of reasonable and well-founded explanations in both
cases; (ii) in the characteristics of the transfer of the victims to the
SIE—the cocking of weapons, concealment of the identity of the
captors, prevention of recognition of the detainee by other members
of the military; and (iii) in the language used, in the initial isolation
and in the warnings as to the severity of the consequences that the
victims’ alleged conduct would have on them, and in the absence of
any determination of their legal status, in spite of it being—which
was obvious—an operation conducted by State agents, and therefore,
one with an abusive or arbitrary aspect that made clear to the victims
that there was a lack of judicial protection and of personal safety and
calm. In the case of the victim Dyer Ampudia, the persistence of the
deprivation of liberty coincided with an exceptional fact: he
remained deprived of his liberty in spite of a negative conclusion of
the police authority, which shows clearly an intimidating intention to
break him mentally. From a subjective perspective, the totality of the
factual characteristics enumerated reveals that the State agents who
physically carried out the kidnapping—and those who ordered it—
proceeded without the least basic sense of humanity or respect for
the individual; they sought deliberately to intensify the suffering of
the kidnapping victim (the means, context and objectives were
themselves meant to intensify the suffering of the victim) in a way
that was unnecessary relative to a simple kidnapping, to keep him
anxious about what was going to be done with him, even excluding
him from his daily activities (which were taken into account to
kidnap him) and in that way, simultaneously, negate them in his
social function temporarily, for the political benefit of the regime in
power.
Not only, as has been set forth previously, are there differences
between treating a kidnapping victim with cruelty and killing a
person with great cruelty; it is also necessary to understand the scope
of cruel treatment in kidnapping. Taking on a dogmatic, traditional,
and fundamentally objective interpretation, appropriate to the
obviously cruel manner of killing a person—which is what murder
requires under our laws—is not consistent with the different criminal
and political meaning assigned by law to each aggravating factor.
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To this is added an internal analysis of the aggravating
circumstances provided for the offense of kidnapping. The analysis
of cruel treatment is framed by two circumstances:
(i) A second degree aggravating circumstance is the one
embodied in Law No. 26222 of August 21, 1993, without
modification to the first degree aggravating circumstance of cruel
treatment. In this scenario, the perpetrator must cause serious bodily
harm to the victim, or seriously harm his mental or physical health,
or cause the victim’s death [. . .] [C]ruel treatment cannot be
identified by acts of torture that speak to the seriousness of the acts
and the detrimental consequences to the victim. Serious bodily harm
and, obviously, death, do not fall within the circumstance of “cruel
treatment,” as when they occur they form part of this especially
aggravating circumstance, which represents a lesser objective
magnitude.
(ii) The circumstance of cruel treatment has always been an
alternative aggravating factor to abusing, corrupting, or
“. . .endangering [. . .] the health of the victim.” The perpetrator
must cause, in addition to the kidnapping itself, specific suffering in
relation to the victim’s physical or mental well-being, but from
which no well-founded risk to his health is derived—obviously, to
his life, either—let alone, as has been set forth previously, grievous
bodily harm or death (the consistency with slight bodily injury, then,
is obvious). Therefore, cruel treatment is equivalent to all objective
or subjective mistreatment (threats, ideological pressure, causing
anxiety or unease) sustained by the victim, but which do not lead to
death, serious harm to his body or physical or mental health, or
significant risk to his health.
[. . .]
§2. The crime of murder: extreme violence and malice aforethought.
697. The subject of the Court’s analysis is the crime of murder,
under the circumstances of extreme violence and malice
aforethought. Murder with extreme violence means to kill another for
an inhumane or futile motive or reason. It is a circumstance that lies
within the framework of culpability, as a category that encompasses
the formation of the perpetrator’s criminal intent [. . .]; it reflects an
intent that belongs to the subjective and personal sphere of the
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perpetrator. Murder with malice aforethought stresses a specific
circumstance of execution, by virtue of which the perpetrator ensures
the execution of the crime and prevents the risk of self-defense on
the part of the victim (strictly speaking, it is a circumstance that
entails greater cowardice of action, and the greater objective
dangerousness of the perpetrator’s conduct) without ignoring the
subjective aspect of the perpetrator, who uses the victim’s
defenselessness or takes advantage of it in the commission of the act.
The Final Judgment of July 6, 2004, No. 999–2004/Tacna, concurred
that it is a circumstance that is mixed in nature.
698. An important element of the circumstance of extreme
violence in a homicide has is that the motive or the cause of death is
despicable (absence of defined objective) or contemptible (brutal,
extreme violence in its determination). The motive in question is not
valid or significant. The case law of the Supreme Court refers to a
criminal act carried out without any apparent explicable reason or
motive, with a perverse instinct or for the mere pleasure of killing
[Final Judgments of May 27, 1999, No. 2343–99/Ancash, and
January [22nd, 1999], No. 4406– 98/Lima]. It also states that the
reason or motive is insignificant, futile or inhumane,
disproportionate, despicable and base [Final Judgments of January
12, 2004, No. 2804–2003/Lima Norte; January [21st, 2005], No.
3904–2004/ La Libertad; and September 9 2004, No. 1488–2004].
There is, based on what has been set forth above, disproportion
between the motivating reason and the seriousness of the homicidal
reaction, which can be identified in homicides perpetrated for
perverse amusement, bloodlust, criminal vanity, out of a prideful or
arrogant nature, and so on.
It is not a question—as HURTADO POZO explains—of simple
clumsy, cruel or brutal execution; in the assertion of ARIAS, it is
necessary to assess the motive with which the perpetrator acts, his
bloodthirsty instinct, aside from which it must be disproportionate,
despicable and base, which reveals in the perpetrator an inhumane
attitude, contrary to the basic sentiments of social solidarity. The
latter is called brutal perversity of determination.
699. The circumstance of malice aforethought, taken from the
Hispanic source, has four requisite elements: a) Normative, only
applicable to crimes committed against persons; b) Objective, based
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in the modus operandi and referring to the use of means, modes or
manners of execution designed to ensure them, eliminating any
possible defense of the victim; c) Subjective, whereby the perpetrator
has to have sought deliberately, or at least taken the opportunity
consciously, to try to eliminate all resistance on the part of the
victim; and d) Teleological, whereby it must be proven whether in
fact, in the specific case, a situation of total defenselessness was
effectively created.
The relevant point is, first of all, the use of means or modes that
tend to ensure the execution of the homicide; second, the certainty of
its execution and the absence of risk to the perpetrator; and, finally,
the perpetrator’s awareness of the defenselessness of the victim and
the choice of means and manners of ensuring the homicide.
This has been established in the case law of the Criminal Chamber
of the Supreme Court [Final Judgments of May 27, 1999, No. 1425–
99–Cusco; and May 25, 2004, No. 880–2004/Arequipa]. The crucial
point with regard to malice aforethought is the assurance of the
execution of the act and the absence of risk in terms of any defense
the victim might offer.
[. . .]
701. In these terms, it is indisputable that the crime was committed
with malice aforethought. That is how it was planned, and that is
how it was carried out. At the same time, its execution involved the
military training of the perpetrators. The victims were caught by
surprise in order to immobilize them, care was taken to ensure that
they were unarmed, they were overpowered and, later, they were
attacked with weapons of war, preventing any defensive maneuver
on their part and ensuring their death. The victims were defenseless
and the lethal results were ensured, without risk to those who carried
out the act. All of the above, furthermore, was sought deliberately.
The use of special circumstances of time and place, the
unexpected attack on the victims (rapid and by surprise in the Barrios
Altos Case), the procedure used by the physical perpetrators of the
crime, which left the victims without the ability to react and was
meant to facilitate the execution of the crime, the helpless state of the
victims—who were unarmed, and subject to the power of their
attackers, which meant their total defenselessness—only confirm the
malice aforethought of the conduct of their attackers.
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There are no grounds, on the other hand, to consider that the
homicide was motivated by extreme violence. Not only did the
perpetrators act on the basis of a defined objective, but also the
motive—in spite of its intrinsic unlawfulness and obvious ethical
reproach, unjustifiable from any point of view—was not futile or
insignificant. The antiterrorist consideration or alibi, besides being
subject to repudiation given what is required of government
employees in their conduct in dealing with persons understood to be
terrorist criminals, does not express a disproportionate, despicable or
base motive. The killing was done according to a previously devised
plan, and the execution of the crime followed, at least externally,
guidelines typical of the performance of military operations, albeit
outside of and counter to military regulations. The notion that was
assumed was based, undoubtedly, on disregard for human life and in
open rebellion against the basic rules of a civilized society, and
against the very essence of military honor and the guidelines that
govern confrontations with and treatment of a defeated or unarmed
enemy. The latter, in spite of its dramatic and shocking illegality,
cannot be considered action based on a motive of extreme violence.
Consequently, homicide with malice aforethought is admitted, and
homicide with extreme violence is rejected.
§3.The crime of grievous bodily harm
[. . .]
705. The crime of grievous bodily harm—as a crime that has
physical effects—requires, as set forth in the previously cited
provision, that the perpetrator by improper act or omission cause,
produce or bring about serious harm to the bodily integrity or health
of the victim.
However, when Article 121 of the Criminal Code refers to the
existence of a harm to body or health, it requires the performance of
conduct—by act or omission—that, on one hand, causes any change,
more or less lasting, to the victim’s body (which is apparent in the
body) or, on the other hand, causes or accentuates a pathological
state of certain intensity, altering physiology (the functional
equilibrium of the organism) or causing mental changes of a certain
magnitude, whether lasting or relatively fleeting. The harm to the
body—bodily integrity—or to psycho-physiological health, must be
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serious. The legislature defines the seriousness of the injury,
incorporating precise mandatory qualifying circumstances. Among
them, and for purposes of this case, there are: a) injuries that present
an imminent danger to life; b) those that cause permanent disability;
and c) those that require thirty or more days of assistance or rest,
according to a doctor’s orders.
706. In the case of “imminent danger to life,” the injury—by its
characteristics and significance of the wound, as well as the
conditions or constitution of the victim—must cause a specific, real,
effective, active danger of seriously jeopardizing the life of the
victim. That is, the injury inflicted must entail a certain likelihood of
complications, which generally arise when mainly internal tissues
and organs are damaged. The victim must actually have been at
death’s door.
707. In the case of “injuries that cause permanent disability,” the
normal physical means that the victim used to enjoy in his daily life,
such as his ability to move, are seriously diminished as a result of the
injury, in such a manner that, as a consequence, he will need the
assistance of third parties or the assistance of some mechanical,
electromechanical or other means in order to get by normally.
Incidentally, there is no need for the disability to be incurable; rather,
it must persist for a considerable length of time.
708. In the case of “causation of any other harm that requires
thirty or more days of assistance or rest,” the time periods are used
with the understanding that the seriousness of harm is in part
measurable by the period of time required for the victim’s recovery
[. . .]. It facilitates the inclusion of an entire range of injuries not
provided for specifically, the only limitation being the requirement of
disability lasting more than twenty-nine days that necessitates a
doctor’s care or leave from work.
709. SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE. The
perpetrator must act with animus vulnerandi or laedendi at the time
of causing serious harm to his victim; that is, criminal intent to
injure, to diminish the bodily integrity or the physical or mental
health of the victim, with knowledge of the specific danger of the
injury caused by his action. [. . .]
It should be noted that, as the Supreme Court has specified,
“. . .from the external and purely objective perspective, the offense of
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causing bodily harm and an attempted murder are completely alike,
the sole and only difference being the perpetrator’s state of mind;
one merely has the intent to injure, while the other has the intent to
kill” [Final Judgment of September [24th, 1997], Motion for Nullity
No. 2493–97/Amazonas].
§4. Crimes Against Humanity: Barrios Altos and La Cantuta.
[. . .]
712. Thus, according to the development or evolution of this
internationally defined criminal offense, it is possible to define
crimes against humanity, in general terms, as does GIL GIL, as any
attack on fundamental individual legally protected interests (life,
physical safety and health, freedom. . .) committed in times of peace
as well as during wartime, as part of a widespread or systematic
attack carried out with the participation or tolerance of the de jure or
de facto political authority.106
713. Murder was always considered a type of crime against
humanity [. . .].
An initial clarification, however, has to do with the term “murder.”
This clarification begins with two necessary considerations. First, the
term “murder” cannot be identified under Article 108 of the
Criminal Code, but rather with the act of killing or causing death;
and, second, by virtue of the recognition of the principle of
individual culpability, the conduct, whether by act or omission, must
be intentional; the criminal intent—of any kind—must extend to all
of the elements of the crime, basically to know that the death is part
106. Alicia Gil Gil, Los crímenes contra la humanidad y el genocidio en el
Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional a la luz de “Los elementos de los
Crímenes,” in La nueva justicia penal supranacional, 94 (Kai Ambos Ed., 2002);
Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 565-568
(Sept. 2, 1998) points in this same direction from a general perspective. The Court
noted that the essential elements of crimes against humanity are those acts that are
inhumane in nature and character that cause great suffering or serious harm to
physical or mental health, in addition to being committed as part of a widespread
and systematic attack against the civilian population. Prosecutor v. Drazen
Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Oct. 7, 1997)
(“…serious acts of violence which harm human beings by striking what is most
essential to them: their lives, liberty, physical welfare, health and/or dignity. They
are inhumane acts that by their extent and gravity go beyond the limits tolerable to
the international community…”)
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of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian
population.
714. If it is understood, in accordance with international
jurisprudence, that a crime against humanity is of a special nature,
with a higher degree of immorality in its commission as compared to
common crimes, then the following must be verified:
1. From the objective or substantive aspect, certain elements
must be present that have been shaped and recognized based
on the positive or customary law of human rights protection.
Specifically, the requirements imposed by the international
instruments and courts have referred always to (i) the status
of the perpetrator (as part of a government entity or a
criminal organization that assumes de facto control of a
territory);107 (ii) the nature of the violation (organized, and
widespread or systematic acts—the term “widespread,”
quantitatively, refers to the number of victims, while the
adjective “systematic” encompasses the idea of a methodical
plan);108 (iii) the timing of the execution of the crime
(situation of internal or external armed conflict),109 and (iv)
the qualities and status of the victims (civilian population,
state of defenselessness).110

107. Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupesckic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 654-55
(June 14, 2000). In the same vein, see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Judgment, ¶ 659 (May 7, 1997).
108. Mireille Delmas-Marty, ¿pueden los crímenes internacionales contribuir al
debate entre universalismo y relativismo de los valores?, Gil Gil, supra note 106 at
83. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment (May 7, 1997) (the attack
must be widespread or systematic, that is, it is not necessary for both criteria to be
met. In both cases it is required that the act be perpetrated in accordance with a
policy, which excludes situations in which inhumane acts are committed on the
perpetrator’s own initiative or in furtherance of his own criminal plan, without the
encouragement or direction of a government or organized group). See Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Sep. 2, 1998). Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgement, ¶ 428 (Feb. 22, 2001) (the
“widespread” nature of the attack shall be determined, principally, based on the
number of victims); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Appeals Court
Judgement, ¶ 94 (June 12, 2002) (the classification of the attack as “systematic”
referred to the organized nature of the acts of violence and the unlikelihood of their
occurring by mere coincidence).
109. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber Decision, ¶ 141
(Oct. 2, 1995) (customary international law no longer required a nexus between
crimes against humanity and an international armed conflict; therefore, such
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2. From the subjective perspective, it is required that the
agent or perpetrator have knowledge of the broad and general
context in which the act occurs, and that the conduct is or will
be part of a widespread or systematized attack—organized
violence—against the civilian population in furtherance of a
plan or policy. It is clear that customary international law has
never recognized any commission of an isolated inhumane
act as a crime against humanity; the act has to be part of a
greater campaign of atrocities committed against civilians.
Accordingly, murder has been characterized as a crime
against humanity,111 with the specification that it be the
consequence or expression of a systematic assault, coming
from the State or its institutions of power, which is promoted
or supported by official or quasi-official policies and
directives, and brought to bear on the civilian population in a
situation of social or military conflict. There is likewise no
impediment to including grievous bodily harm in these
considerations.
715. Based on this established standard, the writings of legal
scholars have underscored the structured, political and systematic
level of the acts of aggression that constitute crimes against
humanity. On this point, AMBOS has stated: “The common
denominator of a systematic attack is that it is carried out according
to a preconceived plan or policy, emphasizing the organized nature
of the attack. The attack is systematic if it is based on a policy or a
plan that provides guidance to the individual perpetrators with
regard to the target of the attack, i.e., the specific victims. . . This is,
in fact, the international element of crimes against humanity, since it
is what makes criminal acts that would be common crimes under
crimes could be committed in times of peace). Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), art. 1(b), U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No.
18, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) (refers to crimes against humanity “whether
committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg [...].”)
110. [...]Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 644 (May 7,
1997) (civilian population means those persons that are not part of the organized
power that is the source of the violence [...]).
111. [...].Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Judgment, (Nov. 29,
1996) (the Tribunal states that, unlike under ordinary law, the attack is no longer
directed at the physical welfare of the victim alone but at humanity as a whole.
Those crimes also transcend the individual because when the individual is
assaulted, humanity comes under attack and is negated).
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other circumstances acquire the character of crimes against
humanity. In essence, the political factor only requires the exclusion
of the casual acts of individuals acting on their own, in an isolated
manner and without anyone coordinating them. . . Such common
criminal acts, even if committed on a widespread scale, are not
crimes against humanity if they are not tolerated, at least by some
State or organization. . . Thus, in order to be crimes against
humanity, crimes committed on a widespread scale must be linked to
some form or another of state or organized authority: they must at
least be tolerated by such authority.”112
716. For its part, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia in the case of PROSECUTOR V. BLASKIC recognized
an attack as systematic based on the following indicators, which can
always be inferred from the context: “a) the existence of a political
objective, a plan pursuant to which the attack is perpetrated, or an
ideology, in the broad sense of the word, that is, to destroy, persecute
or weaken a community; b) the perpetration of a criminal act on a
very large scale against a group of civilians or the repeated and
continuous commission of inhumane acts linked to one another; c)
the preparation and use of significant public or private resources,
whether military or other; d) the implication of high-level political
and/or military authorities in the definition and establishment of the
methodical plan.”113 [. . .] Only the attack—not the specific acts of
which the defendant is accused—must be widespread or systematic.
In addition, as held by the IACtHR in the Case of ALMONACID
ARELLANO V. CHILE (Judgment September 26, 2006, para. 96),
even a single act, committed in the context of a widespread or
systematic attack, is sufficient to give rise to a crime against
humanity.
717. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the acts of murder and
grievous bodily harm at issue in this case go beyond a strictly
common or individual scope and are fully consistent with the
identifying criteria of crimes against humanity. The murders and
grievous bodily harm committed in the cases of Barrios Altos and La
112. KAI AMBOS, ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 133-35
(IDEMSA 2007).
113. Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 94 (Mar.
3, 2000) cited in Scilingo, SAN, Apr. 19, 2005 (No. 16/2005) “Caso Scilingo”
[Scilingo Case] [...].
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Cantuta are also crimes against humanity, fundamentally, because
they were committed within the framework of a state policy of
selective but systematic elimination of alleged members of
subversive groups. This policy, on one hand, was designed, planned
and controlled at the highest levels of State power, and carried out by
state agents—members of military intelligence—who used the
military apparatus to do so; in addition, in accordance with their
objectives, it affected a significant number of defenseless members
of the civilian population.
This conclusion is absolutely compatible with what was set forth
in Part II of this Judgment. It has been proven that it was either a
state ordered decision, or approved by the head of state, that it was
carried out by the military intelligence bodies (the Colina Special
Intelligence Detachment and the DINTE), directed ultimately by the
SIN, that it had all of the official support imaginable, and that its
final objective was the forced disappearance and/or arbitrary or
extrajudicial execution of alleged subversives, of which two
important events—but not the only ones—were specifically Barrios
Altos and La Cantuta.
The foregoing coincides absolutely, based on the totality of the
evidence examined, with the decisions of the IACtHR and the
Constitutional Court, which also classified these acts as crimes
against humanity under international criminal law.
Chapter II: Perpetration by means of control over an organized
apparatus of power
§3. Perpetration by means of control over an organized apparatus of
power
¶1. Background and evolution of the criminal doctrine.
724. The emergence of this approach began with the analysis of
the Eichmann and Staschynski cases. The assessment of those cases
demonstrated that it was not possible to link the defendants to the
classic options of perpetration by means. However, ROXIN proved
that both of the accused were part of an organized apparatus of
power and that the crimes attributed to them in fact reflected plans
and orders from the central bodies of those structures, which
controlled and directed their execution. Accordingly, it was possible
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to conclude that the immediate perpetrator of the crime, the midlevel commanders and the central body of the power structure that
ordered its execution all had different ways of controlling the act, but
were not mutually exclusive.
Thus, while the first had control over the action—that is, the
physical execution of the punishable act—the second and third had
control over the organization, meaning the ability to influence and
control the realization of the criminal event, from their respective
functional level, through the power structure that was at their
disposal. This made the latter true indirect perpetrators, since “the
control over the event exercised by the ‘person in the background’ is
based on the fact that he can, through the apparatus at his disposal,
bring about the effect with greater certainty than even in the case of
control through coercion and error, which are recognized almost
unanimously as cases of perpetration by means.”
Therefore, it is a question of specific control that the principal
exercises over the organization, and not one of a person to person
relationship or direct control over the immediate perpetrator. As
such, the basis of this form of perpetration by means cannot rest on
control or dominance over the “intervening person,” since that
person ultimately “is a free and responsible person in the
performance of his own actions.” The control exercised by the
perpetrator by means is exercised over the apparatus and its
structure, into which the person who carries out the act is included
and incorporated.
725. THE COURT’S ACCEPTANCE OF ROXIN’S THEORY.
ROXIN’s concept was invoked judicially for the first time in 1985
and 1986, in the judgments handed down by the Argentine Tribunals
tasked with trying and reviewing the conviction of the Military
Juntas that ruled Argentina from 1976 to 1983 (Judgment of
December 9, 1985 issued by the National Court of Appeals for
Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters of the Federal Capital,
and the December 30, 1986 Judgment of the Supreme Court,
respectively). The judges in the court of first instance arrived at the
conclusion that the senior members of the military were criminally
responsible as perpetrators by means. Thus, in point VII.6 of their
decision, under the subtitle “The path to be followed,” they
emphasized that the defendants had at all times maintained control
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over the people who carried out the acts and, therefore, had to be
held responsible as indirect perpetrators of the crimes committed.
That decision was later reviewed by the Supreme Court, and in a
split decision the majority also applied the theory of perpetration by
means of control over the organization.
Subsequently, it was the German Federal Supreme Court, in its
Judgment of July 26, 1994(BGHSt, Vol. 40, pp. 218-240) that turned
to the concept of perpetration by means of control over an organized
apparatus of power to hold the members of the National Defense
Council of the former German Democratic Republic criminally liable
for the murders committed by shootings or through the placement of
deadly landmines in the vicinity of the Berlin Wall. In that case, the
three members of the National Defense Council were found to be
indirect perpetrators of those deaths. In this manner, the Court
modified the lower court’s decision, which had only considered them
instigators of those crimes. In our case law, this type of perpetration
by means has also been attributed to the leader of the terrorist group
Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso. The judgment of the
National Criminal Court of October 13, 2006, as well as the Final
Judgment of the Second Temporary Criminal Chamber of the
Supreme Court (the majority opinion) of December 14, 2007, held
him responsible for the homicides and attacks carried out by the
operational levels of that outlaw organization. In these national court
decisions, the individuals who physically executed the crimes were
considered direct perpetrators of those abominable acts, while those
crimes were attributed to Guzmán Reynoso by virtue of the fact that
he controlled the organization, by exercising political and military
control over Shining Path from his position and rank in the Central
Committee.
[. . .]
¶2. The General Assumption: The existence of the
organization.
726. STRUCTURED ORGANIZATION. CHARACTERISTICS.
The theory of perpetration by means of control over organized
apparatuses of power is based fundamentally on the “prior existence
of a structured organization.” Such organization has a solid
hierarchical line that will make its highest strategic level responsible
for the criminal decisions and plans made therein, which, will be
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later assigned to the immediate perpetrator through the vertical
channel provided by its structural design.
Accordingly, an important characteristic of this type of
hierarchically organized structure that highlights its strict verticality,
is (i) the “assignment of roles.” This phrase is more ideographic than
those commonly used in contemporary penal doctrine to explain the
relationship between the strategic level and the physical perpetrator
of the act, and that refer to a division of labor or distribution of
duties. Furthermore, such references could confuse ‘perpetration by
means’ with cases of co-perpetration. In this respect, ROXIN has
specified that, “it is also not possible to speak of a ‘division of labor’
–which currently is considered generally to be a central element of
co-perpetration—when the holder of power leaves it completely to
the executing bodies to carry out his order.”
It is important also to stress, as another characteristic of these
power apparatuses with organized hierarchical structures, that (ii)
they develop a functional life that is independent of their members.
They are grounded not in a special state of mind of the highest
strategic level, but rather in the “functional machinery of the
apparatus,” that is, their “automatism” or development of a selfpropelled process or operation. Consequently, the “person in the
background” can always be confident that his criminal order or plan
will be followed without the need to know the immediate perpetrator.
It is, then, the “automatic operation of the apparatus” that actually
guarantees compliance with the order. Therefore, it is not essential
for there to be an express order, contained in a document, whereby
the strategic superior directly orders the immediate executor to carry
out a specific function. However, that does not mean that the
superior is completely removed from the specific action of the
organization; rather, his presence is noted in the configuration or
operating capacity of a series of mechanisms that interact from inside
and outside the power structure and which enable the apparatus to
remain active and carry out its criminal plans.
¶3. The Specific Elements and their Requirements.
727. ELEMENTS AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. The
identification of the hierarchical organizations that constitute
organized apparatuses of power, which are the basis of the form of
perpetration by means under examination, also requires proof of the
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presence of what the German Federal Supreme Court has called the
“framework conditions.” That is, the functional requirements and
elements. They are as follows: 1) command authority; 2) the
deviation of the organization from the legal system; 3) the fungibility
of the immediate perpetrator; and 4) the elevated willingness of the
executor to commit the act.
[. . .]
¶4. Objective Elements and Requirements.
4.1. Command authority.
729. CONCEPT. As indicated, command authority is a
fundamental condition to charge perpetration by means in the
context of an organized power structure. Command authority is the
capacity of the strategic superior—of the “person in the
background”—to give orders or assign roles to the part of the
organization that is subordinate to him. He acquires this capacity, or
it may be conferred upon him, by virtue of a position of authority,
leadership or influence derived from political, ideological, social,
religious, cultural, economic, or other similar factors.
[. . .]
730. FORMS OF COMMAND AUTHORITY. In this context, a
distinction can be made between command authority, which is
exercised at the superior strategic level and that which is realized at
the intermediate levels. It is important to distinguish that command
authority can be expressed in two ways: first, from the superior
strategic level down to the intermediate tactical or operational levels;
and second, from the intermediate levels to the direct executors. In
both cases, such command authority will always be manifested
vertically. The latter will be decisive for the attribution of
perpetration by means to all of the commanders in the chain of the
power structure, as it is not possible to equate the manner and scope
with which the superior strategic level gives or transmits its decisions
with those given by the mid-level commanders to the direct
executors, precisely because of the different position that each level
occupies inside the criminal organization. The control over the
organization that is exercised from the superior strategic level will be
different from that held by the intermediate commander, since
whomever is at the apex of the hierarchical structure has total
domination of the apparatus, while whomever is in the intermediate
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position only has the potential to give orders in the sector of the
organization in which he is authorized to do so.
This view of the organization and its functional hierarchies has
been applied in the national courts to interpret the design of the
Shining Path. Indeed, the National Criminal Court specified that the
so-called Central Leadership exercised the “real power of control
over the entire organization,” since it was in charge of presiding
over and directing meetings held with the intermediate bodies, and at
the same time controlled the proper operation of the criminal
apparatus. For their part, those “intermediary bodies” were made up
of the so-called Regional Committees and Zone Committees. Then,
on a lower rung, there were Sub-Zone Committees and Cell
Committees. The National Criminal Court found that when this
terrorist group became militarized, all of the structures worked in
terms of conducting armed operations. In that sense, when they
formed the so-called People’s Army, those individuals who had been
the Political Secretary and Undersecretary of a Committee became
the Political Commander and the Military Commander, respectively.
[. . .]
732.
COMMAND
AUTHORITY
AND
ORDERS.
CLASSIFICATION.
1. As stated previously, the most typical manifestation of
command authority is an order. This must be understood as
an order that provides for the performance of an act or
mission that the subordinate must carry out in view of the
functional position and hierarchy of the one issuing the order.
It can be verbal or written. However, it can also be expressed
through signs or gestures. As such, two levels can be
differentiated with respect to orders.
At the first level, there are the formal orders that acquire such
status according to mandates, directives and orders. On the
other hand, at the second level there are orders given for their
substantive effectiveness, that is, the signals, expressions,
gesticulations, specific actions or similar expressions of
another kind.
[. . .]
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2. The first-level orders are frequent in those organizations
that, removing themselves from the formal and legitimate
system that governs their structure, deviate toward the
fulfillment of criminal objectives.
3. The case of the Military Juntas of the Argentine
government evidenced this type of conduct.
[. . .]
4. The orders at the second level are used, generally, by
organized apparatuses of power that have been structured
from their inception completely outside of the legal order.
Such is the case of terrorist organizations that pursue the
violent takeover of political power.
5. According to national case law, this occurred within the
Shining Path organization through the decision-making
power held by its Central Leadership. Indeed, as established
by the National Criminal Court, many of the orders that were
issued consisted of a series of codified gestures and practices
that only the members of the organization, especially its
leaders, would use and interpret. Thus, it was a procedure
regulated by the top leaders that prior to committing an
assassination, it was necessary to “unmask the victim,”
whether that person was a public servant or a businessman.
This was done by putting up posters, distributing flyers,
publishing in newspapers or other media, or through specific
criticism that the Leadership would make against a specific
public figure during Central Committee sessions or other
events in which the murder of certain individuals was
proposed. Those individuals would be eliminated shortly
thereafter, and later, the Central Leadership would hold up
the event expressly as a success of the organization.
According to the judgment of the National Criminal Court,
said procedure was adopted by Abimael Guzmán Reynoso
against retired Vice Admiral Gerónimo Cafferata Marazzi,
during the so-called IV National Conference held in 1986.
4.2. Deviation from the Law. Types and Characteristics.
733. DEFINITION. Another objective element of perpetration by
means of control over an organized apparatus of power is
“detachment” from or “deviation” from the law. “The law” is
identified as a legal system or order represented by a coordinated set
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of general and positive norms that regulate social life. The State, as a
community, defines its normative order. This normative order can
only be a legal order, meaning that which is commonly referred to as
the “law of the State” or “national law.” Nevertheless, this national
law is closely linked and integrated with international law, forming a
single unit. As such, international law forms part of the national legal
system, insofar as the standards created in the international context
are incorporated into the national law of the State. Consequently, the
detachment or deviation from the law means that the organization is
structured, operated and remains outside the national and
international legal order.
734. SCOPE OF DEVIATION FROM THE LAW.
PRESUMPTIONS. As ROXIN notes, in these cases, “the apparatus
functions as a whole outside the legal order.” That is, it causes its
illegal effects as a complete whole that acts totally outside the law. In
his analysis of the Eichmann and Staschynski cases, he found that
state power was operating outside the law since the very guarantees
that it regulated were ineffective. However, that did not mean,
necessarily, that those holding such power were not ultimately
governed by that same legal order, especially in its international
aspect. In ROXIN’s opinion, deviation from the law refers not only
to disregard for the national legal system of each State but also, and
very specifically, to disregard for international law: “only because
all peoples of the world are tied to certain values is it possible for us
to consider criminal and punishable the conduct of superior State
entities that clearly violate human rights.”
Another presumption of perpetration by means of control over an
organized apparatus of power, recognized by ROXIN, arises in the
case of crimes committed by clandestine movements, secret
organizations and similar associations that clash with the domestic
laws of the State. That is, they operate as “a kind of State within the
State that has freed itself from the community order in general, or in
specific dealings with the community.” In short, in ROXIN’s
opinion, deviation from the law would arise not only in crimes
committed by State entities or apparatuses of state power but also
would be applicable to cases of “non-state organized crime” and in
many “forms of the emergence of terrorism.” Only cases of
corporate criminality should be excluded. Consequently, all
conceptualization and understanding of detachment or deviation

810

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:657

from the law must begin by identifying whether the issue deals with
state criminality or nonstate criminality. That will be fundamental in
being able to observe, in each criminal structure and expression, the
presence of perpetration by means of control over organized
apparatuses of power.
735.
PERPETRATION
BY
MEANS
AND
STATE
CRIMINALITY. Given the characteristics and content of the
accusation in the case at hand, it is relevant to evaluate the specific
expressions and manifestations of perpetration by means that are
shaped and operate as state criminality.
[. . .]
2. It is important to note that an important peculiarity of this type
of crime lies in the fact that the strategic superior level of the State,
that is, its central authority, uses the structures of the state apparatus
in the exercise of its position for the systematic commission of
crimes that acquire international relevance due to their seriousness
and the risk of impunity. This form of criminality attacks the legal
order in force, marginalizing the legally enacted laws in their
national as well as supranational aspects. Therefore, a State regime
that from its superior strategic level orders the commission of these
serious crimes cannot be considered a State of laws; indeed, it is
completely outside the law.
[. . .]
736. DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS AND DEVIATION FROM
THE LAW. In this context, it is relevant, particularly to the case at
hand, to evaluate the status of so-called de facto governments that
become de facto by reasons of the manner in which power is
exercised. That is, those that are originally instituted pursuant to the
legal procedures stipulated in the Constitution, but later begin to
express, manifest and conduct themselves outside or in violation of
the law.
¶5. Subjective Elements and Requirements.
1. Fungibility. Types.
737. CONCEPT. Fungibility is the first subjective element on
which a charge of perpetration by means of control over an
organized apparatus of power is based. It has been understood,
generally, as the direct executor’s capacity to be exchanged or
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substituted by the strategic superior in making his criminal plan
operational and in executing it. In that regard, FERNÁNDEZ
IBÁÑEZ, paraphrasing the position of JOECKS, indicates that the
power of substitution held by the person in the background is a
central element of this form of imposing his dominant will.
[. . .]
738. TYPES OF FUNGIBILITY. Based on the foregoing, two
types of fungibility can be identified: negative and positive.
1. Negative fungibility. This corresponds to the traditional
concept conferred upon it by ROXIN, which means, above
all, that: “The perpetrator does not represent a free and
responsible individual, but an anonymous, interchangeable
figure.”
[. . .]
2. In order to illustrate this fungible mode, ROXIN referred
to the arguments asserted by Eichmann’s defense counsel
before the Jerusalem Tribunal. In his opinion, it was
irrelevant if the Nazi officer failed to carry out the order to
execute the Jews, since the order, even in such case, would
have been carried out. In this manner it was clear that the
crime was not the work of an individual person, but rather of
the State itself. National case law has also referred to this
position of negative fungibility. Indeed, the National
Criminal Court in its judgment against Shining Path leader
Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, held: “The person in the
background did not control the will of the executor directly,
but rather only indirectly through the criminal apparatus.”
This was due to the coincidence of two independent factors:
first, because of the decisive nature of the management of the
apparatus; and second, due to the link, membership and
subordination of the executor to the hierarchy of this
apparatus.
3. Positive fungibility. This arises and is seen, precisely,
where there is a plurality of potential executors in the
structure of the apparatus of power.
[. . .]
739. FUNGIBILITY AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION. A
minority sector of legal scholars have questioned the condition that
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fungibility be an essential element of the offense of perpetration by
means of control over an organized apparatus of power.
[. . .]
2. In the national jurisprudence and legal scholarship,
SCHROEDER’s theory has been echoed by MEINI
MÉNDEZ and by the National Criminal Court in the Guzmán
Reynoso Judgment. In the opinion of the former, the
possibility of substitution is an expectation of criminal
conduct and it becomes a simple piece of statistical
information on the likelihood of the success of the criminal
plan, and therefore it is unnecessary to mention the possibility
of substituting the executor as a decisive element of control
over the organization. For the latter, control lies in the “use of
the predisposition of the executor” to carry out the order. The
possibility of substituting the direct perpetrators represents
solely a greater likelihood that the criminal conduct will
materialize, but it does not support any control.
[. . .]
2. Predisposition to commit the unlawful act.
740. NECESSITY OF ITS INCLUSION. The three criteria
examined up to this point: command authority, deviation from the
law and fungibility, were for a long time the three basic pillars of
ROXIN’s theory of perpetration by means of control over organized
apparatuses of power. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, in his
latest studies this author has considered the inclusion and integration
of a fourth element called the considerably high willingness of the
executor to perform the act.
[. . .]
Its jurisprudential usefulness in deciding cases of perpetration by
means in cases of State crimes was made clear in the mid-[1990s] by
the German Federal Supreme Court in its judgment against the
members of National Defense Council of the German Democratic
Republic. In that judgment, the responsibility of the perpetrator by
means was based on showing that the “person in the background”
had taken advantage of the “unconditional willingness of the
immediate perpetrator to execute the crime.”
[. . .]
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§4. Perpetration by means and superior responsibility in
international criminal law
742. BACKGROUND. It is important to distinguish between
perpetration by means of control over an organized apparatus of
power and other means of accusation developed in international
criminal law to attribute criminal responsibility to strategic levels of
State or State-based power structures. Specifically, we refer here to
the theory of superior responsibility. This is a criterion of accusation
that arose and was developed at the end of WWII and which was
implemented at the Nüremberg and Tokyo trials.114 According to
those who have studied these cases, “In those trials, the idea was
made clear that the commanders not only had the duty to respect the
laws of war but also the obligation to make their subordinates
respected them.”115 Later, around the mid-[1990s], the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also used this theory to
convict the military commanders of the Army of the Serbian
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina who failed to prevent their
subordinate troops from perpetrating crimes against humanity, and
those who omitted to investigate or punish the direct perpetrators of
those criminal acts.116
743. CHARACTERISTIC
RESPONSIBILITY.

ELEMENTS

OF

SUPERIOR

Superior responsibility, as interpreted in scholarly opinions and
regulated under international criminal law, establishes the liability by
omission of the person who exercises command over the direct
114. Eduardo Bertoni, Autoría mediata por aparatos organizados de poder:
Antecedentes y Aplicación Práctica in LOS CAMINOS DE LA JUSTICIA PENAL Y LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS 4 (IDEHPUCP 2007).
115. Id. at 29.
116. MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, ¿PUEDEN LOS CRÍMENES INTERNACIONALES
CONTRIBUIR AL DEBATE ENTRE UNIVERSALISMO Y RELATIVISMO DE LOS VALORES?
CRÍMENES INTERNACIONALES Y JURISDICCIONES INTERNACIONALES 83 (Editorial
Norma 2004) provides important clarification with regard to the fact that although
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
[unlike the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda] seemed to
require the existence of an armed conflict for the commission of crimes against
humanity, “in practice, however, the autonomy of the ICTY was strengthened with
the Tadic judgment, in which the Appeals Chamber held that customary
international law no longer required a link between crimes against humanity and
an international armed conflict. In other words, it is clear that a crime against
humanity can be committed in peace time.”
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perpetrator of the crime.117 In such cases, it is generally stated that
the superior fails to comply with his duty of prevention, supervision
and punishment of all crimes that are, or may be, committed by his
subordinates. This means, then, that there is a legal obligation on the
part of the superior, which he omits. According to AMBOS, “The
concept of command, or better, superior responsibility, makes the
superior liable for a failure to act to prevent criminal misconduct of
his or her subordinates. The superior is punished for a lack of
control and supervision of his or her subordinates who commit
crimes. Thus, the superior is punished both for his or her own failure
to intervene and for the crimes of others. As a result, the concept
seems to create, on the one hand, direct liability for the lack of
supervision, and, on the other, indirect liability for the criminal acts
of others. [. . .] Superior responsibility has a double character: it is a
genuine offence of omission [. . .] and an offence which creates
danger. . .”118
744. DEFINITION. It is clear, then, that in view of its
characteristics and assumptions this mode of assigning responsibility
is different from perpetration by means of control over an organized
apparatus of power. The latter, essentially, will always be an act of
commission, but one that travels from the issuance of the order by
the strategic superior to its specific execution by the intervening
117. KAI AMBOS, LA PARTE GENERAL DEL DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 79
(Temis 2005) (this doctrine presupposes that the perpetrator holds a specific
position of military or political power. It is, furthermore, intimately related to a
punishable act of omission. The perpetrator’s position as a commander places him
in a position of guarantor, which results in the emergence of specific duties of
control, protection or oversight (duties of the guarantor), noncompliance with
which makes him guilty by omission).
118. KAI AMBOS, EL NUEVO DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 375 (ARA
Editores 2004). The concept of “superior responsibility” has a dual aspect: it is a
crime of omission and a crime that creates danger. The superior is punished, from
the objective perspective, for failing to supervise the subordinates and for not
“preventing” or “suppressing” the commission of their atrocities. The crimes
committed by the subordinates are neither an element of the crime nor a simple
objective condition for the liability of the superior; they are only the point of
reference of the superior’s failure to supervise. From the subjective perspective,
the criminal intent of the superior is not limited solely to the failure to supervise,
which creates the risk or the danger that the subordinates will commit crimes, but
also to those derivative crimes themselves. Kai Ambos, La responsabilidad del
superior en el derecho penal internacional in AA.VV.: La nueva justicia penal
supranacional 159, 197, 198 (Editorial Tirant lo Blanch 2002).
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person.119 The difference is also developed normatively in the Rome
Statute, which regulates precisely both types as two distinct levels of
involvement and punishability of the strategic bodies linked to the
commission of crimes that violate human rights. Indeed, Article
25(3)(a) of the Statute identifies perpetration by means fairly clearly
(“Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other
person is criminally responsible”).120 On the other hand, Article 28
defines in detail the conditions of omission that constitute superior
responsibility (“. . .as a result of his or her failure to exercise control
properly. . .”).121
119. For a discussion of the differences, see GERHARD WERLE, TRATADO DE
DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 217-18, 225-25 (Editorial Tirant lo Blanch
2005). The author indicates (1) that perpetration by means is recognized in the
major legal systems of the world; however, prior to the entry into force of the
Rome Statute it was neither regulated in international law nor had it been
implemented in its case law; (2) that in international criminal law perpetration by
means is relevant, above all, in the form of control over an organization; (3) that
the regulation by the Rome Statute, in terms of the punishability of the perpetrator
by means is independent of whether the immediate perpetrator is himself
criminally liable. Article 25(3)(a) has an explanatory effect in two regards [one is
underscored], by virtue of which the concept of the “perpetrator behind the
perpetrator” acquires a basis in international criminal law, as the responsibility of
the person who acts as the direct or immediate perpetrator is not excluded
expressly. On the other hand, regarding the concept of superior responsibility, he
notes (4) that is a legal creation of international criminal law, under the aegis of
which the military leader or civilian superior can be held responsible for crimes
against international law committed by the subordinates, when they are to blame
for the violation of their duties of control; and, (5) that from the theoretical point of
view, this concept can be placed between responsibility by omission and the theory
of criminal participation, which presents complicated issues of definition and of
concurrence with the general principles of the theory of participation.
120. Dino Carlos Caro Coria, La tipificación de los crímenes consagrados en el
Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional in AAVV LA CORTE PENAL
INTERNACIONAL Y LAS MEDIDAS DE SU IMPLEMENTACIÓN EN EL PERU 145
(Elizabeth Salmón ed. 2001) (this formulation, as DINO CARLOS CARO CORIA
emphasizes, incorporates ROXIN’s theory of perpetration by means through
“organized power structures”).
121. In this respect, see also Brief for Allard K. Lowenstein International
Human Rights Clinic of Yale Law School as Amicus Curiae, at 27. It states as
follows:
In this way, unlike perpetration by means or co-perpetration, superior
responsibility attributes responsibility to superiors for their omissions—that
is, their inaction when it comes to taking the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the criminal act or to punish the crimes committed by
their subordinates. In comparison, perpetration by means and co-perpetration
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§5. Defendant Fujimori Fujimori as perpetrator by means
745. The defendant’s indirect perpetration of the acts of which he
is accused, in accordance with Chapter II of Part III and what has
been set out in the previous paragraphs of this Chapter, is sufficiently
proven. The legal and factual elements, which as presumptions and
requirements support such level and method of assigning criminal
responsibility, have been satisfied conclusively. In that respect, the
following information is relevant:
1. The defendant occupied the highest position at the
strategic level of State power in general and of the National
Defense System in particular. From that position he exercised
clear command authority for the direct political and military
leadership of strategies for confronting the subversive
terrorist organizations that had been active in the country
since the beginning of the [1980s].
2. In his formal role as central entity, that is, as shaper and
developer of government policies, and as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces and the National Police, the
defendant abused his position of authority and perverted the
legitimate use of his power; as of [1990] (together with his
advisor Vladimiro Montesinos Torres and with the direct
support of Army General Hermoza Ríos, who held the
highest positions in the military hierarchy), he began to set up
an organized apparatus of power based on the central and
derivative units of the SINA, which were co-opted at their
highest levels of command.
3. In this context, defendant Fujimori Fujimori started to
devise, and simultaneously to define, special objectives and
strategies to confront terrorist subversion, particularly the
core groups that had begun to operate in the country’s urban
areas, most notably in the capital and surrounding areas. He
did this with his advisory milieu and the support of the State,
using the secret intelligence services, which because of their
function were characterized by the compartmentalization of
their bodies or units, the hierarchical subordination if their
structures, and the secrecy and complete clandestinity of their
agents and actions.

generally presume that the perpetrators perform some positive act to set in
motion the events that lead to the crime.
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4. In this control, with the central government objective as
the defined policy, the general strategies and the execution
orders were issued or transmitted by the defendant and
retransmitted by the other levels of the organized power
structure in very diverse ways, fully consistent with the
informal or quasi-formal systems that characterize the codes
of communication and action manuals typical of the strategic
or operational intelligence system.
5. In that context and practice, the underlying theme was the
elimination of alleged terrorists and their organizations or
bases of support. The specific strategy accorded to it was the
identification, location, capture and physical elimination of
members and sympathizers of the terrorist groups. At the
tactical level, the operational pattern for the application of
this strategy began with the gathering of information on the
subversive core groups and their members, in order to later
eliminate them with special intelligence operations under the
responsibility of specialized SIE units that would be assigned
and supervised by the SIN, with the logistical support and
coordination of the Peruvian Army Headquarters.
6. The crimes of murder and grievous bodily harm that
occurred in Barrios Altos and La Cantuta were acts
committed in the execution of those objectives. They
involved the strategy and tactical patterns of special
intelligence operations against terrorist subversion, clearly
illegal and clandestine in nature, that cannot be supported by
the national and international legal systems that they
subordinated systematically or from which they deviated
completely.
7. The crimes of kidnapping against the victims Gorriti and
Dyer also were in response to orders given and/or supported
directly by the defendant for the unlawful control of political
dissidence or criticism of his de facto regime, in a situation of
democratic instability where fundamental rights and
guarantees were disregarded by force.
8. Furthermore, in all of the crimes at issue in this case, the
fungible status of the direct perpetrators as well as their
willingness to execute the act and their lack of any direct or
horizontal relationship to the defendant, confirm his status as
a perpetrator by means, as the central entity with hierarchical
control over the power structure, whose “automatism” he was
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familiar with and could control through his mid-level
commanders.
746. The criminal activity and operations of Barrios Altos and La
Cantuta, and in the basement of the SIE, carried out by the organized
apparatus of power built and energized by the defendant from the
SINA—whose basic executing core with regard to the control of
subversive terrorist organizations was the Colina Special Intelligence
Detachment—were an expression of State criminality against human
rights in clear deviation from and continuous violation of national
and international law. As stated by FARALDO CABANA: “The
objectives of these state organizations that begin to act criminally
coincide with those of the State, but the means used remain
autonomous and differentiated from those provided in the legal
system, as they are criminal in nature. Therefore, it can be asserted
that the organized apparatus of power, which is no longer the State as
a whole but rather a specific State organization (i.e., the State
security forces and agencies, the Armed Forces, the intelligence
services), acts outside the framework of the legal system; this is a
necessary requirement, as we know, for the application of the theory
of control over the organization.[“]
747. Furthermore, in the field of criminology there is no current
substantive inconsistency between the categories of Criminal State
and Dirty War waged by state organizations as the defense asserted
in its oral argument. Moreover, the defense has attempted to
construct a fallacy surrounding the options set forth by FARALDO
CABANA, whose classification with respect to the matter is a mere
criminological option that is neither the sole nor the predominant one
among contemporary approaches to the subject. It is even possible to
observe a distortion of the author’s opinion by the defense counsel,
since in no section of her monograph does the jurist affirm that
Criminal States use the entire State apparatus for acts involving the
extermination of persons.
On the contrary, there is consensus in recognizing that both
demonstrations of criminality and criminological categories stem
from the same etiological source: State Criminality. That is, criminal
behavior created, executed, supported, tolerated or justified at the
highest spheres of state power. They are part of forms of criminality
that, as understood by HASSEMER, materialize only with the
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support of the State. Their features of criminality and neutralization
or impunity, in a macro or micro sense, are the same, and have been
summarized precisely by ZAFFARONI. This author underscores as
such the denial of responsibility, the denial of the harm and the
denial of the victims, the latter being “. . .the most common
neutralization technique in State crimes. The victims were terrorists,
traitors to the nation, they were the real aggressors, the crime of state
was not a crime but rather legitimate and necessary defense, and so
on.[”]
Not in the most notable legal scholarship in the field of criminal
law, nor in international criminal policy on the protection of human
rights, are there qualitative differences between one or another
criminal manifestation of the institutions of state power, as the
defense has also asserted. On the contrary, the same concepts,
characterizations and strategies of prevention and oversight are
applied to them all.
At the most, it has been maintained, in a strictly academic and not
in a substantive or functional sense, that there are some variations of
degree, whereby both expressions—Criminal State and Dirty War—
carried out by state organizations, can be considered quantitative
modes of the same model of action or modus operandi for the
realization of like objectives and policies that violate human rights
through the murder, kidnapping or disappearance of groups of the
defenseless civilian population. Thus, in the first, the spread of the
criminal acts covers distinct spheres of the State. In the second, on
the other hand, the selective and sector-based criminal activity of
strategic bodies and special operations predominates. Nevertheless,
the clandestine and illegal nature of the plans, the secrecy of the
executors, the undercover control of the operations, the cruelty of the
procedures, the tolerance of the supervisors, the justification of the
means and the official use of mechanisms of impunity in the shaping
of policies and for the communication or execution of the criminal
decisions and orders, are shared and are common to both forms of
state criminality. Accordingly, criminal responsibility is assigned to
them under both national and international criminal law. FARALDO
CABANA, in this respect, notes that “. . .these actions of State
bodies that entail the perverse use of the state apparatus in the service
of the systematic and organized violation of human rights are also
the subject of international law and international criminal law when
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they are consistent with crimes against humanity. This occurs when
the commission of crimes against basic legally protected individual
rights such as life, liberty, dignity or physical safety, is combined
with the objective of destroying in an organized and systematic
fashion an identifiable group within the population, with the
tolerance or participation of the de jure or de facto political
authority.[“]
748. Therefore, if the murders of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, as
well as the kidnappings in the SIE basement, were carried out with
the imposition of the defendant’s dominant will upon the organized
power structure, and with a modus operandi that is typical, at least,
of the second of those previously described expressions of state
criminality, the indirect perpetration of those acts is entirely
attributable to defendant Fujimori Fujimori. This is recognized in the
very same theoretical option invoked by the defense, that is,
FARALDO CABANA: “Also admissible is perpetration by means of
control of the organization in cases in which certain state
organizations, following instructions that come from the highest
institutions of the State, begin to use criminal means to achieve
political objectives pursued by the State as a whole or by the group
(political, military) that dominates it at the time, such as the
elimination of terrorist guerrilla movements or political dissidence.”
Furthermore, according to the same theoretical source, international
experience, particularly in Latin America, demonstrates that: “it is
characteristic of the operations of the state organizations that
undertake a dirty war to cover up and conceal their criminal methods
from third parties. We have seen how the Argentine tribunals
highlighted the schizophrenic behavior of the State during the
Argentine military dictatorship; while part of their organizations had
begun to act criminally, carrying out a dirty war against political
dissidence, the rest continued to conduct themselves normally and
with respect for the law. The same occurred in Chile during the
military dictatorship.[“]
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Chapter IV: Civil Reparations. Determination.
[. . .]
§2. Court decisions and payments made to the victims in the Barrios
Altos and La Cantuta cases.
774. On March [14th, 2001], the IACtHR issued its judgment on
the merits in the Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. It held, pursuant to
the terms of recognition of international responsibility made by the
State, that the State had violated the right to life, the right to humane
treatment, and the right to a fair trial and judicial protection. It also
ordered, in pertinent part, that the reparations would be determined
by mutual agreement among the respondent State, the InterAmerican Commission and the victims, their next of kin or their
legal representatives.
On November [30th, 2001], the IACtHR rendered its judgment on
reparations, approving the agreement on reparations of August
[22nd, 2001], entered into between the Peruvian State and the
victims, their next of kin and their legal representatives. The
agreement included the payment of one hundred and seventy-five
thousand U.S. dollars (US $175,000.00) to each one of the surviving
victims and for each one of the deceased victims (with the exception
of Máximo León León, in which case the amount was two hundred
and fifty thousand U.S. dollars (US $250,000.00)), as well as the
payment of healthcare expenses. It also included the non-pecuniary
reparations of publication of the judgment, a public expression of
apology and the erection of a memorial monument.
775. On November [29th, 2006], the IACtHR issued its judgment
on the merits, costs and reparations in the Case of La Cantuta v.
Peru. It should be noted that the judgment of November [30th,
2007], which interpreted the judgment on the merits, reparations and
costs, did not in essence modify the prior judgment.
A. The IACtHR declared, in accordance with the admission
of the Peruvian State, the international responsibility of the
State for violations of the right to life, the right to humane
treatment and individual liberty, and the right to a fair trial
and judicial protection in relation to its obligation to respect
the rights of the victims.
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B. The decision also ordered the State to: i) take the
necessary actions to effectively conduct and complete, within
a reasonable time, the ongoing investigations and the criminal
proceedings pending in the domestic courts; ii) search for and
locate the mortal remains of specific victims; iii) publicly
acknowledge its liability; iv) include the victims in the
memorial monument named “El Ojo que Llora” (The Crying
Eye); v) publish the partial acknowledgement; provide health
care services and specialized treatment to the relatives of the
victims; and vi) implement permanent human rights-oriented
programs for the members of the security forces and judges.
C. The Court further ordered [. . .].122
[. . .]
777. Consequent to the decisions of the IACtHR, the Peruvian
State complied in paying the compensation to the victims in the
Barrios Altos Case, as reflected in the information forwarded by the
executive secretary of the National Human Rights Council at pages
twenty-three thousand seventy-five to twenty-three thousand three
hundred and twenty-eight and at page sixty-one thousand seven
hundred and seventy-one
With respect to the La Cantuta Case, the information on the
record, contained in official letter No. 2007–2007–JUS/CNDH–SE
of November [15th, 2007], does not reflect the State’s compliance
with payment of the monetary sums, although it must be taken into
account that pursuant to the IACtHR’s judgment in that case the
Peruvian State stated that it had paid three million soles
(S/3,000,000.00) between [1996 and 1998] [paragraph 197]. The last
report of the executive secretary of the National Human Rights
Council, contained in official letter No. 2096–2008–JUS/CNDH–SE,
of last September twenty-second, stated that compliance with the
monetary reparations was still pending. As far as the military
criminal court judgment regarding the case of La Cantuta, the
information in question confirms the payment of the civil
reparations.

122. Refers to the payments to be made to the relatives of the victims.
(Publisher’s note).
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§3. Civil reparations at the national level and the decision of the
international court—Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
778. The Court must decide whether it is proper to issue a
judgment ordering civil reparations to the victims and their next of
kin for the acts perpetrated against them when there is already an
international judgment addressing this same issue [. . .].
779. [. . .] The international responsibility of the State is direct and
principal in nature, just as it arises in terms of the violation of the
Convention rights attributed to the State, while in this case the direct
civil liability for the commission of a crime is assigned to the
perpetrator or participant in the crime, to the extent that he caused
harm.123 In the first case, it is the State that is obligated to provide
reparations; in the second case it is the direct responsibility of the
perpetrator of the crime, as the person who committed it. In
principle, the person who is criminally responsible is also civilly
liable.
780. The victims of the harm to be redressed are the same, the
damages arose from a single unlawful event, and the judgments of
the IACtHR have identified the victims and their relatives and also
determined specific reparations for all of them. Bearing this in mind,
it is not possible for them to receive additional, or double,
compensation. For them to do so would give rise to the unjust
enrichment of the victim, and the IACtHR maintains, with respect to
this matter, that the enrichment or the impoverishment of the victim
or his heirs is unacceptable124 [. . .].
781. The principle that this case law doctrine conveys is clear. A
double payment for damages arising from the commission of a single
act, or rather, an unlawful result that gave rise to compensable
damages, is not possible. Accordingly, it will only be possible to set
monetary damages for those purposes not considered in a prior
judgment, or with respect to individuals not included therein who
deserve compensation. The only exception would be where, for those
items already established—always or exclusively before the
international court, which is at a higher level than the domestic
123. Final Judgment of March 29, 2001, Motion for Nullity No. 412-2001/Lima.
124. Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 2006 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 202 (Nov. 29, 2006) (with precedent in the Goiburú,
Montero Aranguren and Ximenes López judgments).
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court—a lack of reasonableness and/or proportionality is noted in
light of the facts proven.
[. . .]
786. In addition, and in accordance with the doctrine assumed in
paragraph 781, it must be determined whether the civil parties, who
represent twenty-one of the twenty-nine victims of the Barrios Altos
and La Cantuta cases, are entitled to compensation for their activities
conducted in this trial. This would be an issue that was, of course,
not addressed in the international case.
The doctrine established in the case law of the IACtHR (paragraph
243 of the La Cantuta Case) has established—updating, according to
CHIOVENDA, the idea derived from Roman Law—that what is
called “costs and expenses” (which in the new Code of Criminal
Procedure takes on its own importance, and which it is proper to
determine independently) is included within the concept of
reparation. This is because the activity undertaken by the victims for
purposes of obtaining justice entails expenditures that must be
compensated when responsibility is established by means of a
conviction.
[. . .] It is proper to assume this doctrine and therefore to
determine, as part of the civil reparations, a sum of money for the
expenditures that the civil parties have paid out in dealing with this
case.
787. [. . .] Therefore, as it must be established at a reasonable
amount, the total estimated sum—divided proportionately among the
number of victims included in the civil party—shall be twenty
thousand U.S. dollars (US $20,000.00).
788. It should be made clear that these payments must be made by
defendant Fujimori Fujimori as the direct perpetrator of the crimes.125
The State cannot be included because it has neither been served
notice of summons nor been considered expressly as a liable civil
party [Article 100 in fine of the Code of Criminal Procedure].126 It is
125. Final Judgment No. 834-2000/San Martín, of June 9, 2000.
126. It is consistent doctrine, accepted by the Supreme Court, that the civil third
party or liable civil party that has not been summonsed cannot exercise its right of
defense and, consequently, the judgment ordering that it pay civil reparations is
non-binding. SeeDOMINGO GARCÍA RADA, MANUAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL
PENAL, OCTAVA EDICIÓN 106 (EDDILI 1984).
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likewise necessary to bear in mind that the sums paid by the State at
the international level, completely or partially, may be subject to
repetition with respect to the defendant in an independent case,
insofar as he is found to be the indirect perpetrator of the criminal
attacks that were the basis for finding the international responsibility
of the State.
§4. Other reparations claims. The position of the civil party.
789. The civil party [. . .] requested, in addition to the financial
requests already made by the Office of the Attorney General, specific
measures of satisfaction based on the Resolution adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on March [21st, 2006] in its
Sixtieth Period of Sessions, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law.” On this legal basis, it requested as
a measure of satisfaction that an official statement or court decision
be issued to restore the dignity, reputation and rights of the victims
and those persons closely related to them.
790 and 791127
§5. Admissibility of the measures of satisfaction requested.
[. . .]
793. It is possible to assert, from a general perspective, that civil
liability imposes upon the liable party the obligation to restore the
wealth of the affected party to its state prior to the commission of the
punishable offense. The purpose is always to make the most
comprehensive reparation of the harm and to neutralize the effects of
the criminal action, whether potential or actual. From this
perspective, the national legislature has provided three options:
restitution (which is preferred, and is a kind of assertion of the
recovery claim in the criminal case), reparation and compensation.
[. . .]
The Criminal Code links restitution—as a form of restoring the
legal status altered by the criminal act—to reparation when the latter
127. The civil party also requested other measures of satisfaction. (Publisher’s
note).
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is connected to the deprivation of an asset as a result of the criminal
conduct and restitution is not possible. It includes, obviously, the
payment of the damage and deterioration of the asset, which
nevertheless typically constitute compensation; restitution is made in
the payment of the value of the asset in question, and reflects the
magnitude of the harm caused [. . .]
Compensation, on the other hand, is established as a suitable
means of financial compensation for harm to an individual’s rights
regardless of whether the damaged good is a physical thing or
another interest—restitution, in any case, does not prevent
compensation if some detriment has arisen from the crime. Such
damages must be derived directly from the punishable act
(cause/effect relationship), and they must be compensated, except,
clearly, harm to an individual’s rights and pain and suffering, insofar
as they stem unequivocally from the events. There is reasonable
discretion in the court’s decision, but, pursuant to Article 1984 of the
Civil Code, it must correspond to its magnitude and to the harm
caused to the victim or his family. Nevertheless, there is no evidence
on which to establish suitable grounds for compensation in order to
quantify the appropriate compensation with financial criteria, and
therefore the description itself of the crime itself must be borne in
mind. In that case, it is set reasonably based on criteria of equity
[See: Civil Cassation No. 47–1–1998]; Article 1984 of the Civil
Code stipulates that the assessment of non-pecuniary damages—
understood as harm to an individual’s rights and pain and suffering—
is according to their magnitude and the harm caused to the victim or
his family. For this the court must take into account the nature of the
interest harmed in terms of the non-pecuniary nature of the legally
protected interest. Its determination will depend on each case and the
personal conditions that warrant compensation; it should not be
limited to purely mathematical calculations.
Recoverable damages are pecuniary or property damages, and
non-pecuniary damages: harm to an individual’s rights and pain and
suffering. Pecuniary or property damages include damage to things
and physical injuries, that is, the harm caused to economic rights,
which must be redressed [the crime of bodily harm, for example,
includes healthcare expenses, disability from employment, the
discomfort, pain and inconveniences of the injury and curative
treatment, and the consequences of the injuries]. Non-pecuniary
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damages, subdivided into: i) harm to an individual’s rights,
understood as the harm caused to the basic or non-monetary rights of
persons—harm or damage to a right, a benefit or interest of the
person as such; and ii) pain and suffering, understood as the mental
grief and suffering—which includes anxiety, distress and physical
suffering—experienced by the victim and which is short-lived and
not lasting, as defined by the Italian Constitutional Court in its
Judgment No. 148 of July [14th, 1986].
[. . .]
Furthermore, indirect or consequential damages and lost wages
must be included within pecuniary damages; strictly speaking, they
are two categories of pecuniary damages. Consequential damages are
understood as financial damage and physical or mental personal
injury, with or without financial repercussions. Lost wages are
understood as the absence of earnings that the victim reasonably
would have produced; this, obviously, is hypothetical, that is, it
assumes a probabilistic reading of how events would have unfolded
but for the intervention of the crime at issue. With regard to the heirs
(which is the case of most of the civil plaintiffs) the compensation
can be broken down, following the Spanish case law, into three
components: (1) healthcare and funeral costs, which provide a secure
evidentiary base; (2) economic hardship, if they depended financially
on the deceased, determined based on support allowances and the
loss of financial care; and (3) pain and suffering, which is intrinsic
and need not be proven.
794. In En Banc Decision No. 6–2006/CJ–116, of October [13th,
2006] (paragraph eight), the Supreme Court, in this same vein,
established that civil damages must be understood as those negative
effects derived from the harm caused to a protected interest, which
can give rise to (1) pecuniary damages, consisting of a harm to rights
of an economic nature, which must be redressed, based on the
reduction of the net assets of the victim and on the non-increase of
the victim’s net assets or net worth of the earnings that he has
stopped receiving (reduction of net assets); as well as to (2) nonpecuniary damages, limited to harm caused to the (non-monetary)
rights or legitimate basic interests of individuals as well as entities;
this is where intangible assets of the victim’s, which do not have any
financial implications, are affected.
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795. The case law of the Criminal Chambers of the Supreme Court
has consistently held that civil reparations have a scope of definition
or extent that refers specifically to economic redress. The request
put forward in the civil claim in the national criminal case, in the vast
majority of cases, asserts that a conviction must entail, among other
things, certain positive obligations. Article 93 of the Criminal Code
establishes specifically that the purpose of civil reparations is the
restoration of the asset or, if that is not possible, the payment of its
value, and the compensation of damages. In cases of crimes such as
those in the instant case, which are not crimes against property,
neither restitution nor reparation is admissible, insofar as they
correlate only to a person’s net assets [the reparation of the harm
consists of making a monetary payment in view of the asset that it is
not possible to restore]; rather, it is compensation, which means to
order the payment of an amount of money sufficient to cover all of
the harm caused by the criminal offense.
796. The civil party, however, without denying the validity of the
compensation measures included in our domestic law, considers that
the scope of the reparation includes other measures in addition to
compensation and restitution: measures of satisfaction, rehabilitation
and non-repetition, contained in international human rights law. To
this end, as specified in paragraphs 784 to 786, the assertion is based
on the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on March [21st, 2006] in its Sixtieth Period of Sessions, 128
“Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law.”
That Resolution, in its second whereas clause, recommends that
the States take the Basic Principles and Guidelines into account,
promote respect thereof and bring them to the attention of, among
others, the members of the judiciary. The Preamble of the Basic
Principles and Guidelines recalls various provisions found in
international instruments that recognize the right to a remedy for

128. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006).
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victims of violations of international human rights law, including
Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and Articles 68 and 75 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, as well as in regional international human rights
provisions, such as Article 25 of the American Convention on
Human Rights. In addition, the Preamble affirms that the Basic
Principles and Guidelines apply to gross violations of international
human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian
law which, by their very grave nature, constitute an affront to human
dignity. It also underscores that the clauses it contains specify
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the
implementation of existing legal obligations under international
human rights law and international humanitarian law.
Section IX of the Basic Principles and Guidelines addresses
“reparation for harm suffered.” Principle eighteen establishes that in
accordance with domestic law and international law, victims shall be
provided with full and effective reparation, as appropriate, in five
forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and
guarantees of non-repetition. Restitution, which has a broader
meaning than that provided under domestic law, includes, as
appropriate, restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights,
identity, family life and citizenship, return to one’s place of
residence, restoration of employment and return of property
(principle nineteen). Compensation, which has an aspect that might
be compared to our domestic law, includes any economically
assessable damage (principle twenty). Rehabilitation includes
medical and psychological care, as well as legal and social services
(principle twenty-one). Satisfaction, not provided for under our
national law, includes various measures such as verification of the
facts and full and public disclosure of the truth, a judicial decision
restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim and
of persons closely connected with the victim, and a public apology
(principle twenty-three). Guarantees of non-repetition—also not
part of our national law—should include, among other measures,
reviewing and reforming laws, educating and training public
servants, and strengthening the independence of the judiciary
(principle twenty-three).
[. . .]
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798. The reparations measures ordered by the IACtHR are based
on Article 63.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights and
on the Court’s interpretation of the theory of international
responsibility, whereby it establishes reparations measures that tend
to erase the effects of the violations committed. Within this
framework provided by the Convention, specific reparations
measures are developed for the regional protection system; they seek
to overcome obstacles to the effective reparation of damages
sustained by the victims, as well as to address the need to provide an
answer that facilitates the decision of the case at hand.129 The
IACtHR, to the extent possible, orders full restitution to the situation
that existed prior to the commission of the violation (restitutio in
integrum);130 and if that is not feasible in whole or in part, other
measures are taken to guarantee rights, redress the consequences and
compensate the damages, as well as to ensure the non-repetition of
harmful acts similar to the ones that occurred in the case.131
799. In principle, the Court accepts the primacy of international
human rights law as the basic support for its decision in this area.
The standards found therein are binding, and are directly and
immediately enforceable, insofar as they contain standards more
favorable to the fundamental rights of the individual than those set
forth in the Constitution.132 As such, it is proper to integrate these
provisions—based on their own terms—into the domestic system, as
well as to apply the case law of the IACtHR to decide, in pertinent
part, the conflicts of interest expressed at the national level.133 The
129. Case of the 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, ¶ 221 (July 5, 2004).
130. Case of Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, ¶ 236 (Nov. 25, 2003).
131. Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objection,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 99, ¶ 150 (June 7,
2003). Viviana Krsticevic, Reflexiones sobre la ejecución de las decisiones del
sistema interamericano de protección de derechos humanos in CEJIL:
IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE LAS DECISIONES DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS 24-25 (San Jose 2007).
132. César Landa Implementación de las decisiones del sistema interamericano
de derechos humanos en el ordenamiento constitucional peruano in CEJIL:
IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE LAS DECISIONES DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS 149 (San Jose 2007).
133. Case No. 25/26-2005/PI/TC, ¶ 26, 32, Tribunal Constitucional
[Constitutional Court], Aug. 19, 2009
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interpretive guidelines to the American Convention on Human
Rights and the principles of jurisprudence that come from the
IACtHR, in addition to being an inevitable guide for interpreting the
rights recognized in the Convention, are binding upon this Court.
This doctrine, furthermore, has been noted by the Constitutional
Court in Judgment No. 0217–2002–HC/TC, of April [7th, 2002], and
reaffirmed in Judgment No. 2730–2006– PA/ TC, of July [21st,
2006], paragraph twelve; it has also been emphasized in particular by
the Supreme Court in Binding Final Judgment No. 18–2004, of
November [17th, 2004].
[. . .]
800. Consequently, to the extent that the facts at issue in this case
can be classified as “. . .gross violations of international human rights
law and serious violations of international humanitarian law
constituting crimes under international law. . .” (principle four), the
provisions contained in the Basic Principles and Guidelines shall be
applicable in the national court, especially since they have been
included consistently in the case law of the IACtHR.
§6. Ruling on the merit of the non-pecuniary measures requested by
the civil party.
[. . .]
804. As noted from the comparative analysis of the judgments of
the IACtHR and the previously cited requests for relief, three of
those requests have already been admitted by the IACtHR:
healthcare benefits, the search for the remains of the victims of La
Cantuta and changes in the law—which in the case of the
international decisions are specific, and therefore, controllable.
Furthermore, every judgment that is issued on the scope and
magnitude of the facts, declares them proven and specifies the
established that international human rights treaties not only form part of our legal
system but also have the status of constitutional law. See also Luis Huerta, La
aplicación de jurisprudencia constitucional para el juzgamiento de violaciones de
derechos humanos in LOS CAMINOS DE LA JUSTICIA PENAL Y LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS, INSTITUTO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DE LA PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD
CATÓLICA DEL PERU 109 (Francisco Macedo ed. 2007) (it is up to legal
practitioners to assert the prevalence of the Constitution and human rights treaties
over any other provision of lower hierarchical ranking that is inconsistent with
their meaning).
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harmful result to the victims, in and of itself, is a measure of
reparation. Consequently, the requests concerning the necessity of a
statement that the victims were attacked as a result of the defendant’s
conduct and that there are other indirect victims, in accordance with
the law of damages, are already included. The petition for relief at
page twenty-three thousand four hundred and ninety-three, in general
terms, requests a court decision to restore the dignity, reputation and
rights of the victims and the people closely connected to them.
However, it does not specify the measure and the sense of the
corresponding court decision. It is sufficient, nevertheless, for those
purposes, and as a consequence of the statement of facts proven, to
affirm that there is no evidence whatsoever, beyond an insinuation
made by one of the participants in the events—without any
supporting circumstantial evidence to justify it—that can even
remotely lead to the suspicion that the victims were linked to the
PCP–SL and involved in specific attacks with terrorist objectives.134

134. There is no consistent information whatsoever from police agencies,
intelligence agencies or the Office of the Attorney General—let alone court
judgments—that in any way supports an assertion, even at the level of reasonable
suspicion, that any of the victims of Barrios Altos or La Cantuta were involved in
the two large attacks preceding the acts perpetrated against them, or that they were
members or were linked to the PCP-SL. The statements of the student named
Espinoza Ochoa (tenth session) [which link some of the murdered students to PCPSL proselytizing activities at La Cantuta University, but do not clearly establish
their membership in that terrorist organization] and Army Major Martin Rivas’s
very vague remarks against the victims (at pp. 139 and 165 of the book Ojo por
Ojo by the journalist Jara Flores) to justify the response of the military intelligence
forces to the attack against the Húsares de Junín and the Tarata attack—accusing
them of being part of the PCP-SL apparatus, alleging that the tenement house on
Jirón Huanta and the University Residence were refuges for the activists and
perpetrators of the attacks, and of their modes of criminal operation—have no solid
basis whatsoever. In the eighty-ninth session, PNP Colonel Jiménez Baca not only
questioned the grounds for the reasoning of military intelligence to link the victims
to the PCP-SL but also reported, with respect to the crime of La Cantuta, that a
student from La Cantuta linked to the PCP-SL was arrested some time later and
stated that the victims neither belonged to a Shining Path detachment, nor were
they leaders of that organization. He added that the PCP-SL’s organizational logic
and manner of acting made it infeasible for there to be an open meeting of leaders
and top officials, and also of politically active members of the bodies that were
created, as they were all informed by compartmentalization.
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§7. Civil reparations to the victims Gorriti Ellenbogen and Dyer
Ampudia.
[. . .]
806. [. . .] As far as the non-pecuniary damages (harm to
individual rights and pain and suffering) are concerned, every
arbitrary deprivation of liberty—a legally protected right of the
highest order and of maximum constitutional importance and
protection—of course, caused suffering, anxiety, terror, uncertainty
and helplessness of particular significance, especially in the context
of the interruption of constitutional order or the abusive exercise of
government authority, and carried out by military and intelligence
forces (the victims having been confined at an SIE facility). Clearly,
it is not necessary that the pain and suffering be materialized in
specific pathological or psychological disturbances. That harm, in
view of the proof of the facts, has been sufficiently established. It is
not possible for it to be established through specific evidence, and
therefore it must be inferred from the severity of the fact proven or
from its mental and emotional connotations. The quantification of
such damages, in sum, must be established in accordance with
criteria of equity, bearing in mind the circumstances in which the
facts occurred and unfolded and the personal charcteristics of the
victims [. . .].
In conclusion, for non-pecuniary or non-monetary damages only,
it is proper to set the amount at fifteen thousand U.S. dollars (US
$15,000.00) for each victim.
§8. Specification of the amounts to be paid by the defendant for civil
reparations.
807. [. . .] “Interest shall accrue on the amount of the
compensation from the date on which the harm was caused.” The
interest in question shall accrue from the date of the commission of
the crime (the acts that gave rise to the damage or harm) to the date
of this judgment; it must not be confused with default interest that
runs from the start of a lawsuit. Moreover, as this item is stipulated
as a necessary consequence, the parties need not have referred to it
expressly.
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PART THREE: DECISION
821. Based on these legal grounds, administering justice on behalf
of the Nation and in its best judgment as authorized by Law, having
stated, argued and voted on the issues of fact in a separate section,
the Special Division of the Supreme Court of the Republic
RULES:
822. That the evidentiary issues raised by the defense counsel of
defendant Alberto Fujimori Fujimori under subheadings two
(evidentiary issues), three (video and audio evidence) and four (other
evidentiary arguments) of Chapter I of Part Two of this judgment,
are UNFOUNDED, except for:
I. The objection to the statement of military expert José Luis
García regarding Manual MFA–110–1–EMC, as established in
paragraph 70, is partially admissible.
II. The assessment of the evidentiary issues pertaining to the
pretrial statements specified in paragraphs 72 and 73, which are ruled
inadmissible as evidence in this case; and the audio recording
entitled “Fujimori–Montesinos Dialogue,” consistent with paragraph
153, which is excluded form the evidence.
823. TO CONVICT ALBERTO FUJIMORI FUJIMORI or
KENYA FUJIMORI, whose particulars were specified paragraph 4,
as the indirect perpetrator of the offenses of:
I. Aggravated murder, with the aggravating circumstance of
malice aforethought, against:
1. Luis Antonio León Borja.
2. Luis Alberto Díaz Ascovilca.
3. Alejandro Rosales Alejandro.
4. Máximo León León.
5. Placentina Marcela Chumbipuma Aguirre.
6. Octavio Benigno Huamanyauri Nolasco.
7. Filomeno León León.
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8. Lucio Quispe Huanaco.
9. Tito Ricardo Ramírez Alberto.
10. Teobaldo Ríos Lira.
11. Manuel Isaías Ríos Pérez.
12. Nelly María Rubina Arquiñigo.
13. Odar Mender Sifuentes Núñez.
14. Benedicta Yanque Churo
15. Javier Manuel Ríos Rojas. (BARRIOS ALTOS CASE)
16. Juan Gabriel Mariño Figueroa.
17. Bertila Lozano Torres.
18. Dora Oyague Fierro.
19. Robert Teodoro Espinoza.
20. Marcelino Rosales Cárdenas.
21. Felipe Flores Chipana.
22. Luis Enrique Ortiz Perea.
23. Richard Armando Amaro Cóndor.
24. Heráclides Pablo Meza.
25. Hugo Muñoz Sánchez. (LA CANTUTA CASE)
II. Grievous bodily harm, against:
1. Natividad Condorcahuana Chicaña.
2. Felipe León León.
3. Tomás Livias Ortega.
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4. Alfonso Rodas Alvitres. (BARRIOS ALTOS CASE)
The aforementioned offenses of aggravated murder and
grievous bodily harm are crimes against humanity under
international criminal law.
III. Aggravated kidnapping, with
circumstance of cruel treatment, against:

the

aggravating

1. Gustavo Andrés Gorriti Ellenbogen.
2. Samuel Edward Dyer Ampudia. (SIE BASEMENT
CASE)
824. Accordingly, A TERM OF IMPRISONMENT OF
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IS IMPOSED, to be calculated from
November [7th, 2005], on which date the defendant was arrested in
Chile with a view to extradition, to June [18th, 2006], on which date
he was released on bond, and from September [22nd, 2007], on
which date he was brought before this Court, to its expiration on
February [10th, 2032].
825. The Court ORDERED the following measures in benefit of
the victims, in accordance with the determination set forth in Part
Three, Chapter IV, subheadings 3 to 8 of this judgment:
A. It SET, for purposes of non-pecuniary damages to be paid
to Marcelino Marcos Pablo Meza and Carmen Juana Mariños
Figueroa, siblings of deceased victims Heráclides Pablo Meza
and Juan Gabriel Muñoz Figueroa, respectively, the amount
of sixty-two thousand and four hundred nuevos soles
(S/.62,400.00) each.
B. It ESTABLISHED, for purposes of compensatory
payment the amount of twenty thousand dollars (US
$20,000.00) to the legal heirs of: 1. Luis Antonio León Borja,
2. Alejandro Rosales Alejandro, 3. Máximo León León, 4.
Placentina Marcela Chumbipuma Aguirre, 5. Octavio
Benigno Huamanyauri Nolasco, 6. Manuel Isaías Ríos Pérez,
7. Benedicta Yanque Churo, 8. Javier Manuel Ríos Rojas, 9.
Juan Gabriel Mariño Figueroa. 10. Bertila Lozano Torres, 11.
Dora Oyague Fierro, 12. Robert Teodoro Espinoza, 13. Felipe
Flores Chipana, 14. Luis Enrique Ortiz Perea. 15. Richard
Armando Amaro Cóndor, 16. Heráclides Pablo Meza, and 17.
Hugo Muñoz Sánchez. Likewise, to: 18. Natividad
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Condorcahuana Chicaña, 19. Felipe León León, 20. Tomás
Livias Ortega, and 21. Alfonso Rodas Alvitres. The amount
of sixty-two thousand four hundred nuevos soles
(S/.62,400.00) shall be divided proportionately among the
victims; that is, two thousand nine hundred and seventy-one
nuevos soles and forty-three céntimos (S/.2971.43) to each of
them.
C. It DETERMINED, for purposes of compensation for nonpecuniary damages the amount of forty-six thousand and
eight hundred nuevos soles (S/.46,800.00) to each of the
victims Gustavo Andrés Gorriti Ellenbogen and Samuel
Edward Dyer Ampudia.
D. It SPECIFIED that the three monetary sums shall be paid
by defendant Alberto Fujimori Fujimori personally. Interest
shall accrue on these sums from the date on which the harm
occurred.
826. THE COURT RESOLVED that it is not proper:
1. TO GRANT the twenty-nine victims from the Barrios
Altos and La Cantuta cases—with the exception set forth in
clause (a) of the previous paragraph—compensation for
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, because the issue was
already decided at the international level, and must be
enforced in the legally provided manner and venue.
2. TO ORDER compliance with measures of satisfaction,
rehabilitation and non-repetition requested by the civil party,
because they have already been ordered by the international
court (the IACtHR ordered seven measures in each case in
the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases).
827. Bearing in mind what was established in paragraph 764 of
this judgment, the Court STATES ON RECORD, categorically, that
the twenty-nine victims identified in the Barrios Altos and La
Cantuta cases—whose names are listed in paragraph 783, I and II, of
the judgment—were neither linked to the terrorist actions of the
PCP–SL, nor were they members of that criminal organization.
828. It is ORDERED that charges be brought: (i) against Alberto
Augusto Pinto Cárdenas, Vladimiro Montesinos Torres and Nicolás
de Bari Hermoza Ríos for the offense of aggravated kidnapping
committed against Gustavo Andrés Gorriti Ellenbogen; (ii) against
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Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos for the offense of rebellion against the
State; and (iii) against Willy Chirinos Chirinos for the offense of
perjury against the State. Consequently, IT IS ORDERED that the
respective case file be opened with copies of this judgment and the
case records cited in Part Three, Chapter V, subheadings 2 and 3, and
that they be sent to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor with
proper jurisdiction for the appropriate legal purposes.
829. The Court has ISSUED the respective investigation request
to the Office of the Attorney General in order for it to take the
appropriate steps to follow up on the DNA analysis sent to London to
determine the identity of the victims in the La Cantuta case.
830. It is ORDERED that once this judgment has become final, it
shall be recorded in the respective Registry; the notarial certified
copies and notices of conviction shall be forwarded, and, thereafter,
the case record shall be sent back to the original court for the
appropriate legal purposes. Notice shall be given at a public hearing
and entered into the record where appropriate.
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